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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

WENDELL E. BRUMLEY, et al.,

]

Plaintiffs/Cross-Appellants,
. Appeal No- 91-0242
vs•
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
et al.,

]
]

Priority No. 11

Defendants/Appellants•
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant
to Utah Code Ann- § 59-1-608 (1987), section 5 of Article VIII of
the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1991
Supp.), and Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE 1. The District Court erred in defining
Plaintiff Class. The Class is overbroad to the extent that it
includes persons receiving federal retirement benefits for the
year 1984; it includes persons who failed to pay under protest
for the years 1985 through 1987; it includes persons barred by
the six month statute of limitation; and it includes military
retirees who do not receive pension income.
Standard

of Reviews

This Court will reverse a

trial court decision on class certification "when it is shown

-1-

that the trial court misapplied the law or abused its discretion.
. • . " Call v. West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986).
ISSUE 2. The District Court erred in denying
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss because Plaintiffs failed to
exhaust administrative remedies; It further erred in granting
injunctive relief without findings of fact and conclusions of law
and in violation of the Tax Injunction Act.
Standard

of Rexriewz

review is correction of error.

Dismissal.

The standard of

The ruling by a trial court on

"the propriety of a 12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law . . .
the trial court's ruling [is given] no deference and [the court
will] review it under a correctness standard." St. Benedict's
Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991).
The reviewing court must construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the Plaintiff and resolve all inferences in its
favor in reviewing the ruling on a motion to dismiss. Arrow
Indus, v. Zions First National Bank, 767 P.2d 935f 936 (Utah
19 88).

Injunction.

The reviewing Court reviews the District

Court's decision in granting the injunction to determine if it
has abused its discretion, or if its judgment is clearly against
the weight of the evidence.

See Systems Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon,

669 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1983) (citing John v. Ward, 451 P.2d 182,
188 (Okla. 1976)).
ISSUE 3. The District Court erred in granting
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and ruling, without
precedent, that State and Federal law mandate income tax refunds
for all members of the class for the years 1985 through 1988.

-2-

Standard

of

Reviewz

When reviewing a ruling on

motion for summary judgment, the Court should determine "whether
there is a genuine issue of material fact and, if there is not,
whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law* . • ."

Arrow Indus, v. Zions First National Bank, 767 P.2d

935, 937 (Utah 1988).

The reviewing Court should view the facts

and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to the lowing party.

Hamblin v. City of Clearfield, 7 95 P.2d

1133 (Utah 1990) .
ISSUE 4. The District Court erred in crafting a remedy
that is overbroad and overinclusive.
Standard

of Review:

reviewed for correctness.

This is a question of law

Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757,

759 (Utah 1990).
ISSUE 5. The District Court erred in not allowing
Defendants the prescribed time to file objections to Plaintiffs'
Amended Proposed Findings, Conclusions, and Partial Summary
Judgment and by making findings when ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment that are unsupported by the record.
Standard

of Re\rle*rz

Time for Objection.

a question of law reviewed for correctness.

Ld.

This is

Findings.

The

reviewing court views the evidence in a "light most favorable to
the losing party and affirms only where it appears there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact . . . " D & L Supply v.
Saurini, 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989).
ISSUE 6. The District Court erred in awarding
Plaintiffs attorney fees and reimbursement for tax return
preparation.
-3-

Standard

of Revievz

Attorney Fees.

"[W]here

attorney fees are awarded to a prevailing party on summary
judgment, the undisputed, material facts must establish, as a
matter of law, (1) the parties are entitled to the award and (2)
the amount awarded is reasonable.

Taylor v. Estate of Taylor,

770 P.2d 163, 169 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citation omitted).
Costs.

Whether Plaintiffs should have received reimbursement for

tax return preparation and court costs is a conclusion of law.
Conclusions of law are given no deference, but are reviewed for
correctness.

Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah

1990) .

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-301 (Supp. 1989).

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31 (1987).

3.

Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-504(2).

4.

Utah Rule Civ. P. 54.

5.

Utah Rule Civ. P. 52.

6.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-704 (1987).

7.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) (Supp. 1991 and
1987) .

8.

4 U.S.C. § 111.

-4-

STATEMENT OF CASE
1.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This appeal is from a District Court order.
20.)

(R. 1119-

On November 7, 1991, this Court found that the District

Court order was not final, but accepted the case as an
interlocutory appeal-

The order grants summary judgment for

Plaintiffs in a tax refund action pursuant to state law, and
denies summary judgment for the Defendants.
refund action is based on 4 U.S.C. § 111.
2.

The Plaintiffs' tax
(R. 1156 tr. 6.)

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

In Davis v. Michigan, 489 U.S. 803 (1989), the Supreme
Court held that the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental
tax immunity embodied in 4 U.S.C. § 111 required that the State
of Michigan treat federal and state retirement income the same
for state income tax purposes.

Prior to this decision, Michigan,

and many other states, allowed a tax exemption for state
retirement pensions but not for federal retirement pensions.
The Supreme Court did not decide the question of
retroactive application of its Davis decision because the State
of Michigan had conceded that a tax refund would be provided to
Mr. Davis*
On June 9, 1989, a number of Plaintiffs ("Plaintiffs")
filed a complaint in the Third Judicial District Court, in and
for Salt Lake County, against the Utah State Tax Commission and
various named officers of the Tax Commission ("Defendants"),
-5-

seeking a refund for all taxes paid on retirement benefits
received from federal sources for tax years 1984-1988-

The

complaint alleged that the Defendants were in violation of a
variety of federal and state statutes and court decisions.
On November 8, 19 89, the case was reassigned to the
Honorable David S. Young, District Judge of the Tax Division of
the Third Judicial District Court.
On October 10, 1989, Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint.

Defendants argued (1) lack of

subject matter jurisdiction; (2) failure to exhaust
administrative remedies; (3) governmental immunity; and (4)
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
On January 29, 1990, Plaintiffs filed a motion to
certify a class consisting of all living persons and estates of
deceased persons who had paid Utah state income tax on federal
retirement pensions for tax years 1984-1988.
On February 20, 1990, the District Court entered an
order denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss except as it related
to Plaintiffs' claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
250.)

(R.

The grounds stated for denying the motion were that the

Court had jurisdiction for the years in question, that Plaintiffs
were not required to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14, and that the Utah State Tax
Commission had no procedure for dealing with a class action suit.

-6-

On March 12, 1990f Defendants filed a petition for
permission to appeal from an interlocutory order with the Utah
Supreme Court, (Case 90-0109), seeking review of the District
Court's denial of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss-

Permission to

prosecute that appeal was denied.
On March 23, 1990, the District Court entered an order
certifying a class consisting of all federal retirees and estates
of deceased persons who had paid Utah state income tax on federal
pensions.

(R. 289.)
Further, On March 23, 1990, Plaintiffs filed a motion

to enjoin the Utah State Tax Commission from considering appeals
filed by members of the Plaintiff Class.

(R. 292.)

On June 8, 199 0, the District Court entered an order
against the Utah State Tax Commission enjoining it from
considering appeals filed by members of the Plaintiff Class.
(R.367.)
On September 5, 1990, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment against the Tax Commission for refund of income
taxes.

(R. 395.)

On October 15, 1990, Defendants filed a Cross-

Motion for Summary Judgment.

(R. 616.)

On November 15, 1990, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to
Strike certain of the affidavits submitted by Defendants in
support of Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
803.)

(R.

On December 27, 1990, Defendants filed a Motion to Strike

one of Plaintiffs' affidavits,

(R. 946.)
-7-

On March 4, 1991, a hearing was held on both
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' CrossMotion for Summary Judgment and the respective Motions to Strike.
(R. 1156. ) At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Young ruled
from the bench, and granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment-

(R. 1156 tr. 73.)

Judge Young denied Defendants'

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Id,, tr. 74.)

At the hearing on March 4, 1991, Judge Young granted
Defendants' Motion to Strike from the bench.

Judge Young, also

from the bench, granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike on relevancy
grounds as it related to the affidavits of Mr. Knowlton, Mr.
Christensen, and Mr. Memmott.

(_Id. tr. 75.)

However, Judge

Young subsequently entered an order striking not only the three
affidavits mentioned in the bench ruling as irrelevant, but all
of Defendants' affidavits that were requested stricken by
Plaintiffs.

(R. 1113.)

On April 3, 1991, Defendants filed with the District
Court objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Partial Summary Judgment.

(R. 1087.)

Among the matters contested was that the proposed Order exceeded
the bench ruling made by Judge Young.

(R. 1113.)

Subsequently, Plaintiffs submitted amended proposed
findings and conclusions.

On April 15, 1991, Judge Young made a

minute entry providing that "[t]he court has reviewed the Amended
Proposed Findings, Conclusions and Partial Summary Judgement as
-8-

submitted.
court.
•"

The same are approved to be the final order of the

The Defendants' objections thereto are thus denied. . .

(R. 1110.)
On April 16, 1991, Judge Young signed Plaintiffs'

Amended Proposed Findings, Conclusions and Partial Summary
Judgment.

The Amended Findings, Conclusions and Partial Summary

Judgment were filed with the court clerk on the same day.

At

this time, Defendants had pot had the opportunity to file
objections to Plaintiffs' Amended Proposed Findings, Conclusions,
and Partial Summary Judgment.

Defendants' Objections to

Plaintiffs Amended Proposed Findings, Conclusions and Partial
Summary Judgment were protectively filed on April 18, 1991.

(R.

1143.)
On May 10, 1991, Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal in
the Tax Division of the Third District Court.

(R. 1147.)

On November 7, 19 91, this Court determined that the
District Court's order was not appealable pursuant to rule 54(b),
Utah R. Civ. P.

However, the case was accepted as an

interlocutory appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior to 1989, Utah law provided that retirement
benefits received from the state retirement fund by former state
and local government employees were exempt from state individual
income taxes, while retirement benefits received by all others,
-9-

including former employees of the federal government, were not
exempt.

(See predecessors to current Utah Code Ann. § 49-1-608.)

Prior to March 1989, the legality of this exemption had never
been contested in a Utah administrative or court proceeding.

(R.

701, 707, 713-14, 717, 1031, 1054-55. )
The Utah State Tax Commission believed that it was
acting lawfully in taxing federal retirement income based upon
the laws existing at that time.

(R. 713.)

The State of Utah relied in good faith on the
preferential treatment of state employees as part of a benefit
program for state employees and part of a revenue raising program
for the State.

(R. 701, 707.)

In 1984, Davis, a Michigan resident and former federal
civil service employee, petitioned the Michigan Department of
Treasury for a refund of state taxes paid on his federal
retirement benefits.

He argued that Michigan's inconsistent tax

treatment of state and federal retirement benefits violated 4
U.S.C. § 111 (Section 111). This petition was denied by the
Michigan Department of Treasury.

Davis brought suit in the

Michigan Court of Claims; it denied relief.

Davis, 489 U.S. at

807.
The case was appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Asserting the longstanding view that retired federal workers are
not employees of the United States, it ruled that Michigan's tax
system did not contravene Section 111, holding that the statute
-10-

only applied to current federal employees.

The Michigan Court

also held that the tax did not discriminate against the federal
government since the exemption was rationally related to the
legitimate state objective of attracting and retaining qualified
employees.

Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 408 N.W.2d 433

(Mich. 1987).

The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.

Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 412 N.W.2d 22 (Mich. 1987).
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity
embodied in Section 111 required Michigan to treat federal and
state retirement income the same for state income tax purposes.
Davis, 489 U.S. at 808-814.
Prior to the decision in Davis v. Michigan, 489 U.S.
803 (1989), the Utah Legislature had been advised by its legal
counsel that state pension and taxation issues were issues of
state's rights and not federal questions.

(R. 720.)

As a result of the decision in the Davis case, in the
fall of 1989, the Governor of Utah called a special session of
the legislature to amend both Utah's retirement act and the state
individual income tax act dealing with state income tax basis and
rates, and additions and subtractions to federal individual
income tax.

The legislature met in special session and passed

legislation bringing Utah's laws into compliance with the Davis
decision.

(R, 701, 707.)
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All federal, state, local, and private retirement
income is now treated identically, except as provided under IRS
regulations and/or federal statutes.

(R. 713.)

Prior to the special session, a complaint was filed by
a number of named Plaintiffs ("Named Plaintiffs") in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, against the
Utah State Tax Commission and various named officers of the Tax
Commission ("Defendants"), seeking a refund for all taxes paid on
federal retirement benefits received from federal sources for tax
years 1984 through 1988.

This complaint alleged that the

Defendants were in violation of a variety of federal and state
statutes and court decisions.
At the time the action was filed, it was estimated that
if Plaintiffs prevailed, approximately $99,944,000 in taxes paid
and $37,206,000 in accumulated interest, totalling $137,150,000,
must be refunded to U.S. Government and military retirees.
724.)

(R.

Interest on the potential income tax refund accumulates at

approximately $750,000 a month.

(R. 724.)

Plaintiffs stipulated

below that they could not prevail on any cause of action for the
1984 year.

(R. 1156 tr. 8.)

The potential refund is now

estimated to be approximately $104 million.

(R. 725.)

This is

in contrast to $8.3 million, which is the "best estimate benefit"
received by state retirees for the years 1985-1988.
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(R. 1059.)

The relief requested in this case could seriously
impact the state's budget, requiring program reductions, tax
increases, or both-

(R. 702, 708.)

State revenue projections have been characterized in
the following manner.
Revenue forecasts for the next five years
indicate that the state revenues will not
keep pace with the state's budgetary needs
due to tax policy changes, expenditures for
federally-mandated human services, and
critical law enforcement and educational
needs. . . .
(R. 702, 708.)

The extraordinary relief sought by Plaintiffs

could cause great financial harm to the state and its citizens.
(R. 702, 708.)

The current services expenditure approach

developed by the Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst shows
that the state will incur budget deficits in each year from 1992
through 1996.

(R. 728.)

The combined deficit for the years 1992

through 1996 is projected to be $196 million.

Id.

The taxes paid by federal retirees for tax years 198519 88 have been expended by the state in appropriations and are no
longer available for refunds.

(R. 702, 708.)

Under the current

taxing system, the relief sought will result in insufficient
funds for the state's budgeted needs. (R. 702, 708.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Iv
Class-

The District Court erred in defining Plaintiff

Plaintiff Class, as defined by the District Court, is
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overbroad.

First, Plaintiffs have conceded that they cannot

prevail under any theory for the year 1984.

Notwithstanding, the

class presently includes persons who received federal benefits or
annuities for 1984.

Second, included in Plaintiff Class are

persons who have failed to pay under protest for the tax years
1985-1987.

Because payment under protest is mandatory under Utah

law for a suit for refund in District Court, these persons were
improperly included within Plaintiff Class.
§ 59-1-301 (Supp. 1989).

See Utah Code Ann.

Third, the class improperly includes

individuals barred by the applicable six month statute of
limitations.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31 (1987).

Finally, the

class includes federal military retirees who do not receive
pension income.
services.

They receive current compensation for reduced

Accordingly, Davis v. Michigan, 489 U.S. 803 (1989)

does not speak to that group.

For the these reasons, this Court

should remand this case to the District Court for a narrower
class definition.
2.

The District Court erred in denying the

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and in granting injunctive relief.
Because Plaintiff Class failed to exhaust administrative remedies
as required by Utah law, the District Court improperly denied
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

Plaintiffs introduced no evidence

that exhaustion of administrative remedies would result in
irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit.

At a

minimum, this Court should find concurrent jurisdiction between
-14-

the Tax Court and the Tax Commission,

Under concurrent

jurisdiction, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies
requiring initial agency review.
The District Court erred in entering an order enjoining
the Tax Commission from proceeding administratively on refund
claims filed by individual class members.

First, the Court is

without jurisdiction to enjoin the Commission from hearing tax
refund cases pursuant to the Tax Injunction Act.

Second, the

District Court failed to make the requisite findings supporting
its injunction.

Hence, the Court's order should be remanded for

such findings.
3.

Neither Utah nor Federal law mandate refunds to

Plaintiff Class.

The District Court could not have concluded

from state statutes or cases prior to the Davis decision that
Utah's taxing scheme was illegal or unconstitutional.

In fact,

no Utah case law had ever addressed those issues involved in
Davis.

Accordingly, in the absence of any state statutory or

precedential guidance on the issue, the District Court erred by
not turning to and applying appropriate federal law.
Further, federal law does not require refunds. The
Davis decision did not mandate refunds; it only required equal
treatment.

Furthermore, the seminal case in determining whether

a Supreme Court decision has retroactive application is Chevron
Oil Co, v, Huson, 404 U,S. 97 (1971).
Davis be applied prospectively only.
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That case requires that
In Chevron, the Supreme

Court set forth three factors to be considered in determining
whether a judicial decision should operate prospectively only.

A

decision will operate only prospectively:
(1)

if it establishes a new principle of law by

overruling clear past precedent by deciding an issue of
first impression whose resolution was not clearly
foreshadowed;
(2)

if prospective only application will not retard

the operation of the rule in question; and
(3)

if retroactive application would result in

inequity, injustice or hardship.
Davis clearly established a new principle of law.
Application of the Davis rule prospectively will not retard the
operation of the rule that federal employees' pensions receive
equal tax treatment.

Retroactive application of the Davis

decision will result in inequity, injustice, and hardship to the
state.

Therefore the decision should be applied prospectively

only.
Further, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in
American Trucking Ass'n v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2335 (1990)
"the prospective application of a new principle of law begins on
the date of the decision announcing the principle."

Accordingly,

because the Davis Decision has prospective application from March
27, 1989, Plaintiffs' relief is barred for the years 1985-1988.
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4,
overinclusive.

The District Court's remedy is overbroad and
Davis did not mandate refunds for taxes paid by

federal retirees; rather, that case only required equal treatment
of federal and state retirement income for state income tax
purposes.

Accordingly, Utah complied with the Davis decision

when it revised its income tax statute to provide for identical
treatment of state and federal pensioners.
In McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages,
110 S. Ct. 2238 (1990), the Supreme Court set out the minimum
procedural standards that a state remedy must provide to satisfy
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process.

Utah has satisfied these

minimum Due Process requirements by providing both predeprivation
and postdeprivation remedies for those taxpayers contesting
payment of taxes.

Moreover, despite precedential direction to

the contrary, the District Court failed to balance equities in
crafting its remedy.

Hence, the District Court's refund remedy

was inequitable and should be reversed.
5.

The District Court erred in not allowing

Defendants the prescribed time to object to the proposed final
order and by making findings unsupported by the record.
Defendants' prescribed period of time in which to file
objections to Plaintiffs' proposed final order had not lapsed
prior to entry of the order.

Therefore, by signing and entering

the order, the Court deprived Defendants of their right to object
under Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
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Because the Defendants were denied their right to object, the
Amended Findings, Conclusions, and Partial Summary Judgment must
be set aside.
Further, the District Court erred in making findings of
material facts in ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment that are completely unsupported by the record.

Because

the findings were unsupported and therefore technically in
dispute, logically they could not be the basis for the Court's
granting summary judgment.

Accordingly, this Court must remand

for findings consistent with the record.
6-

The District Court erred in awarding Plaintiffs'

attorney fees and court costs and in granting reimbursement to
Plaintiffs for the costs of preparing amended tax returns*

In

order to justify the award of attorney fees, this Court has ruled
that a claim or defense be without merit or not brought in good
faith.

There is no evidence whatsoever that Defendants actions

or defenses are without merit and not brought in good faith.
Because this threshold requirement is not satisfied, attorney
fees assessed against Defendants are not justified.
Similarly, the District Court erred in granting costs
to Plaintiffs for preparing amended returns and court costs.
Utah R. Civ. P. 54 directs that "costs against the state of Utah
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law."

The

District Court failed to articulate any basis in law for
imposition of costs; hence the award should be reversed.
-18-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
INTRODUCTION
THE DISTRICT COURT'S CLASS DEFINITION IS OVERBROAD,
Over Defendants' objections, and without an evidentiary
hearing, the District Court certified the class as:
All persons and the estates of deceased
persons who received federal retirement
benefits or annuities and who have paid Utah
state income tax on their federal retirement
benefits for the 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987
and/or the 1988 tax years,
(R.289.)
As defined by the District Court, the class is
overbroad,

(R. 281-)

There was no finding by the District Court

that there are questions of law or fact common to the class.
class includes persons having claims for 1984.

The

Plaintiffs have

admitted these persons could not prevail under any theory.

The

class includes Plaintiffs who have not paid under protest and
therefore have no proper jurisdictional basis for their claims.
At the time Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Summary Judgment,
they included former full-time military personnel who do not
receive pension income.

These individuals receive current

compensation for reduced services.

The class should have been

limited to those persons who paid their taxes under protest and
therefore brought a timely action in District Court.
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(R. 225.)

It is for those persons only that the District Court has
jurisdiction.
•A;

The Class Definition Is Overbroad Because
Plaintiffs Have Admitted They Cannot Prevail Under
Any Theory For The-1984 Year.

Plaintiffs conceded below that they could not prevail
for the 1984 year under any theory.

(R. 1156 tr. 7-8.)

As the

class is now defined, all persons receiving federal benefits or
annuities for .1984 are included in the class.

However, there is

no theory under which this 1984 group could be included in the
class.

Therefore, this case must be remanded so that the

Plaintiff class can be correctly defined.
B.

The District Court Erred In Including Within The
Class The Tax Years 1985 Through 1987 Because
There Is No Evidence In The Record Showing Payment
Of Tax Under Protest For Those Years.

Plaintiffs conceded below that, M[i]f a class is not
certified, only the named Plaintiffs will have met the six month
statute of limitations to pursue a claim of payment under
protest."

(R. 216.)

Plaintiffs also conceded, "[w]e did not

protest '87, '86, '85, '84 taxes."

(R. 1158 tr. 27.)

The

District Court found that "all of the 1988 participants in this
action, which includes the entire class, shall be deemed to have
paid "under protest" . . . "

(R. 1156 tr. 74.)

This finding was

made even though contrary evidence was in the record.

(R. 561.)

(Charles L. Miller stated in his affidavit in support of
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment: "I protested the
-20-

collection of Utah State income tax on my 1988 federal retirement
income by not paying my 19 88 Utah State income tax."
added)).

(Emphasis

Plaintiff Class claims for years 1985-1987 are

therefore barred, inasmuch as the record is devoid of evidence
showing that Plaintiffs have paid their tax under protest and
brought a suit within the six month limitation period for years
1985-1987.

-21-

Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-301 (Supp. 1989)1 sets forth the
requirement of payment under protest:
In all cases of l e w of taxes, licenses, or
other demands for public revenue which is
deemed unlawful by the party whose property
is taxed, or from whom the tax or license is
demanded or enforced, that party may pay
under protest the tax or license, or any part
deemed unlawful, to the officers designated
and authorized by law to collect the tax or
license; and then the party so paying or a
legal representative may bring an action in
the tax division of the appropriate district
court against the officer to whom the tax or
1

This statute first appeared on the books in Utah in 1898.
See R.S. § 2684 (1898)It was placed among the miscellaneous
taxation provisions, thus making it applicable to all types of
taxes. This is evidenced by the expansiveness of its language.
During the next 80 years, it remained among the miscellaneous
provisions. See C.L. § 2684 (1907); C.L. § 6094 (1917); R.S. § 8011-11(1933); Utah Code Ann. § 80-11-11(1943). Id. at § 59-1111(1977). Then in 1987, as part of a property tax recodification
effort, it was renumbered and placed within the property tax
chapter.
See 1987 Utah Laws Ch. 4 § 260.
It is important to
recognize that the legislative debate accompanying this change gave
no indication that any substantive change had occurred in the
statute. See transcript of S.B. 71, January 16, 1987. (R. 783.)
Thus, by renumbering the statute, the legislature did not intend
substantive changes in it. A court should look to the intent of
the legislature at the time of a statute's enactment and not infer
substantive changes in it, when it is merely moved from one
location in the code to another. See Atlas Corp. v. Tax Comm'n 415
P. 2d 208, 209 (Utah 1966) (it was incorrect for the Tax Commission
to conclude that delinquent occupation taxes for mining could be
collected using tax warrants where the occupation tax provisions
had been moved from their original place in the code and placed
among provisions regarding the assessment of property that allowed
collection by warrant).
In 1988, the section was reenacted and again moved to its
current place in the miscellaneous chapter. See 1988 Utah Laws,
Ch. 3, § 88. The foregoing legislative history makes clear that §
59-1-301 was in existence during the tax years in question, and was
applicable to income tax.
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license was paid, or against the state,
county, municipality, or other taxing entity
on whose behalf it was collected, to recover
the tax or license or any portion of the tax
or license paid under protest,
(Emphasis added,)
In order for Plaintiffs to receive a refund through an
original action in District Court for allegedly illegal taxes,
they must have first paid these taxes under protest.

The

requirements of this statute are mandatory.
The Supreme Court made this clear in State v. District
Court, 102 Utah 290, 115 P.2d 913 (Utah 1941) (overturned on
other grounds in State v. District

Court, 102 Utah 2d 57, 128

P.2d 471 (1942) (hereinafter "District Court II" n . 2

In

District Court, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether the District Court had jurisdiction over the State of
Utah in a tax refund action where state taxes had been paid under
protest and were later declared unconstitutional.
found:

The Court

"payment under protest is a condition precedent to the

recovery of taxes paid to the state."

District Court, 115 P.2d

at 915.
The Utah Supreme Court also addressed this issue in
Shea v. Tax Comm'n, 101 Utah 209, 120 P.2d 274 (Utah 1941).

Shea

On rehearing, the Utah Supreme Court in District Court
11/ 128 P. 2d 471 (Utah 1942), reviewed and overturned State v.
District Court, 115 P. 2d 913 (Utah 1941). However, only on the
procedural issue regarding service of summons was the decision
overturned.
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involved a refund action by a freight line for fuel taxes; the
tax was not paid under protest, and the tax was later declared
unconstitutional by the Court,

Id. at 274-75.

The Court

rejected the taxpayer's refund argument and found that taxes
alleged to be illegal must be paid under protest to be
recoverable:
In cases in which legality or illegality of
tax sought to be recovered by taxpayer
necessarily involves determination of
questions of law calling for exercise of
strictly judicial functions, payments under
protest and compliance with other provisions
of the statutes afford the exclusive remedy,
• . . We are fortified in this position
because there has been upon the statute books
for over forty years a provision similar to
Section 80-11-11, R.S.U. 1933 rthe forerunner
of § 59-1-301] , providing "In all cases of
levy of taxes, licenses or other demands for
public revenue which is deemed unlawful" it
may be paid under protest and suit brought to
recover.
Id. at 275 (emphasis added).

Thus, Plaintiffs must have paid all

contested taxes under protest as a prerequisite to a refund suit.
This has not been done.

Therefore, the relief they seek must be

denied.
Plaintiffs have failed to provide any evidence that
payment under protest was made, except by isolated individuals
for tax year 1988.

No payment under protest and suits for refund

were made until after the Davis decision was handed down in 1989.
As discussed above, protest after payment is not provided for
under Utah law.

Thus, the case must be remanded to the District
-24-

Court with instructions to redefine the class to exclude any
taxpayers who did not pay under protest.
C.

The District Court Erred In Not Barring All
Plaintiff Class Claims For Years 1985-1987
Pursuant To The Statute Of Limitations-

The limitations period for suits for refund of state
taxes that have been paid under protest is governed by Utah Code
Ann, § 78-12-31 (1987).3 It provides:

3

This statute has been in force since 1888, See C.L. §
3147.198 (1888),
The legislature has renumbered the statute;
however, it has never changed the statute so as to affect the Utah
Supreme Court's interpretation of it in State v. District Court,
102 Utah 290, 115 P. 2d 913 (Utah 1941) (discussed supra) . Thus, it
should be presumed that this interpretation is consistent with the
intent of the legislature:
Where the legislature amends a portion of a statute,
leaving other portions unamended, or re-enacts a portion
without change, absent substantial evidence to the
contrary, the legislature is presumed to have been
satisfied with prior judicial constructions of the
unaltered portions of the statute and to have adopted
those constructions as consistent with its own intent,
American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1984); see
also Black Bull Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 547 P.2d 1334, 1335-36
(Utah 1976) .
Thus, under the American Coal Co. rule of statutory
construction, it is presumed that the legislature intended the
six-month limitations period to apply to refund actions against
the state. This was made clear with the Utah Supreme Court's
judicial construction of the statute in District Court, supra.
See also Shea v. State Tax Comm'n, 101 Utah 209, 120 P.2d 274
(Utah 1941) (diesel taxes not paid under protest to the State are
subject to six-month limitations period); State v. District
Court, 102 Utah 290, 115 P. 2d 913 (Utah 1941) (taxes paid under
protest to the State are subject to 6 month limitations period);
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Matson, 64 Utah 214 (1924) (illegal
taxes paid to the Secretary of State in his official capacity are
subject to the six-month limitations provision)•
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Within six months:
an action against an officer . . •:
• ••

(2)

for money paid to any such officer under
protest, or seized by such officer in
his official capacity, as a collector of
taxes, and which, it is claimed, ought
to be refunded.

Payment of taxes falls within the scope of Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-31(2) (1987).

The Utah Supreme Court addressed the

scope of this statute in Ponderosa One Limited Partnership v.
Suburban Sanitary Dist., 738 P.2d 635 (Utah 1987).
In Ponderosa,, the Plaintiff paid a sewer service charge
under protest.
refund.

JEd..

Ld. at 636.

Nine months later it sought a

The sanitary district argued the six-month

limitations period as a defense.

Ld.

The Court rejected that

argument, holding that the sewer service was not a tax and thus a
different limitations period was applicable.

JId. at 637.

However, in reaching that decision, the Court declared that tax
actions properly fall within the six-month period.

Jkk at 638.

As previously stated, Plaintiffs conceded below that
"if a class is not certified, only the named Plaintiffs will have
met the six month statute of limitations to pursue a claim of
payment under protest."

(R. 216.)

Plaintiffs also conceded

"[W]e did not protest '87, '86, '85, '84 taxes."
27.)

(R. 1158 tr.

Plaintiffs have attempted to use payment under protest by a
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few individuals as a basis for jurisdiction for many individuals
who do not have claims:
It is axiomatic that no class action may
proceed on behalf of class members whose
claims are barred by the applicable statute
of limitations. If F,R.Civ,P,23 were
otherwise, it would give the class action
method of litigation the ability to revive
stale claims that could not otherwise be
brought on an individual basis. Viewed in
this light, the applicable statute of
limitations marks the outer boundary for
class membership",
Schmidt v. Interstate Fed, Savings and Loan Ass'n, 74 F.R.D. 423,
428 (U.S.D.C., D.C. 1977).
Hence, the class must be limited to those persons
paying their 1988 taxes under protest and bringing an action in
District Court within six months,
D.

Payment Under Protest And A Short Statute of
Limitations for an Alleged Illegal Tax Meet
Federal Due Process Requirements.

In McKesson Corp, v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages, 110
S. Ct, 2238 (1990), the Supreme Court validated a payment under
protest and short limitations period for the purpose of denying a
refund for a tax later held to be unconstitutional:
[I]n the future, States may avail themselves
of a variety of procedural protections
against any disruptive effects of a tax
scheme's invalidation, such as providing by
statute that refunds will be available to
only those taxpayers paying under protest, or
enforcing relatively short statutes of
limitation applicable to refund actions. See
supra, at 2254, Such procedural measures
would sufficiently protect States' fiscal
security when weighed against their
-27-

obligation to provide meaningful relief for
their unconstitutional taxation.
Id, at 2257 (emphasis added) (In McKesson,, the Court "assume[d]
for present purposes that petitioner satisfied whatever protest
requirements might exist," Jd. at 2243-44, n.4.).

Therefore,

payment under protest and the six-month statute of limitations
meet federal constitutional concerns,
E.

The Rule In Davis Does Not Apply To Federal
Military Retirees; Hence, They Should Not Be
Included In The Class.

The Court in Davis declared the Michigan statute to be
in conflict with federal law because it treated federal civilian
retirees less favorably than state and local retirees when there
was no significant difference between the Michigan state and
local government retirees sufficient to justify the different
treatment.

The Utah Public Employee's Retirement Act, like most

retirement programs, provides for regular retirement at 65 years.
Utah Code Ann. § 49-2-103(6) (1989 and Supp. 1990).

The federal

Civil Service Retirement Act (5 U.S.C. § 8331, et seq.) is
similar, providing for regular retirement at age 62 or 60,
depending on the years of service, and early retirement at age 55
with 30 years of service.
However, the retirement system for regular United
States military personnel is entirely different; rather than
providing deferred compensation, it provides current compensation
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for reduced services/

United States v. Tyler, 105 U. S. 244

(1882). In Costello v. United States, 587 F. 2d 424 (9th Cir.
1978), cert, denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979) , the court held that a
change in plaintiff's pay after retirement did not offend Due
Process, because military retirement pay was pay for continuing
military service, not deferred compensation; and in Watson v.
Watson, 424 F. Supp. 866 (E.D.N.C. 1976), the court held that
retired military pay is remuneration for employment and subject
to garnishment the same as active duty pay.

Most service

personnel may retire after 20 years of service, regardless of
age, which means that many are retired before the age of 40.
See, eg., 10 U.S.C. § 1293; 10 U.S.C. § 3911; 10 U.S.C. § 6323.
In return, retired military personnel remain subject to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. § 802) and must be
prepared for recall at any time (10 U.S.C. § 688).
Because military retirement pay is current
compensation, it is fundamentally different from the Utah State
and local government pensions which were exempted from Utah
In determining whether military retirees are includable
under the Davis ruling, this court must apply federal law.
See
ATA, 110 S.Ct. at 2330 ("whether a constitutional decision of this
Court is retroactive . . . is a matter of federal law.") "[T]he
antecedent choice-of-law question is a federal one where the rule
at issue itself derives from federal law, constitutional or
otherwise."
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S.Ct.
2439, 2443 (1991) (Souter, J. Lead opinion). Hence, the Utah Court
of Appeal's dictum in Greene v. Greene, 751 P. 2d 827 (Utah Ct. App.
1988), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988) (quoting Gardner v.
Gardner, 748 P. 2d 1076 (Utah 1988)) that military retirement is
"deferred compensation" should not be considered.
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income tax during the taxable years in question.

There is no

comparable class of state retirees who have received current pay
for reduced services.

Individuals receiving military retirement

pay, current pay for reduced services, should not be included in
the class with federal civil service retirees receiving current
pay for past services.
This case should be remanded to the District Court with
instructions to issue a narrower class definition on four
grounds:

(1) the class cannot include persons receiving federal

retirement benefits or annuities for the 1984 tax year; (2) the
class cannot include persons who failed to pay their tax under
protest; (3) the class cannot include those persons barred by a
six month statute of limitations; and (4) finally, the class
should not include federal military retirees.

POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN GRANTING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.
K.

Even If the District Court Had Jurisdiction,
Plaintiffs Must First Exhaust Administrative
Remedies.

Defendants moved to dismiss on the basis that
Plaintiffs had not exhausted administrative remedies.

The

District Court found that "requiring the Plaintiffs to exhaust
administrative remedies would result in irreparable harm
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disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring
exhaustion."

(R. 251. ) 5

The policies underlying the exhaustion doctrine are
well articulated in Estate of Friedman v. Pierce County, 768 P.2d
462 (Wash. 1988):
[T]o (1) insure against premature
interruption of the administrative process,
(2) allow the agency to develop the necessary
factual background on which to base a
decision, (3) aljLow the exercise of agency
expertise, (4) provide a more efficient
process and allow the agency to correct its
own mistakes, and (5) insure that individuals
are not encouraged to ignore administrative
procedures by resort to the courts.
Id. at 467 (quoting Orion Corp. v. State, 103 Wash.2d 441, 45657, 693 P.2d 1369 (Wash. 1985)).
The Utah legislature has provided a means whereby the
underlying purpose of the exhaustion doctrine can be met.
Court has affirmed the exhaustion doctrine.

This

The administrative

remedies provided at Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-531 through 535 are
complete, adequate, and speedy.

Plaintiffs failed to show that

"irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit" would
result in requiring adherence to the exhaustion doctrine.
Allowing Plaintiffs to circumvent the statutory and common law
requirements of exhaustion in this case will set a dangerous
precedent.
3

See also Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2)(b) (i ) (no
exhaustion required where it could result in irreparable harm
disproportionate to the public benefit).
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The District Court also held that there was no need to
exhaust administrative remedies because there was no means to
certify a class before the Commission,

(R. 251.)

However, no

class was needed for a plain and speedy resolution of the case.
Declaratory relief was available through the Commission pursuant
to Utah Code Ann, § 63-46b-21 (1989) and Utah Admin, R, 861-15A(Q).

The Commission could have considered the issues in this

case and made a declaratory ruling on the facts before it,
1158 tr, 8.)

(R.

This ruling would then have applied to all

similarly situated persons, thus avoiding the costly and
cumbersome class litigation now before the Court,
Finally, the District Court found that Plaintiffs need
not exhaust administrative remedies because "of indications that
the Utah State Tax Commission has preliminarily decided that
Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 109 S. Ct, 1500 (1989) does
not mandate refunds in Utah,"6

(R. 252,)

The only decision

6

In fact, it appears that a premature decision was made by
the District Court,
The District Court, prior to any legal
arguments on the application of the Davis decision, stated:
It seems to me when a case comes down that
shows that there has been an interpretation
different than the Tax Commission thought
should be applied to, in this case, retirement
funds, and that now makes it likely that the
State Tax Commission should take a different
view and take a different position than it has
previously, it seems to me that the State Tax
Commission, or that the government, ought to
step forward and be the first to say, we've
misunderstood this, we're willing now to apply
it consistent with the decision of the United
-32-

that had been made was made by the Auditing Division of the Tax
Commission.

(R. 1158 tr. 25.)

had never heard the case.

However, the Tax Commissioners

Only they could render a decision on

behalf of the Tax Commission.

No such determination had in fact

been made as Plaintiffs implied.
The policy and legal requirements underlying the
exhaustion doctrine require Plaintiffs to first utilize the
administrative process.
B.

Even If the District Court had Jurisdiction, It
Was Concurrent Jurisdiction. Hence, The Doctrine
of Primary Jurisdiction Vests Jurisdiction in the
Commission.

The Commission does not concede that it shares
jurisdiction with the District Court over this matter.

However,

if this Court finds that the District Court had jurisdiction, it
should find that there is concurrent jurisdiction between the
District Court and the Tax Commission.

Where both an

administrative agency and the court have concurrent jurisdiction
States Supreme Court, and this is the way we
think we'll interpret this decision, and apply
it.
Then there's a beginning point for
everybody to look at.
(R. 1158 tr. 9.)
Why should all of these, potentially 34,000
people, be put in a position that they have to
continue to jump through hoops that may not be
necessary? It seems to me that the government
is playing an ignoble role and the government
should not be playing that.
(R. 1158 tr. 7.)
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over the same matter, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
applies.

This doctrine provides:

"[I]n cases raising issues of

fact not within the conventional experience of judges or cases
requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, the agencies
created by the legislative branch for regulating the subject
matter should first be heard."

Union Pacific R.R. Co. v.

Structural Steel & Forge Co., 344 P.2d 157, 158 (Utah 1959).

The

underlying rationale for this doctrine is "uniformity in
decisions" and "expertise of the agencies."

Id.

The state constitution and statutes specifically
empower the Commission to hear income tax matters, with the
declared intent to promote consistency in tax treatment.

See

Utah Const, art. XIII § 11; see also Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-10-102,
501 to 548 (1987).

This is in accord with the uniformity

rationale of Structural Steel & Forge Co./ supra.
Before any refunds may be given, the Commission must
make a factual determination on whether taxes were paid to the
state by class members, whether payment was made under protest,
whether proper refund procedures were followed, and whether this
was done within the statutory time limits.

The Commission and

its staff possess the requisite skill and expertise to fairly and
efficiently determine these factual matters.
Further, tax assessment questions are under the
jurisdiction of the Commission.

"The Commission shall make the

inquiries, determinations, and assessments of all taxes . • •
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[and chapters that impose] income taxes."
10-527 (1987).

Utah Code Ann. § 59-

This would include a determination by the

Commission of how taxes should be assessed for the tax years
involved in this case.
Further, the Commission has been granted discretion in
examining records of taxpayers to ascertain "the correctness of
any return."

Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-544 (1987).

This would

include the correctness cf a petition for refund.

Because the

Commission has been granted discretion over these matters, the
Court should find that the Commission has jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs argued below that no issues may go before
the Commission because it "cannot rule that the laws of the state
of Utah are illegal or unconstitutional."

(R. 299.)

This Court

in Johnson v. Retirement Bd., 621 P.2d 1234, 1237-8 (Utah 1980)
found: "the mere introduction of a constitutional issue does not
obviate the need for exhaustion of administrative remedies.

As

stated in Public Utilities Comm, v. U.S., 355 U.S. 534, 539-40,
78 S. Ct. at 450, 'if . . . an administrative proceeding might
leave no remnant of the constitutional question, the
administrative remedy plainly should be pursued.'"
The Commission could avoid the constitutional question
by finding that the statute of limitations has expired or that
Davis does not apply retroactively.

These findings would not

exceed the Commission's authority or expertise.
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Hence, the

Commission should not be enjoined from exercising its
jurisdiction.
C.

There Is No Basis For An Extraordinary Writ In
This Case.

The District Court erroneously relied on writ of
mandamus as a basis for jurisdiction.

(R. 1126.)

This Court in

Oqden City Corp. v. Adam, 635 P.2d 70, 71-2 (Utah 1981), stated
that an extraordinary writ will issue only where no other plain,
speedy, or adequate remedy exists.

Such a remedy exists:

Plaintiffs were free to seek refund through the Tax Commission
for refund of taxes.
D.

Before The District Court Could Issue Declaratory
Relief It Must Have Had Jurisdiction.

The District Court erred in holding that it had
jurisdiction pursuant to the authority to issue declaratory
judgments.

(R. 1125.)

Utah Code Ann. § 68-33-1 (1987) sets

forth the power of District Courts to issue a declaratory
judgment:
The District Courts within their respective
jurisdiction shall have power to declare
rights, status, and other legal relations,
whether or not further relief is or could be
claimed. No action or proceeding shall be
open to objection on the ground that a
declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for.
The declaration may be either affirmative or
negative in form and effect; and such
declaration shall have the force and effect
of a final judgment or decree.
Hence, for a District Court to issue a declaratory judgment, the
rights, status, and other legal relations must be within its
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respective jurisdiction.

As set forth above, the District Court

was without jurisdiction to address rights of any of the parties
except for the limited number that had paid their 1988 taxes
under protest.
E.

The District Court Erred In Entering An Order
Enjoining The Utah State Tax Commission From
Proceeding Administratively In Adjudicating
Petitions Filed By Individual Class Members.
1.

The District Court Erred In Not Making
Findings Or Conclusions Supporting Its
Injunction Order.

The District Court failed to make findings supporting
the order enjoining the Utah State Tax Commission from
considering appeals filed by members of the Plaintiff Class.
This Court should remand that decision for the requisite
findings.
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the
facts without a jury or with an advisory
jury, the court shall find the facts
specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in
granting or refusing interlocutory
injunctions the court shall similarly set
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of
law which constitute the grounds of its
action. . . .
(Emphasis added.)
The District Court failed to enter oral or written
findings as the basis for its decision to enjoin the Tax
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Commission from hearings involving the Plaintiff Class or any
members*

(R. 367-368.)

Consequently, Defendants are without

articulable grounds to seek review of the District Court's
decision.

This Court should remand with instructions to make

findings to support the District Court's order.
2*

The Tax Injunction Act Bars The District
Court From Enjoining Commission Proceedings.

The District Court is without jurisdiction to enjoin
the Commission from hearing a tax refund case.

Where a

legislative declaration clearly and unequivocally deprives a
court of jurisdiction, it may not adjudicate although it would
normally have jurisdiction.

See Dimmitt v. City Court of Salt

Lake City, 444 P.2d 461, 463 (Utah 1968).

Utah Code Annotated

§ 59-1-704 (1987) provides:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Parts 5,
6, and 7 of Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, 6, 7,
10, and 12 and the rules promulgated
thereunder, no suit for the purpose of
restraining the assessment or collection of
any tax, penalty, or interest imposed under
Chapter 1, 2, 6, 7, 10, or 12 may be
maintained in any court by any person,
whether or not such person is the person
against whom such tax was assessed.
(2) No suit may be maintained in any court
for the purpose of restraining the assessment
or collection of the amount of the state tax
liability, of a transferee or of a fiduciary
of property of a taxpayer.
None of the exceptions in Chapter 10 apply to this
proceeding.

Chapter 10 mentioned in this statute governs

individual income tax.

That is the subject of this proceeding.
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Further, the determination of taxes and tax refunds is an
integral part of the tax assessment and collection process.
Plaintiffs' complaint admits that this action involves tax
assessment and collections.
37, 54, 58, and 67.

See Amended Complaint at II 25, 31,

(R. 81-102.)

This statute specifically

enjoins the Court from restricting the Commission from exercising
jurisdiction over this matter.
POINT III
NEITHER STATE NOR FEDERAL LAW MANDATE REFUNDSThe District Court Ruling.
The Plaintiffs below argued at length that their cause
of action was not based upon the Davis case, but was based upon a
violation of the plain and unambiguous meaning of 4 U.S.C. § 111.
(R. 1156 tr. 6.)

The District Court in its bench ruling found

that Plaintiffs were entitled to a refund under state law,

(R.

1156 tr. 73.) ("the Court finds that the Petitioners are entitled
to a refund under state law. . . - " • ) •

In

the proposed Findings,

Conclusion, and Partial Summary Judgment, drafted by Plaintiffs'
counsel, the bench ruling was stretched to include federal as
well as state grounds,

Defendants noted in their objections to

the proposed Order that the District Court had expressly stated
that its ruling was based on state grounds.

(R. 1091, 1145.)

The Court provided no rationale from the bench whatsoever that it
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was considering any other basis for its ruling.

(R. 1156 tr. 73-

4.)
Yet in the Amended Order, the District Court found a
violation of 4 U.S.C. § 111 as well as a violation of the
doctrine of federal sovereign immunity.

(R. 1129.)

Although the

written ruling adopted by the District Court discusses the
federal retroactivity analysis at length, it blithely suggests
that even without Davis, it would find the State's actions
unlawful and unconstitutional.

(R. 1135.)

The ruling then forges ahead to state that nonetheless,
Davis must be accorded full retroactive effect, in spite of the
fact that under the rubric adopted by the Supreme Court,
prospectivity is appropriate.

For the reasons set forth below,

the District Court erred in its analysis of state and federal law
regarding its interpretation of Section 111 and the effect of the
Davis decision.
A,

Under a State Analysis, the Court Could Not Have
Concluded the State's Taxing Scheme Was Illegal or
Unconstitutional.
1.

State Law prior to Davis.

The District Court could not have concluded from state
statutes or cases prior to the Davis ruling that the State's
taxing scheme was illegal or unconstitutional.

In point of fact,

no state or federal cases had ever construed Section 111 within
the context of those issues raised in Davis.
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The interpretation

of this statute by the Davis Court was, therefore, a matter of
first impression*
The only law on the books prior to the Davis ruling was
the heretofore unchallenged and presumptively valid taxing scheme
now challenged by the Plaintiffs.

This Court examined the Utah

exemption in Christensen v. Tax Comm'n, 591 P.2d 445 (Utah 1979).
Although not dealing with the issue of federal pensioners, the
Court provided a strong basis for reliance under Utah law:
The retirement income in issue here was paid
from the Utah State Employees Retirement
System. Sections 49-1-28 and 49-10-47
specifically exempt this retirement income
from any state, county, or municipal tax of
the State of Utah. The correct construction
of the statutes involved results in the
following interpretation: Retirement
benefits received by a state employee are
exempt from taxation by virtue of the
provisions of U.C.A., 1953, 49-1-28 and 4910-47, thus not subject to section 59-14A-13,
and that the income is not reportable.
Retirement benefits received by any
individual through a pension plan other than
the state retirement system are not exempt.

When the tax reform act was first introduced
to the legislature in 1971 (Senate Bill 108
which was later passed as the 1973 Tax Reform
Act), companion bills were also introduced to
repeal the exemption provisions for state
employees. The companion bills were
defeated, and this indicates a strong intent
on the part of the legislature to continue
the preferential treatment afforded state
employees over other recipients of retirement
income.
Id. at 448-49 (emphasis added).
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Additionally, a significant body of law existed outside
of the State which had considered the issue of federal/state and
state/federal relations involving preferential or discriminatory
treatment*

As discussed above, none of these cases construed

Section 111 in the same context as Davis, but all involved the
issue of differential treatment.

However, viewing these

precedents, ample reason existed for the State to believe that it
could adopt a preference for its employees.

Far from "dictating"

the result in Davis, the cases addressing retirement income had
uniformly upheld the validity of exempting some pension benefits
even though other pension benefits were taxed.7

Utah had every

reason to rely on this longstanding, unchallenged, and widespread
practice.
In Clark v. United States, 691 F.2d. 837 (7th Circuit
1982), the Court concluded that the disparate treatment of
federal and state retirement provisions did not constitute
discriminatory treatment.

In that case, which considers a

challenge to the federal statute providing a cost of living
allowance to federal retirees, the court held that federal
pensioners constituted a legitimate class of similarly situated
7

See, e.g., Huckaba v. Johnson, 573 P.2d 305 (Or. 1977)
(state may discriminate in imposing state income tax on some
federal pensions as opposed to other federal pensions and state
pensions); Butzbach v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 3 N.J. Tax 462
(N.J. Tax Ct. 1981) (state inheritance tax may be imposed on
transfer of private annuity even though public employment annuity
transfer is exempt from same tax); Gritzmacher v. Director, Div. of
Taxation, 2 N.J. Tax 489 (N.J. Tax Ct. 1981) (same result).
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persons distinct from state and private pensioners and to which
"[tjhe United States . . . has special responsibilities and
obligations . . . that it does not have to non-federal retirees."
Id. at 841-42 •

Should the State have concluded from Clark that

only the Federal Government had special responsibilities and
obligations to its employees, but the State did not?
From the State's viewpoint, and apparently from the
viewpoint of the Utah federal retirees, none of whom ever mounted
a legal challenge to the Utah tax system prior to March 28, 1989,
it appeared prior to Davis that, even if Section 111 applied to
federal retirees, the validity of Utah's taxes under the
discrimination component of Section 111 would be tested by the
traditional equal protection standard:
Where taxation is concerned and no specific
federal right, apart from equal protection,
is imperiled, the States have large leeway in
making classifications and drawing lines
which in their judgement produce reasonable
systems of taxation. . . .
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 355, 359 (1973)
(footnote omitted);

see also Carmichael v. Southern Coal

Co.,

301 U.S. 495, 509 (1937) (inequalities which result from singling
out one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitations).

Under traditional equal protection

analysis, the Michigan tax would have been almost certainly
upheld.

Now the District Court, in hindsight, suggests that the
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offending statute was plainly and unambiguously wrong and had
been from its inception in 1947.

(R. 1156 tr. 38.)

In its ruling, the District Court suggests that it is
free to examine Section 111 apart from the impact of Davis and
that it may make its own independent analysis of that section.
The illogical nature of this notion is evident.

What if the

District Court had concluded Utah's future imposition of the
different tax treatment to be valid in the face of the Davis
decision?

Is the District Court so bold as to suggest that it is

free of federal court precedent and may consider this issue in a
vacuum?
The District Court's striking of the affidavits which
went to the heart of the federal analysis demonstrate clearly
that it based its ruling on purely state, not federal grounds.
On state grounds, there was no basis for the District Court's
ruling.

In the absence of any state statutory or precedential

guidance on this issue, the District Court erred by not turning
to and applying the appropriate federal law.
2.

Laches and Waiver.

Under a state analysis, the District Court further
erred in not finding Plaintiffs' claims are barred by laches and
waiver.

(R. 275-6.)
The Utah Supreme Court held in Leaver v. Gross, 610

P.2d 1262 (Utah 1980) that laches is contingent upon the
establishment of two elements: (1) the lack of diligence on the
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part of the Plaintiffs and (2) an injury to the Defendant owing
to such lack of diligence.

Id. at 1264.

Moreover, this same

Court held in Papanikolas Brothers Enter, v. Suqarhouse Shopping
Center Assoc., 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975) that:
[l]aches is not mere delay, but delay that
works a disadvantage to another. To
constitute laches, two elements must be
established: (1) The lack of diligence on the
part of plaintiff; (2) An injury to defendant
owing to such lack of diligence. Although
lapse of time is an essential part of laches,
the length of time must depend on the
circumstances of each case, for the propriety
of refusing a claim is equally predicated
upon the gravity of the prejudice suffered by
defendant and the length of plaintiff's
delay.
Id. at 1260 (footnote omitted).
In reliance on the above mentioned cases, the District
Court should have dismissed Plaintiffs' action as barred by
laches.

The facts in the present action satisfy the laches

requirements.

First, if the statute was clear as held by the

Court there has been a lack of diligence and/or unexplained delay
in Plaintiffs' assertion of their claims.

Plaintiffs below

asserted that Utah's statute allowing for disparate treatment
between state and federal retirees was a clear violation of
4 U.S.C. § 111 on its face.

(R. 1156 tr. 6.)

Yet at the time

Plaintiffs brought this action, this statute had been in place
for over forty years.
unchallenged.

Prior to 1989, the statute was

Below, Plaintiffs' repeatedly stated that they

were cognizant of the inconsistent treatment. (R. 852.)
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If such

treatment was a "clear violation" of 4 U.S.C. 111 Plaintiffs were
obliged to file an action challenging the statute within some
reasonable time of the statute's enactment.

Since they did not,

laches is a bar to their claims now.
Importantly, Plaintiffs' lack of diligence in asserting
their claims has injured the State and its taxpayers.

If

Plaintiffs, based on their alleged knowledge of a violation of
Section 111, had asserted their claims in the early years
following the legislation, the statute now threatened by the
Davis decision could have been reassessed at a much earlier date.
The State and its taxpayers are now subject to a substantially
greater financial injury than if this suit had been commenced
years ago, or immediately following the statute's enactment.
Moreover, laches effectuates a waiver of the claim
against the state: "[t]he defense of laches is a form of waiver,
or if not strictly waiver, conduct of the type which €>quity will
deem sufficient to bar application of a remedy otherwise
available."

Packarski v. Smith, 147 A.2d 176 (Del. Ch. 1958).

Plaintiffs' delay in asserting their claim constitutes
a waiver of that claim.

In Hoffa v. Hough, 30 A. 2d 761 (Md.

1943), the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that "[ejquity will
not aid a claimant who has slept on his right for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, thereby suffering his claim to
become stale and causing prejudice to an adverse party, such
manifest neglect constituting an implied waiver."
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Id. at 763 1

(empha sis added).
For the same reasons, Plaintiffs now should be
precluded from maintaining an action against Defendants.

As

previously stated, the statute was enacted over forty years ago,
and Plaintiffs claim long-term cognizance of its illegality.

It

is fair to conclude that Plaintiffs have "slept on their rights"
during this long period of time, and hence have impliedly waived
the right to bring an action now that would surely prejudice
Defendants,

Accordingly, under state law analysis, Plaintiffs'

claims should have been dismissed based on laches and waiver.
B.

Federal Analysis.

The federal issue before this Court is whether there is
an obligation by the State to provide retroactive relief for an
alleged federal constitutional violation for years 1985-1988.
ATA, 110 S. Ct. at 2330-1 (1990).

This requires the Court to

determine whether the holding of Davis applies retroactively to
mandate that the state provide a remedy for years 1985-1988.
State courts are free to determine the retroactivity of their own
decisions; however, state courts must adhere to Supreme Court
retroactivity decisions when determining whether a decision of
the Supreme Court is retroactive.

ATA, 110 S. Ct. at 2330.

Retroactivity in civil cases is governed by a three-pronged test.
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
Only after it is decided that Davis applies
retroactively using the three pronged test of Chevron must the
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Court consider the constitutional remedial provisions for state
tax refunds as set forth in McKesson, 110 S. Ct. 2238 (1990).
1.

Requirements of the Davis case.

Defendants do not dispute that the Davis interpretation
of 4 U.S.C. § 111 required re-examination of Utah's individual
income tax.

That re-examination has already been undertaken and

completed by the Utah State Legislature.

See Utah Code Ann.

§ 49-1-608 (Supp. 1991) (benefits of state retirees are subject
to state income tax). Plaintiffs' claim for retroactive monetary
relief is another matter entirely.

At the outset, it must be

remembered that the Supreme Court in Davis did not mandate
refunds; it only mandated equal treatment.

Davis held that under

Section 111 a state's tax system cannot provide an exemption for
state retirement income while not providing an exemption for
federal retirement income.

Davis, 489 U.S. at 810.

Any system

which does so may be corrected either by exempting both state and
federal retirement income or by taxing both.

_Ld. at 817-18.

Neither Davis nor Section 111 grants former federal employees a
cause of action for monetary relief.8

Accordingly, Utah, by

amending its statute to provide equal treatment, has completely

8

The Supreme Court's decisions in Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co. , 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989); Dellmoth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397,
2308 (1989); and Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 109 S. Ct.
2304, 2308 (1989), uniformly hold that in order to subject states
to retroactive monetary awards, Congress must manifest its
intention through clear and unambiguous language on the face of the
statute.
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satisfied Section 111 as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Davis.

Federal law compels no further action by the State,
2.

The Chevron Test for Determining Whether a
Court Ruling Operates Prospectively Only.

In Chevron, supra, the Supreme Court set forth three
factors to be considered in determining whether a judicial ruling
should operate prospectively only,

A decision will operate

prospectively only:
(1) if it establishes a new principle of law by
overruling clear past precedent or by deciding an issue of first
impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed;
(2) if prospective only application will not retard the
operation of the rule in question; and
(3) if retroactive application would result in
inequity, injustice or hardship.
a,

Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-107.

Davis Operates Prospectively Only Under the
Chevron Factors.
i. Davis Unquestionably Established a New
Principle of Law.

The first Chevron factor is straightforward.

The

judicial decision must establish a new rule of law either by
overruling clear past precedent "or by deciding an issue of first
impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed."

Id.

There can be no doubt that Davis satisfies this requirement.
When a decision "disrupts a practice long accepted and widely
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relied upon,"9 it constitutes a new rule of law.10

At the time

of the Davis decision at least twenty-three states, more than
one-half of the states that impose an individual income tax, had
statutes similar to the Michigan statute.11

The practice of

exempting state pension income was widespread and in place for
decades.

Indeed, Utah's exemption was first enacted over forty

years ago.

See 1947 Utah Laws Ch. 131, § 13.

Moreover, as the result "was not dictated by precedent
existing at the time" of the decision, it is clearer still that a
new rule of law has been announced.

Teaque v. Lane, 109 S. Ct.

1060, 1070 (1989) (plurality opinion) (emphasis in the original).
9

Milton v. Wainwriqht, 407 U.S. 371, 381-82 n.2 (1972)
(Stewart, J., Dissenting) (quoted with approval in United States v.
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 552 (1982)).
10

See First of McAlester Corp. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n., 7 09
P.2d 1026, 1034 (Okl. 1985) (finding a tax might reasonably be
assumed to be constitutional "based on the longstanding and
widespread practice of various states to which the United States
Supreme Court has not specifically spoken").
11

See Ala. Code §§ 36-27-28 and 40-18-19 (Supp. 1988);
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 43-1022 (Supp. 1988); Ark. Code Ann. § 2651-3026; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-22-104(4)(f) and (g) (Supp. 1988);
Ga. Code Ann. § 48-7-27^a)(4)(A) (Supp. 1988); Iowa Code Ann. §
97A.12 (West 1984); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 74-4923(b) (1985); Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 16.690 (Michie/Bobs-Merrill Supp. 1988); La. R.S.
42545, 47:44.1 (Supp. 1989); Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. § 206.30
(1988); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 21-29-51 and 25-11-129 (1972); Mo. Rev.
Stat. §§ 86.190 and 104.540 (1986); Mont. Code Ann. § 15-30-111(2)
(1987); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 10-11-145 and 22-11-42 (1978); N.Y. Tax
Law § 612(c)(3) (McKinney 1987); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 135-9 (1988);
Okla. Stat. § 68 2358 (1988); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 316.680(1)(c) and
(d) (1987); S.C. Code § 12-7-435(a), (d) and (e) (Supp. 1988); Utah
Code Ann. § 49-1-608 (1989); Va. Code § 58.1-322(C)(3) Supp. 1988);
W.Va. Code § ll-21-12(c) (5) and (6) (Supp. 1988); Wis. Stat. §
71.05(l)(a) (Supp. 1988).
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With respect to Section lllf not a single case dealing with the
issue had cast the slightest doubt on the state tax systems then
in place.

See supra Note 7.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of 4 U.S.C. §

111,12 likewise, could not have been reasonably anticipated.
The Court's interpretation, and thus the ruling in Davis, rested
upon three findings, none of which was foreshadowed, much less
dictated the result in Davis.

The Court found:

(1) Section 111 applies not only to pay or compensation
of current employees of the United States but also to pension
benefits received by previous employees, 489 U.S. 808;
(2) Congress intended that the immunity from
discriminatory state taxation embodied in Section 111 be
coextensive with the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental
tax immunity, id. at 813; and
(3) the proper standard for determining whether the
state tax statute discriminates against federal retirees is a
"significant difference" standard.

JEd. at 815-16.

Each of those findings constitute a departure from prior
interpretations and hence, a new rule of law.
12

4 U.S.C. §111 provides in relevant part:

The United States consents to the taxation of pay or
compensation for personal service as an officer or
employee of the United States . . . by a duly constituted
taxing authority having jurisdiction, if the taxation
does not discriminate against the officer or employee
because of the source of the pay or compensation.
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a)

The holding that the "pay or compensation for
personal service as a officer or employee of
the United States" applies to pension
benefits received by previous employees was a
new rule of law.

The Supreme Court determined that retirement benefits
of former federal employees were within the language of Section
111.

The statute by its terms, applies only to compensation for

service as a federal "employee".

Because the petitioner in Davis

was not a current employee, the statute appeared inapplicable on
its face.

Michigan argued that a federal retiree is no longer an

"employee" of the United States and, therefore, is not covered by
Section 111.

The Supreme Court stated that because retirement

benefits constitute "deferred compensation for past y€>ars of
service rendered to the Government," Mr. Davis received the pay
"as" a federal employee. . . . "
marks in original).

Davis, 489 U.S. 808 (quotation

This statutory construction of Section 111

was not based on precedent but constituted a new rule of law;
indeed, this was the first time Section 111 had been construed in
the context of those issues dealt with in Davis.

The Supreme

Court itself remarked that Congress could have used more precise
language in Section 111.

JId.. at 810.

The Supreme Court cited three Federal Courts of Appeals
decisions to support the conclusion that Section 111 applied
because federal retirement income is a form of deferred
compensation.

Zucker v. United States, 758 F.2d 637 (Fed. Cir.

1985), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 842 (1985); Kizas v. Webster, 707
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F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 1042 (1984);
and Clark v. United States, 691 F.2d 837 (7th Cir. 1982).13
None of these Circuit Court decisions relied upon by the Supreme
Court dictated or clearly foreshadowed the outcome in Davis;
indeed, those cases did not discuss Section 111.
The decisions cited contain no analysis of whether
retirement benefits constitute deferred compensation.

In so

holding in Davis, the Supreme Court established a new rule of
law.

The adoption of this new rule was a necessary prerequisite

to the holding that federal retirees are included within the

In Zucker, plaintiffs argued that because retirement
benefits are deferred compensation they had a property interest in
them which prohibited adjustments to the benefits. While the Court
did not reach the issue, it remarked in dicta that "[t]he
legislative history lends some support to the view that the basic
annuity was intended as deferred compensation." Zucker, supra at
639.
In Kizas, federal employees argued that the Federal Bureau of
Investigations' "special preference" previously accorded its
clerical and support employees when making appointments as Special
Agents
constituted
deferred
compensation
and
thus
vested
contractual rights. Without discussing the deferred compensation
issue, Kizas merely held that federal employees' rights are
determined by statutes and regulations rather than by ordinary
contract principles. Kizas, supra at 535.
In Clark, state and private pensioners challenged the
constitutionality of a federal statute providing cost-of-living
adjustments to federal retirees when state and private retirees
received no such benefit from the federal government. The Seventh
Circuit, without discussion, simply referred to the Civil Service
Retirement system as "a deferred compensation plan." Clark, supra
at 842.
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class protected by Section 111 which led to the invalidation of
Michigan' s statute.1A

lA

Plaintiffs below mistakenly relied on Fitzpatrick v. Tax
Comm'n, 386 P. 2d 896 (Utah 1963) for the assertion that the Tax
Commission has already taken the position that retirement income is
deferred compensation, (R. 840-841).
This case dealt with
retirement benefits from a private contract. 386 P.2d 896, 897.
That case was decided under ordinary contract principles:
Insofar as we have been able to find from our
research, the authorities uniformly hold that
payments pursuant to a contract for personal
services constitute income to the recipient;
and
that
there
is a presumption
that
additional payments provided for in such a
contract are further compensaticn for services
and are, therefore, income.
Id. at 898 (footnote omitted)*
However, that type of analysis does not apply to federal
workers:
[FJederal workers serve by appointment, and
their rights are therefore a matter of "legal
status even where compacts are made."
In
other words, their entitlement to pay and
other
benefits
"must
be
determined
by
reference to the statutes and regulations
governing
[compensation], rather than to
ordinary contract principles."
Kizas, 707 F.2d at 535, footnotes omitted (relied on by the Supreme
Court in its Davis decision). Hence, federal workers are governed
by statutes and regulations, whereas private pensioners, under Utah
law, are governed by ordinary contact principles.
Thus,
defendants' position in Fitzpatrick dealing with a private
pensioner is not inconsistent with their treatment of federal
retirees.
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b)

The holding that the Section 111 immunity
from discriminatory taxation is coextensive
with the constitutional doctrine of
intergovernmental tax immunity was a new rule
of law.

Under traditional Equal Protection analysis, the Utah
statute would not have been threatened,15
The Supreme Court in Davis supported its conclusion
that Michigan's tax scheme should not be analyzed under
established standards for determining whether a state tax is
discriminatory on the basis of another preliminary finding-

The

finding by the Court that Congress intended that the scope of
immunity embodied in Section 111 be coextensive with the
protection afforded by the constitutional doctrine of
intergovernmental immunity is a new rule of law.

Nothing in the

legislative history of Section 111 nor its background would have
alerted Utah to this conclusion of the Supreme Court.
The doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity had its
genesis in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 616, 4 L.Ed. 579
(1819).

After expanding the doctrine to bar federal taxation of

state employees and state taxation of federal employees,16 the
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356,
359 (1973) (footnote omitted); See also Carmichael v. Southern Coal
Co. , 301 U.S. 495, 509 (1937) (inequalities which result from
singling out one particular class for taxation or exemption
infringe no constitutional limitations).
16

See Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, 78 U.S. 113 (1871);
Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435, 41 U.S. 435
(1942).
This expansion of the doctrine was based on the theory
that, because a government employee receives his income under a
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Supreme Court began to retreat from that interpretation.

Thus,

in Helverinq v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938), the Supreme Court
held that the federal government could tax the income of most
state employees, and in Graves v. New York ex r e L O'Keafe, 306
U.S. 466 (1939), that the states could tax the income of federal
employees.

Although the legislative history of Section 111 does

not mention Graves, the proximity in time and the similarity of
issues between Graves and Section 111 led the Supreme Court in
Davis to conclude that Section 111 incorporates the
intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine as embodied in Graves.
It follows, the Davis Court reasoned, that Congress intended the
nondiscrimination clause of Section 111 to be elevated to and
coextensive with the nondiscrimination component of the
constitutional intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine.17
This connection between Section 111 and the
intergovernmental tax immunity clause was determined for the
first time in Davis and was neither dictated nor foreshadowed by
prior precedent.

The Court itself in Davis uses no stronger

language than to say that "it is reasonable to conclude that
contract with the government, a tax on the income of the employee
constitutes a tax on the government itself.
17

The Court apparently did not find it problematical that
the discrimination standard which the Court inferred Congress
intended to be applied, i.e., the "significant difference" standard
set forth in Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Indep. School Dist., 361
U.S. 376 (1960), was not established at the time of the enactment
of Section 111.
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Congress drew upon the constitutional doctrine in defining the
scope of the immunity retained in § 111."

Davis, 489 U.S. at

813,
c)

The holding that whether the state tax
statute discriminates against federal
retirees is determined by a "significant
difference" standard was a new rule of law*

The holding that Section 111 is coextensive with the
intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine was a necessary
preliminary holding to the rejection of the rational basis test.
The holding did not suggest, let alone mandate, the application
of the "significant difference" standard.

The surprising ruling

that the significant difference standard should apply to the
facts presented in Davis was a new rule of law.18
Neither Graves nor the legislative history of Section
111 dictated the discrimination test applied in Davis. Graves
indicated only that a state tax on federal employees would not
violate the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine if the tax
did not create such a burden on the national government as to

The "significant difference" standard applied by the
majority in Davis requires that "[t]he imposition of a heavier tax
burden on [those who deal with one sovereign] than is imposed on
[those who deal with the other] must be justified by significant
differences between the two classes.*' Davis, 489 U.S. 815-16
(citing Phillips, 361 U.S. at 383). The Court held that Michigan
failed to establish that there were significant differences between
a class composed of federal retirees and one composed of state
retirees.
The Court did not consider that the two classes
established under Michigan's statute were (1) state retirees and
(2) all other retirees, federal and private.
•57-

constitute that state's interference in the national government's
performance of its functions,19
The legislative history of Section 111 merely indicates
that a state tax on federal employees does not discriminate if it
is not aimed at and does not threaten the operation of the
federal government.

Thus, the Committee Report states:

To protect the Federal Government against the
unlikely possibility of State and local
taxation of compensation of Federal officers
and employees which is aimed at, or threatens
the efficient operation of, the Federal
Government, the consent [to taxation set
forth in § 111] is expressly confined to
taxation which does not discriminate against
such officers or employees because of the
source of their compensation,
(Emphasis added, ) 2 0
This statement leads to the inescapable conclusion that
the type of discrimination proscribed by Section 111 is that

19

The issue presented in Graves was whether the tax
violated the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity, not
whether the tax discriminated. The Court held that the imposition
by New York of an income tax on the salary of a federal employee
did not violate the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine because
the economic burden of the tax was not "passed on so as to impose
a burden on the national government tantamount to an interference
by one government with the other in the performance of its
functions." Id.. Graves, 306 U,S. at 480-81, While the Court in
Graves describes the tax as non-discriminatory in that it is "laid
on the income of all members of the community," as opposed to the
tax in McCulloch which was imposed solely on the Bank of the United
States, the Court does not discuss discrimination or suggest the
proper standard for determining whether a tax is discriminatory.
Id, at 483-84,
20

See S, Rep, No. 112, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939); H.R,
Rep, No. 26, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
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aimed at or threatening the operation of the federal government.
Under the aimed at or threatening standard, as under the
traditional and established rational basis standard,21 the tax
invalidated in Davis clearly would have been upheld.

When the

Supreme Court in Davis decided to repudiate both of these tests
in this context, it created a new and much stricter rule of law.
There was no precedent indicating that the "significant
difference" test should apply across the board in
intergovernmental tax immunity cases.

In fact, in the most

recent Supreme Court decision considering the constitutionality
of a state tax under the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine,
the discriminatory state tax was upheld.

See United States v.

County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977).22
21

Under this standard, a class of similarly situated
taxpayers may be established.
This class may be treated
differently
if
the different
treatment
bears
a rational
relationship to a legitimate state goal. See Carmichael, 301 U.S.
495, 509. The Court's application of a similarly situated-rational
basis standard would have resulted in upholding the exemption from
taxation for state and local retirement benefits.
See Allied
Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959) (statute which favors
a certain class is not arbitrary if the discrimination is founded
upon a reasonable distinction or difference in state policy);
United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 473 (1958) (proper
standard is whether class defined is "an arbitrary or invidiously
discriminatory one").
22

The Court in County of Fresno noted that the tax was not
imposed solely on federal employees but also on "other similarly
situated constituents of the State." 2d., at 462 (emphasis added).
This level of scrutiny differs greatly from the "significant
difference" standard applied in Davis.
While the tax at issue in County of Fresno was imposed on the
income of private users of both state and federally owned tax
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The decision in County of Fresno is in accord with the
legislative history of Section 111:

so long as the tax is not

aimed at or threatening to the federal government, it does not
violate the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine.

Before

Davis, a state would have been justified in relying on County of
Fresno as a statement of the law on differential treatment in the
area of state taxation of federal employees.

Davis created new

law in this area.
In light of the Court's changed interpretation in these
three aspects of federal law, it is indisputable that Davis was
not clearly foreshadowed, much less dictated.

The first prong of

the Chevron test, therefore, is satisfied.
ii. Prospective Only Application of Davis Will
Not Retard the Operation of the Rule in
Question,
Under the second Chevron factor, the Court must
consider the purpose and effect of the newly announced rule in
order to determine whether prospective only application will
retard its operation.

Chevron, 404 U.S. at 107.

The rule

exempt property, this fact was not the basis for the Supreme
Court's decision. Rather, the basis for the decision was that the
tax did not single out federal employees but was imposed on the
majority of the state's cirizens and that it did not threaten the
operation of the federal government, Icl. at 462, 464. As Justice
Stevens noted in his reliance on County of Fresno in his dissent in
Davis, "[wjhen the tax burden is shared equally by federal agents
and the vast majority of a State's citizens, . . . the
nondiscrimination principle [of intergovernmental tax immunity] is
not applicable and constitutional protection is not necessary."
Davis, 489 U.S. at 803 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
-60-

announced in Davis was that a state may not tax federal
retirement benefits if it exempts state retirement benefits,
unless the state can establish a significant difference between
state and federal retirees-

By amending its statute, Utah has

furthered the rule in question-

No additional action by the

State is needed to accomplish the purpose of the rule.
Moreover, retroactive application clearly is not needed
to discourage the legislature from enacting future statutes that
discriminate against federal employees.

Federal employees are a

significant political force in Utah, fully represented in the
legislature.

There is also no suggestion that the legislature

acted in bad faith more than forty years ago in adopting the
exemption, and its good faith is clearly evidenced by its prompt
repeal of the exemption following the Davis decision.

This was

echoed by the District Court: "I don't think I would indicate to
you that I have any belief that the state acted in bad faith."
(R. 1156 tr. 40.)
Equal treatment is achieved with prospective
application of Davis.
interest whatsoever.

Granting tax refunds does not advance that
Retroactive application of Davis, rather

than advancing the rule there announced, would be "more in the
nature of a punitive award for misconstruing the
constitutionality of the . . . tax."
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National Can Corp., 749

P.2d 1286, 1292 (Wash. 1988).23

No punitive award can be

justified by the facts of this case.
iii. Retroactive Application of the Davis Decision
Would Result in Inequity, Injustice, and
Hardship.
The third Chevron factor requires the Court to consider
the inequity, injustice and hardship imposed by retroactive
application.

JA. at 107. This step in the Chevron analysis

requires a court to balance and weigh various factors, including
the state's justifiable reliance on the constitutionality of the
statute, the relative benefit and harm to result from retroactive
application, and the injustice in providing the benefit to the
litigant.
Defendants justifiably relied on the constitutionality
of the forty plus year old exemption, a variation of which was in
effect in at least twenty-three other states.
supra.

See note 11,

Prior to Davis, Utah simply had no reason to doubt the

validity of the exemption.
This justifiable reliance on the exemption clearly was
a sound basis for the State's reliance on the revenues collected
under the tax system in operation at the time of the Davis
decision.

Those revenues have been budgeted and spent;: any

refunds would come from current or future revenues.

23

This Court

This would be particularly true with those persons
receiving military pension benefits since such persons are members
of a class not under the rule in Davis. See supra p. 10.
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should balance the relative benefit to any individual plaintiff
of an award for refunds against the relative harm to the State
and all her citizens resulting from a decision of retroactive
application of Davis.
The most serious ramification of the retroactive
application of Davis is the obligation to provide refunds to all
federal retirees for the relevant statutory periods at a cost of
nearly $104 million including interest.

(R. 725.)

A liability

of this magnitude would create a financial hardship on the State.
(R. 730.)
Moreover, the hardship attributable to this potential
tax refund liability is compounded by the current fiscal problems
confronting the State.

(R. 700, 706, 730.)

The State's options for dealing with a resource demand
of this magnitude are limited. (See R. 702, 707, 730.)

If the

Court were to require refunds, the magnitude of increased revenue
needs would be staggering.

Such a financial burden most likely

would force reductions across all areas of state government,
including education, aid to needy individuals, aid to localities,
and other essential government services.
Prospectivity is particularly appropriate in the case
now before this Court for additional equitable reasons as well.
Utah's purpose in exempting state and local retirement income was
legitimate —

to enhance state and local retirement benefits, and

thus, to attract employees and to reward state and local civil
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servants, without spending additional state revenues.

The

exemption violated no constitutional restraint of which the
legislature should have been cognizant-

The statutes did not

single out federal retirees for taxation but taxed them as it did
all other non-state retirees-

Any discriminatory effect of the

exemption was unintended, indirect and benign.

No state could

have reasonably predicted that its effort to reward its employees
would be seen as discrimination against former federal employees.
Moreover, from the perspective of equity, Plaintiffs
here are not in a special position.

They are no more or less

economically disadvantaged than thousands of other Utah citizens
who received pension income from private employers and also paid
their Utah individual income taxes.
In sum, Utah can clearly satisfy the third prong of
Chevron.

The State's finances would suffer excessive disruption

from an award of tax refunds.

Such refunds would have to be paid

out of current revenues, such as revenues specifically dedicated
to education, law enforcement or social programs.

The current

state taxpayers -- private, state, and federal retirees —

would

wind up footing the bill in the form of reduced services and/or
higher taxes.

All of the equities support the prospective only

application of Davis.

The State has acted in good faith and with

justifiable reliance from the time it adopted the exemption.
Therefore, as a matter of law, Davis should apply prospectively
only.
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3.

Recent Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court Support
Prospective Only Application of Davis: The ATA and
Beam Cases.
a.

The American Trucking Association Decision

The facts of American Trucking Ass'n v. Smith, 110 S.
Ct. 2323 (1990) (plurality opinion), are analogous to the facts
in this case.

At issue in ATA was a Highway Use Equalization Tax

("HUE") that impermissibly discriminated against out-of-state
truckers.

Following denial of refund by the Arkansas Supreme

Court, the Supreme Court held the decision pending the outcome of
a similar case, American Trucking Ass'n v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266
(1987) ("Scheiner").

In Scheiner, decided June 23, 1987, the

Supreme Court found the tax violated the Commerce Clause; ATA was
remanded to the Arkansas Supreme Court for further consideration
based on the Scheiner decision.

Pending the outcome in ATA,

Justice Blackmun on August 14, 1987, acting as Circuit Justice,
ordered that all Arkansas HUE taxes should be placed in escrow
prior to a decision by the Arkansas Supreme Court.

The Arkansas

Supreme Court invalidated the HUE tax based on the Scheiner
decision, but refused to give any refunds for HUE taxes paid
before Justice Blackmun's escrow order.

The Arkansas Court

applied the three-pronged test of Chevron, supra, to determine
that Scheiner should not be applied retroactively.

At issue in

ATA was whether the Arkansas Supreme Court erred in its
application of the Chevron test.

The Court found that Chevron
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mandated prospective only application except for taxes collected
after the date that the Scheiner decision was handed down.
First, the Court concluded that Scheiner established a
new principle of law.

Id..

ATA, 110 S. Ct. at 2332.

It found

that where a precedent having direct application in a case rests
on reasons rejected in another line of decisions, District Court
should apply that decision until the Supreme Court overrules it.
The Court in ATA found that lower courts should follow the case
which directly controls, leaving to the Supreme Court the
prerogative of overruling its own decisions.

Id.

Thus, although

the precedent which provided the underpinnings for the Scheiner
decision had been called into question, it still retained its
vitality as binding precedent.2A Second, the Court observed that
retroactive application of Scheiner would not deter future
violations of free trade.

It found that there was not "strong

parochial" incentive to commit further violations because the
"HUE tax was entirely consistent with the Aero Mayflower line of
cases and it is not the purpose of the Commerce Clause to prevent
legitimate state taxation of interstate commerce."

ATA, 110 S.

Ct. at 2332 (citations omitted).

u

It is unclear how broadly or narrowly
Supreme Court would interpret this first prong
Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl, 110 S. Ct. 3202, 3204
found that the decision applied retroactively
because it was not like other precedents
"overturned]
a
lengthy
list
of
settled
"revolutionize^] the law of state taxation.").
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the current U.S.
of Chevron.
See
(1990) (the court
in Ashland Oil,
"which arguably
decision"
and

Finally, after carefully considering the equities, the
Court determined that Scheiner should not be applied
retroactively,

ATA, 110 S. Ct. at 2333.

In making this

determination, the Court found:
Where a State can easily foresee the
invalidation of its tax statutes, its
reliance interests may merit little concern,
see McKesson,
U.S., at
, 110 S. Ct, at
2254-2258, 2257. By contrast, because the
State cannot be expected to foresee that a
decision of this Court would overturn
established precedents, the inequity of
unsettling actions taken in reliance on those
precedents is apparent. Although at this
point the burden that the retroactive
application of Scheiner would place on
Arkansas cannot be precisely determined, it
is clear that the invalidation of the State's
HUE tax would have potentially disruptive
consequences for the State and its citizens.
A refund, if required by state or federal
law, could deplete the state treasury, thus
threatening the State's current operations
and future plans. Presumably, under
McKesson, the State would be required to
calculate and refund that portion of the tax
that would be found under Scheiner to
discriminate against interstate commerce,
with the attendant potentially significant
administrative costs that would entail.
ATA, 110 S. Ct. at 2333.

Thus, Scheiner was not applied

retroactively.
On the issue of whether a refund was due from the date
of the Scheiner decision and not the date of Justice Blackmun's
escrow order, the Court held:

"[i]t is, of course a fundamental

tenet of our retroactivity doctrine that the prospective
application of a new principle of law begins on the date of the
-67-

decision announcing the principle. . . ."
added).

Id.

at 2335 (emphasis

The Court found that "the critical event for

prospectivity is 'the occurrence of the underlying transaction,
and not the payment of money therefor, . . .' [citation]."

Id.

at 2336.
i.

Application of ATA to this Case.

ATA reiterated the application of the three-pronged
Chevron test.

As set forth in detail above, the three-pronged

Chevron test dictates prospective only application of the Davis
decision.

The only remaining question is when does the Davis

decision bind the State?

As set forth in ATA, "the prospective

application of a new principle of law begins on the date of the
decision announcing the principle."

J[d_. 110 U.S. 2335.

Thus,

the Davis decision should have prospective application beginning
on March 28, 1989.

This would bar all relief as sought by

Plaintiffs for years 1985-1988.

It is irrelevant that the 1988

income tax filing date was April 17, 1989.

As the Court made

clear, it is "the occurrence of the underlying transaction, and
not the payment of money therefor" that is the critical
determination.

Td. 110 U.S. at 2336.

Hence, the closure of the

tax year on December 31 of a given year is the governing date.
b.
i.

The Beam Decision,
Introduction.

The most recent pronouncement by the Supreme Court, in
the area of retroactivity, was handed down on June 20, 1991.
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James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
The origins of that case are from a 1984 Supreme Court decision.
In 1984, the Supreme Court held in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Diasf
468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984) ("Bacchus"), that a Hawaii tax statute
that distinguished between imported and local alcohol products
violated the Commerce Clause.

Prior to its amendment in 19 85,

Georgia state law imposed a similar tax.

See Ga. Code Ann. § 3-

4-60 (1982).
After the Bacchus decision, James B. Beam Distilling
Co. filed suit in the Georgia trial court alleging that Georgia's
law was likewise inconsistent with the Commerce Clause.

It

sought refunds of the amount paid for the years 1982, 1983 and
1984.

The trial court and the Georgia Supreme Court held that in

light of Bacchus, the Georgia law was unconstitutional for the
years in question.

Using a Chevron analysis, however, the

Georgia Supreme Court refused to apply its ruling retroactively
and thus denied the refund request.
v. State, 382 S.E.2d 95 (1989).

James B. Beam Distilling Co.

On review, the Supreme Court

reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further
proceedings.

Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2448.

Five opinions were written in Beam, none of which
commanded a majority of the Supreme Court.23
25

Three
pending before
decision. They
reconsideration

The lead opinion,

cases similar to the case now before the court were
the U.S. Supreme Court at the time of the Beam
were remanded back to state Courts. A remand and
order means precisely what it says: the court is to
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written by Justice Souter, was joined by only one other Justice,
Justice Stevens-

Justice White wrote a separate concurrence.

Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Scalia —

in two separate

opinions, each joined by the three of them —
separately.

also concurred

There was a dissent written by Justice 0'Conner,

joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy.
ii. Dissenting Opinion by Justice O'Connor,
Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy; Concurring Opinions of Justices
Blackmun, Marshall and Scalia.
An understanding of the Court's fractured vote is best
understood by beginning with the dissent.

Justice 0'Conner

writing for the three dissenters supports the Chevron analysis:

reconsider a decision in light of an intervening precedent which
contains similar issues. The order does not compel the court to
reach a different result. See R. Stern, E. Gressman & S. Shapiro,
Supreme Court Practice 279-80 (6th ed. 1986) see also Bush v.
Lucas, 647 F.2d 573, 575 (5th Cir. 1981), aff 'd, 462 U.S. 367
(19 83) (reconsideration order means that Supreme Court has merely
"flagged" case as one upon which intervening decision may have some
bearing but which Court has not concluded has a material effect;
judgment for defendant). See also Hellman, ''Granted, Vacated and
Remanded": Shedding Light on a Dark Corner of Supreme Court
Practice, 67 Judicature 389 (1984). In a study of 289 cases in
which remand and reconsideration orders were issued, Professor
Hellman found that the lower court affirmed its original ruling in
a substantial number of cases and that few of these judgments were
reversed on further appeal to the Supreme Court. Ld. at 394-95.
(reaffirmed). In fact, had it been the Supreme Court's view that
Beam was controlling in these cases the Supreme Court could have
issued a per curiam opinion, as it did in two cases pending on
petitions for certiorari at the time the Supreme Court decided ATA
in 1990. See National Mines Corp. v. Caryl, 110 S. Ct. 3205 (1990)
(per curiam), and Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl, 110 S. Ct. 3202
(1990) (per curiam) (state court judgments applying Armco Inc. v.
Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984), prospectively-only reversed).
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The equitable analysis of Chevron places
limitations on the liability that may be
imposed on unsuspecting parties after this
Court changes the law. . • . To impose on
Georgia and the other States that reasonably
relied on this Court's established precedent
such extraordinary retroactive liability, at
a time when most States are struggling to
fund even the most basic services, is the
height of unfairness,
111 S. Ct. at 2455.

Because these justices would support

prospectivity only, they without question would not apply Davis
retroactively to this case.
Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Scalia disagree with
the analysis of Justice O'Connor on the choice of law issue.
Their position, staked out in two separate Beam concurrences, is
that the equities cannot be considered because the Supreme Court
lacks the authority to apply its constitutional decisions
prospectively only.

Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Scalia do

not discuss retroactivity as a remedial issue in Beam.
The resulting situation is that six Justices are
equally divided on whether Chevron can be applied to determine if
Davis is retroactive under the federal choice of law issue.

The

critical question on this issue, therefore, is how the other
three Justices will vote when this question is presented to them.
The answer to that question requires a close analysis of Justice
Souter's and Justice White's opinions in Beam.
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iii. Justice Souter's Opinion Announcing the
Judgment of the Courtf Joined by Justice
Stevens.
It is important to note preliminarily that Justice
Souter in Beam, like the four dissenting Justices in ATA,26
distinguishes between retroactivity as a choice of law principle
and retroactivity as a remedial principle,
2446,

ATA, 111 S. Ct. at

Following his distinction between retroactivity as a

choice of law principle and as a remedial principle, Justice
Souter outlines three potential answers to the "choice of law"
issue.

First, the new decision can be purely prospective in

effect, that is, it can apply only to facts arising after the
decision is announced.

Justice Souter cites Chevron as an

example of pure prospectivity.

Chevron served to announce a new

rule of law, but the new rule applied neither to the party before
the Court nor to others who could assert the same claim prior to
the decision.

Second, the new rule can be fully retroactive,

applying to the parties before the Court and to all others who
could assert the same claim.

Third, the new rule can apply

prospectively to some litigants and retroactively to others.
This latter possibility is referred to as "modified, or
selective, prospectivity."
Justice Souter rejects the concept of selective
prospectivity as a choice of law principle in the civil context.
26

Justices
dissented in ATA.

Stevens,

Brennan,
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Marshall,

and

Blackmun

Ill S. Ct. at 2446.

He further concludes that Bacchus by

"implication" applied its new rule to the litigants there before
the Court.

Given that conclusion, and the illegitimacy of

selective prospectivity, it followed to Justice Souter that the
Bacchus rule applied to the litigants in Beam.
The important point to be made about Justice Souter's
opinion is that in the end it addresses, in his own words, only a
"narrow" point.

What he concludes—and all he concludes—is that

selective prospectivity is an illegitimate choice of law outcome.
He does not decide when pure prospectivity might be appropriate.
Nor does he address remedial issues.

Justice Souter's own words

best demonstrate the narrow reach of his opinion:
The grounds for our decision today are
narrow. They are confined entirely to an
issue of choice of law: when the Court has
applied a rule of law to the litigants in one
case it must do so with respect to all others
not barred by procedural requirements or res
judicata. We do net speculate as to the
bounds or propriety of pure prospectivity.
Nor do we speculate about the remedy that may
be appropriate in this case; remedial issues
were neither considered below nor argued to
this Court, save for an effort by petitioner
to buttress its claim by reference to our
decision last term in McKesson. As we have
observed repeatedly, federal "issues of
remedy ... may well be intertwined with, or
their consideration obviated by, issues of
state law." Bacchus, 468 U.S., at 277, 104
S. Ct., at 3058. Nothing we say here
deprives respondent of his opportunity to
raise procedural bars to recovery under state
law or demonstrate reliance interests
entitled to consideration in determining the
nature of the remedy that must be provided, a
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matter with which McKesson did not deal. See
Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S., at 296, 90 S.
Ct. f at 1039 (Harlan, J., concurring); cf.
Lemon, 411 U.S., at 203, 93 S. Ct., at 1471.
Ill S. Ct. at 2448.
iv. Justice White's Opinion Concurring in the
Result.
Justice White in his concurrence agrees that Bacchus
may be read as applying the benefit of the judgment to Bacchus
Imports and agrees that it applies to other litigants whose cases
were not final at the time of the Bacchus decision.
at 2448.

Ill S. Ct.

But Justice White reaffirms his view, as expressed by

Justice O'Connor for the plurality in ATA, that certain decisions
of the Supreme Court will apply prospectively only under a
Chevron analysis.

_Id. at 2449.

Justice White does not discuss

retroactivity as a remedial issue.
v.

Conclusion:

The Meaning of Beam.

The net result of the fractured voting in Be aim is that
only three Justices reject the application of a Chevron analysis
to determine the choice of law in a case such as the one now
before this Court.

Four Justices clearly agree that in the

proper case, based on a Chevron analysis, pure prospectivity is
an appropriate way to reach an equitable resolution of a case
before a court.

Two Justices, while refusing to commit

themselves in Beam, do not reject the application of Chevron.
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None of the Justices reject prospectivity only in the remedial
context,27
vi. Retroactivity of Davis under Beam.
In Beam, Justice Souter's opinion explained that
Bacchus was "fairly read to hold as a choice of law that its rule
should apply retroactively to the litigants then before the
Court."

Ill S. Ct. at 2445-

This conclusion was based on the

terms of the remand order in Bacchus.

Specifically, Bacchus was

remanded for consideration of a defense raised by the state in
that case.

There would have been no need to consider the

defense, Justice Souter reasoned, if it had not already been
implicitly decided that the new law announced by Bacchus applied
to the claim stated by the plaintiffs in that case.

Id.

The Supreme Court made no similar ruling in Davis.

The

question of retroactivity was not at issue in Davis because
Michigan had previously agreed to the payment of a refund to Mr.
Davis if the tax violated federal law.

Specifically, the Court

said in Davis:
For these reasons, we conclude that the
Michigan Income Tax Act violates principles
of intergovernmental tax immunity. . . . The
State having conceded that a refund is
appropriate in these circumstances, see Brief
for Appellee 63, to the extent appellant has
27

Of the three Justices who reject the application of
Chevron to determine the choice of law issue, one, Justice
Marshall, is no longer on the Court.
Moreover, of the two
uncommitted Justices, Justice Stevens has changed his position
since the ATA decision.
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paid taxes pursuant to this invalid tax
scheme, he is entitled to a refund.
489 U.S. at 817.
Thus, the Supreme Court in Davis did not need to
determine whether its decision was to have purely prospective or
fully retroactive effect,

Michigan had taken this issue out of

the case by agreeing to pay refunds whatever the resolution of
that issue, a decision the state was free to make.

For, as

stated by the Supreme Court in McKesson, 110 S. Ct. 2238 (1990),
a state is free to pay refunds under state law even when federal
law would not so require.

JId. at 2240 (stare has power to give a

decision remedial effect greater than that which a federal court
would require cr provide).
The same point can be made another way.

Justice Souter

stated the question in Beam as "whether it is error to refuse to
apply a rule of federal law retroactively after the case
announcing the rule has already done so."
That issue is not presented here.

Ill S. Ct. at 2446.

Davis, the case that announced

the new rule sought to be applied here, has not "already" applied
the new federal rule retroactively.

There was not in Davis, as

there was in Bacchus, an implicit decision on the retroactivity
question.28
28

It is not clear, moreover, that the United States Supreme
Court gave sufficient consideration to the prospective versus
retroactive effect of its decision in Bacchus. See Beam, 111 S.
Ct. at 2451-52 (O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ., Rehnquist, CJ.,
dissenting).
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Because the Supreme Court did not decide the issue of
retroactivity in Davis, this Court is free to determine the issue
in this case.

As has been demonstrated above, four Justices

indicated in Beam that they favor the prospective only
application of a Supreme Court decision in a proper case based on
a Chevron analysis, and two leave cpen the possibility.

Ill S.

Ct. at 2448 (Souter and Stevens, JJ.) 111 S. Ct. at 2449 (White,
J., concurring); 111 S. Ct. at 2451 (O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ.,
Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).

This Court should accept the

invitation to apply Chevron by overturning the decision of the
District Court.
In Swanson, 407 S.E.2d 791 (N.C. 1991), the Supreme
Court of North Carolina applied the Chevron test to hold that
Davis was not retroactive.

Since Davis satisfies all three

prongs of Chevron,29 any other disposition would constitute a
state court's overruling of Chevron, an action that the North
Carolina court refused to take:
l n Beam the Court had an opportunity to say
that the rule of Chevron should no longer be
applied in civil cases and declined to do so.
We do not believe we should anticipate a
change in the law by the United States
29

The United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
only federal court to consider whether Davis constitutes a new rule
of law, has recently ruled that prior to Davis a reasonable state
official could not have known that such a tax system was
unconstitutional. Swanson v. Powers, 937 F.2d 965 (4th Cir. 1991).
As stated by the Circuit Court "a state official who examined North
Carolina's tax system prior to Davis might easily have concluded
that it worked no unconstitutional discrimination." Id. at 970.
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Supreme Court, but should adhere to the
opinions as they are now written- We believe
we have done so.
Swanson, 407 S.E.2d 791, 795 (N.C. 1991)reversal of the District Court.

Hence, Beam supports a

The District Court erred in

determining that pursuant to State law Plaintiffs are entitled to
a refund.

Under federal analysis, the Davis decision should be

applied prospectively only.

Therefore, the District Court

decision should be reversed, and the case remanded with
instructions that the Davis decision applies prospectively only.
4.

The District Court Erred In Striking Defendants'
Affidavits Which Are Relevant Under The Federal
Analysis.

The

District Court erred in signing an order granting

Plaintiffs' motion to strike all Defendants' affidavits
supporting cross motion for summary judgment.
The District Court granted "the . . .

(R. at 1113-14.)

petitioner's motion to

strike the affidavits of the defendant in relation to those of
Mr. Knowlton, Mr. Christensen and Mr. Memmott."
(emphasis added.)

(R. 1156 tr. 5.)

However, subsequent to the hearing, the

District Court signed an order striking all of the affidavits
supporting Defendants4" cross-motion for summary judgment.
1114.)

The District Court struck four of Defendants'
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(R.

affidavits30 without a hearing•

Accordingly, that order should

be stricken as contrary to the bench ruling of the Court,
Defendants attached an additional four affidavits to
their Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities.31

Those

affidavits were never ordered stricken by the District Court and
hence remain in support of Defendants' reply memorandum,

(R.

1048-1060, Exhibits A-D.)
The affidavits that were stricken concerned the fiscal
impact that retroactive application of Davis would have on the
State of Utah and the State's reliance on Plaintiffs' past
inaction.

(R. 699-789, Exhibits A-l.)
The District Court's rationale for granting Plaintiffs'

motion was that the "scope of the affidavits was well beyond the
factual basis upon whicn the court should be required to consider
a basis for rendering this decision."

(R. 1156 tr. 75.)

The

District Court improperly determined that the affidavits lacked
relevance.
In striking tne affidavits, the District Court
completely ignored the third prong of the Supreme Court's

30

In addition to the affidavits of Mr. Know! ton, Mr.
Christensen, and Mr. Memmott, the Tax Commission had attached the
affidavits of R.H. Hansen, Jerry E. Larabee, Kevin Howard, and
Douglas A. MacDonald.
31

Those affidavits attached to Defendants' Reply Memorandum
of Points and Authorities are affidavit of Steven S. Nelsonf
supplemental affidavit of Jerry E, Larabee, supplemental affidavit
of R.H. Hansen, and affidavit, of Thomas Michael Williams,
-79-

retroactivity analysis.

That prong provides that "where a

decision of this court would produce substantial inequitable
results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our
cases for avoiding the injustice or hardship by a holding of
nonretroactivity.M

Chevron, 4 04 U.S. at 107 (1971) (quoting

Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 702 (1969)).

Defendants'

affidavits went to the issue of potential hardship to the State
if the Davis decision were to be applied retroactively.

Hence,

the affidavits are relevant under Utah R. Evid. 401.
In arriving at its decision in ATA, the Supreme Court
reasoned:
In determining whether a decision should be
applied retroactively, this Court has
consistently given great weight to the
reliance interests of all parties affected by
changes in the law. . . . To the extent that
retrospective application of a decision
burdens a government's ability to plan or
carry out its programs, the application
injures all of the government's constituents.
These concerns have long informed the Court's
retroactivity decisions. . . .
ATA, 111 S. Ct. at 2334-35 (emphasis added; citation omitted);
see also Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
Finally, the affidavits that were stricken by the
District Court should have been considered in crafting a remedy.
Justice Souter, in his plurality decision in Beam found:
'* [n]othing we say here deprives respondent of his opportunity to
raise procedural bars to recovery under state law or demonstrate
reliance interests entitled to consideration in determining the
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nature of the remedy that must be provided, a matter with which
McKesson did not deal."

Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2448.

Hence, the fiscal impact on the State and its reliance
interests are relevant both in determining the choice of law and
remedy issues.

The affidavits also demonstrate beyond question

the Plaintiffs' lack of state or federal challenge to the Utah
statute until after the Davis decision was announced.

POINT IV
THE DISTRICT COURT'S REMEDY IS OVERBROAD AND
OVERCLUSIVE.
A.

The McKesson Case - Minimum Due Process
Requirements.

The case before the Court requires a three step
inquiry.

First, this Court must determine whether litigants are

procedurally barred by a statute of limitations or payment under
protest requirement.

Second, this Court must determine whether

there has been a constitutional violation by applying the Davis
decision retroactively using the three-pronged Chevron test.
ATA, 110 S. Ct. at 2333.

Third, if a violation has occurred, the

Court then crafts a remedy pursuant to state law that satisfies
minimum federal Due Process requirements.
The Supreme Court in McKesson, 110 S. Ct. 2238 (1990),
set forth the minimum procedural standards that a state remedy
must provide to satisfy Fourteenth Amendment Due Process.

At

issue in McKesson was whether a refund was due under a Florida
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liquor excise tax found unconstitutional-

For several decades,

Florida had given preferred tax treatment to Florida-grown citrus
products used in liquor production-

The Supreme Court

invalidated a similar Hawaii tax scheme as violating the Commerce
Clause-

Following the Hawaii decision, the Florida Legislature

amended its liquor excise tax-

However, the Court found that

these amendments to "[t]he Liquor Tax reflected only cosmetic
changes from the prior version of the tax scheme that itself was
virtually identical to the Hawaii scheme."

110 S. Ct- at 2255.

Given these egregious facts, the Court found that a refund must
be given.
McKesson is important because it provides that "the
root requirement of the Due Process Clause as being that an
individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is
deprived of any significant property interest."

JEcl. at 2250.

However, there is an exception to a predeprivation hearing for
the payment of state taxes:
[I]t is well established that a State need
not provide predeprivation process for the
exaction of taxes. Allowing taxpayers to
litigate their tax liabilities prior to
payment might threaten a government's
financial security, both by creating
unpredictable interim revenue shortfalls
against which the State cannot easily
prepare, and by making the ultimate
collection of validly imposed taxes more
difficult.
Id.

The Fourteenth Amendment concern arises because of the

"coercive means" used to collect an illegal tax.
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Ici. at 2251-

Accordingly, the Court ruled that a postdeprivation
procedure which provided "an opportunity to contest the validity
of the tax and a 'clear and certain remedy" designed to render
the opportunity meaningful by preventing any permanent unlawful
deprivation of property" would satisfy Due Process requirements.
Id. at 2252.
In McKesson, the Supreme Court gave the following
examples of postdeprivation remedies that satisfy minimum federal
Due Process requirements:
1.

Full refund of tax assessed over the amount

competitors had been charged;
2.

Collection of back taxes from those parties

benefiting from lower tax rates; and
3.

A combination of tax refunds to petitioners and

retroactive taxation of those parties taxed at a lower rate.
Id. at 2252.
The Court also set forth procedural safeguards that
could be employed by states to protect against the "disruptive
effects" of an invalidated tax scheme:
1) Refunds only to taxpayers paying under protest; and
2) Short statutes of limitation.

JEd. at 2257.

Finally, the administrative costs -- separate from the
refund cost —

may also be weighed,
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J[d_. at 2258.

On the other hand, if there are predeprivation
safeguards, no Due Process concern exists.

This is because the

requirements of Due Process have already been satisfied:
If a State chooses not to secure payments
under duress and instead offers a meaningful
opportunity for taxpayers to withhold
contested tax assessments and to challenge
their validity in a predeprivation hearing,
payments tendered may be deemed "voluntary,"
The availability of a predeprivation hearing
constitutes a procedural safeguard against
unlawful deprivations sufficient by itself to
satisfy the Due Process Clause, and taxpayers
cannot complain if they fail to avail
themselves of this procedure* See
Mississippi Tax Comm'n, supra, 412 U.S. at
368, n. 11, 93 S. Ct., at 2187, n. 11
"fWlhere voluntary payment Tof a taxi is
knowingly made pursuant to an illegal demand,
recovery of that payment may be denied".
Id. at 2251, n.21 (emphasis added); See also Mammoth City v.
Snow, 253 P. 680 (Utah 1926) (payment of an improper tax is nonrefundable ) .
B.

The Remedy Below Was Draconian Under the McKesson
Standard.

It is important to reemphasize that Davis did not
mandate refunds for taxes paid by federal retirees; rather, Davis
only required equal treatment of federal and state retirement
income for state income tax purposes.

Accordingly, the State of

Utah complied with the Davis decision when it revised its income
tax statute to provide for identical treatment for state and
federal pensioners.

Defendants below requested a remedial
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hearing to submit evidence on the remedy issue,

(R. 697.)

This

request was never entertained by the District Court,
Utah has already satisfied the minimum Due Process
requirements of McKesson,

A federal retiree could have omitted

that portion of his income tax that he felt violated
intergovernmental tax immunity.

In factf there is evidence in

the record showing that this has been done.

(R. 561.)

Not until

a determination of a deficiency would the taxes then be due under
duress.

At this time a predeprivation hearing would be available

to the taxpayer.

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-1-501 through 505.

Hence, the minimum Due Process requirements have already been
satisfied.

Utah needs to do nothing more to satisfy federal Due

Process requirements.
If this Court determines that Plaintiffs are entitled
to some form of retroactive relief, an equitable remedy should be
crafted.

The Court could require Defendants to refund the amount

of money that state and local retirees received in tax benefits
($8.3 million best estimate benefit), see Bohn v. Waddell, 807
P.2d 1 (Ariz. Tax 1991) (opinion on rehearing), or it may require
Defendants to grant tax credits against future tax liability.
Even if Utah had not complied with Due Process by
providing a predeprivation remedy, it has established the
necessary procedural safeguards to protect against economic
disruption.

It has a payment under protest statute.

-85-

See Utah

Code Ann, § 59-1-301,32

That statute allows the taxpayer who

considers a tax to be unlawful to pay under protest.

Moreover,

this statute authorizes a taxpayer to bring an action in court,
thus providing the opportunity to adjudicate the lawfulness of
the tax and preclude permanent deprivation of the tax paid,

Utah

likewise has a six month statute of limitations that applies to
these types of actions.33

Utah Code Ann, § 78-12-31 (1987)•

The District Court failed to contemplate these statutes as it
crafted its remedy.
Both of these statutes provide more than sufficient
protection to taxpayers against permanent deprivation without Due
Process.

Accordingly, the District Court abused its discretion

in ordering refunds to Plaintiffs for the years 1985-1988.

Such

a remedy is severe and is neither prescribed by the Coastitution
nor state law.
Finally, the District Court in fashioning its remedy
failed to consider the well documented reliance interests of the
state.

Justice Souter in Beam opined:
[N]othing we say here precludes consideration
of individual equities when deciding remedial
issues in particular.

Nothing we say here deprives respondent of
his opportunity to . , . demonstrate reliance
32

This statute is discussed in detail, supra at p. 2-7.

33

This statute is discussed in detail, supra at p. 7-9.
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interests entitled to consideration in
determining the nature of the remedy that
must be provided, a matter with which
McKesson did not deal.
Id. at 2448-

In these passages, Justice Souter has invited this

Court to consider the equities and to determine that, in his
words, the taxpayers prevailing under the new rule announced in
Davis may not "obtain the same relief that would have been
awarded if the rule had been an old one."
2443.

Beam, 111 S. Ct. at

Accordingly, retroactivity as a remedial principle clearly

recognizes the equitable and reliance interests of the parties.
Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2448.

This view is also supported by the

opinion of the dissenting Justices in ATA, 110 S. Ct. at 2347-56
(dissent) .
C.

The Utah Supreme Court Approach to Prospective
Only Application of a New Decision Should Be
Applied to Any Remedy Crafted By It.

Utah, like the Supreme Court, recognizes nonretroactivity.3*

The Utah test for non-retroactivity is well

established:
We may in our discretion, prohibit
retroactive operation where the "overruled
law has been justifiably relied upon or where
retroactive operation creates a burden."
Loyal Order of Moose, 657 P.2d at 265. For
example, we have limited or prohibited
Utah has not formally adopted the rule found in Chevron.
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retroactive application of decisions
invalidating or reinterpreting certain
statutes.
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 676 (Utah 1984) (emphasis added).
Utah courts have recognized the immense burden that
retroactive application of tax laws could place on government.
This Court in Rio Alqom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184
(Utah 1984) considered the impact of a retroactive application of
a ruling allowing refunds for state-assessed properties:
[L]ocal governments operate on very precise
and often strained budgets that are carefully
tied to these levies. Since 1981, a number
of owners of state-assessed properties have
paid their taxes under protest or have filed
formal complaints with the Tax Commission.
Retroactive effect to a decision altering the
relative tax burdens between locaJly assessed
and state-assessed properties would require
reopening the assessment process as to tax
obligations not yet final. To the extent
that this might result in refunds of taxes
paid on state-assessed properties, it would
impose indebtedness for future repayments
from locally assessed properties. Such
indebtedness could be huge in counties that
derive high proportions of their budgets from
srate-assessed properties.
Id. at 195; see also Loyal Order of Moose No. 259 v. County 3d.
of Equalization, 657 P.2d 257, 265 (Utah 1982) (giving
retroactive effecr. to the assessment of back taxes could result
"in an unreasonable burden upon . . . governmental bodies
associated with it.");

Board of Educ. v. Salt Lake County, 659

P.2d 1030 (Utah 1983) (new law should not be given retroactive
effect where it would require county government to make payments
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for which it had not budgeted, and where its impact would fall
heavily on taxpayers).
If the new rule of law stated in Davis is to be applied
retroactively under the Utah Supreme Court analysis, any remedy
should be prospective only.
POINT V
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING DEFENDANTS THE
PRESCRIBED TIME TO OBJECT TO THE PROPOSED FINAL ORDER
AND BY MAKING FINDINGS UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.
Rule 4-504(2) of th^ CoHo <>* judicial Administration
Copies of the proposed findings, judgments,
and orders shall be served upon opposing
counsel before being presented to the court
for signature unless the court otherwise
orders. Notice of objections shall be
submitted to the court and counsel within
five days after service,
(Emphasis added.)
In the instant case, the District Court did not allow
Defendants the prescribed time to object to Plaintiffs' Amended
Proposed Findings, Conclusions, and Partial Summary Judgment.
Plaintiffs mailed to Defendants the Amended Proposed
Findings, Conclusions and Partial Summary Judgment on April 10,
1991*.

On April 15, the Court made a minute entry stating: " [t]he

court has reviewed the Amended Proposed Findings, Conclusions and
Partial Summary Judgment as submitted.
be the final order of the Court.

The Defendant's objections

thereto are thus denied." (R. 1110.)
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The same are approved to

In fact,

Defendants had

not yet filed objections to the amended order.

The Court

subsequently signed and entered the order on April 16, 1991.
Rule 6(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
Computation. In computing any period of time
prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the
local rules of any district court, by order
of court, or by any applicable statute, the
day of the act, event, or default from which
the designated period of time begins to run
shall not be included. The last day of the
period so computed shall be included, unless
it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal
holiday,

in

xv-Klcn e v e n t

un^ ^ , „ ^ _ - i — ^ ^

,,^4.^-j

the end of the next day which is not a
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When
the period of time prescribed or allowed is
less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays,
Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded
in the computation.
Pursuant to Rule 6(a), the prescribed period in which
to object to Plaintiffs' Amended Proposed Findings, Conclusions
and Partial Summary Judgment had not lapsed prior to it entry.
Accordingly, by signing and entering the order, the Court
deprived Defendants of their right to object under Rule 4-504(2)
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

Because Defendants

were denied their right to object, the Amended Findings,
Conclusions, and Partial Summary Judgment must be set aside.
The District Court also erred in making findings of
material facts in ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment that are completely unsupported by the record.
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Had

Defendants been given the opportunity to raise objections, this
may not have occurred.
First, the District Court made a finding that the
"Plaintiff class consists of approximately 34,000 individuals
and/or estates, the majority of whom are of advanced age."
1121.)

(R.

This finding is unsupported by the record.
Second, the District Court made a finding that the

"size of each class member's claim is small in relation to the
high cost of pursuing a resolution of the claim."

(R. 1121.)

There is absolutely no evidence introduced by the Plaintiffs into
the record supporting this assertion.
Third, the District Court entered a finding that
"[p]laintiffs will necessarily incur costs to prepare amended tax
returns to be filed with the State Tax Commission as part of the
refund process.

The State Tax Commission has no mechanism to

compute refunds for plaintiffs."

(R. 1124.)

Again there is

absolutely no support for this finding in the record.
Significantly, it is an illogical conclusion of the District
Court that the Tax Commission is without the capacity to process
refunds for the individual Plaintiffs.

Particularly in light of

its later order that it do exactly that.
Finally, the District Court made a finding that
" [attorney's fees have been incurred herein by Plaintiffs and by
the Plaintiff class."

(Rv 1121.)

While this is possible, the

Plaintiffs introduced no evidence into the record that would
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provide the Court a basis for this finding.

Accordingly, the

District Court erred in making the formal finding.
Each of the above findings was made by the District
Court to support its granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment.

The standard for summary judgment is provided in Rule

56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The relevant portion

of that rule provides: "[t]he [summary] judgment shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law."

It is significant that these issues of

material fact remained unsupported when the Court entered Summary
Judgment in favor of Plaintiffs.

POINT VI
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PLAINTIFFS'
ATTORNEY FEES WITHOUT A LEGAL BASIS FOR THE AWARD AND
IN GRANTING COURT COSTS AND REIMBURSEMENT TO PLAINTIFFS
FOR THE COSTS OF PREPARING AMENDED TAX RETURNS.
"Utah adheres to the well-established rule that
attorney's fees generally cannot be recovered unless provided for
by statute or by contract*"

See Canyon Country Store/ 781 P.2d

414, 419 (Utah 1989); see also Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis
Management, 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982); Arnica Mutual Insurance Co.
v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct« App, 1989 )•
-92-

There is no

contractual basis for an award of fees-

The only relevant

statutory provision is Utah Code Annotated 78-27-56(1)(Supp. 1991
& 1987) which provides:
In civil actions, the court shall award
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing
party if the court determines that the action
or defense to the action was without merit
and not brought or asserted in good faith.
The threshold question is whether a party's action or
defense was without merit and not brought in good faith.

The

Utah Court of Appeals recently stated that "in order to recover
fees under § 78-27-56, a trial court must make findings that 1)
the claim or claims were 'without merit', and 2) the party's
conduct was lacking in good faith."

Arnica Mutual Ins. Co. v.

Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 966 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
with reference to bad faith need not be written.

The findings
See Canyon

Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 1989).
Nevertheless, there must be some basis in the record to support
findings of lack of merit and bad faith.
There is absolutely no basis in the present action, nor
in the record, for findings of lack of merit or bad faith that
would sustain an award of attorney fees.
This Court has found that "not only must there be
substantial evidence that the claim was lacking basis in either
law or fact and therefore frivolous, but there must also be
sufficient evidence that the unsuccessful party lacked at least
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one of the good faith elements. . . . "35
P.2d 149, 152 (Utah 1983),

Cady v. Johnson, 671

If the Court refused to find a lack

of good faith in Cady, it can hardly be said that Defendants'
onerous efforts to defend the present claim constitute bad faith
on their part.
In the instant action, there is neither a contractual
nor a statutory basis for attorney fees.

Absent a basis to

support an award, the Court's actions in awarding fees was
improper and must be reversed.
The District Court granted reimbursement to Plaintiffs
for tax return preparation and court costs.

(R. 1141.)

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part:

Rule 54
"Costs

against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies shall be
imposed only to the extent permitted by law. "' Costs are fees
paid to the Court and witnesses.

See Frampton v. Wilson, 605

P.2d 771 (Utah 1980) .
There is no basis in Utah law to impose on Defendants
the costs of preparing amended tax returns or court costs.
Accordingly, the District Court erred in granting them, and the
award should be reversed.

35

The court defined good faith as: "(1) An honest belief in
the propriety of the activities in question; (2) no intent to take
unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or
knowledge of the fact that the activities in question will hinder,
delay or defraud others. See Cady, 671 P.2d 149.
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Jack C. Helgesen, Esq.
Richard Jones, Esq.
LYON, HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JON^S
Attorneys for Petitioners
^/
4768 Harrison Boulevard
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ORDER CERTIFYING CLASS
Brumley et al. vs. Utah Tax Commin. et al.
Page 2
3.

All prior orders of the court shall apply to

members of the class.
4.

Class representatives? class counsel.

Subject

to further order of the court, Wendell E. Brumley and those 334
additional individuals named as Plaintiffs on Plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint are designated class representatives and Jack
C. Helgesen and Richard W. Jones of the firm of Lyon, Helgesen,
Waterfall & Jones are designated as counsel for the class.
5.

Notice. Counsel for Plaintiffs shall submit to

the court a proposal to notify class members and to allow Class
members to exclude themselves from the class by filing the
appropriate notice in written form as directed by further order
A

of the court.
DATED this

day of

/(4dU JL

, 1990.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

00210

ORDER CERTIFYING CLASS
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JACK C . HELGESEN , * 1 '1 [> 1
RICHARD W. JONES, #3938
LYON, HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4768 Harrison Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84403
Telephone: (801) 479-4777

IN THE TAX DIVISION, THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WENDELL E. BRUMLEY, et al, /
i
i
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Civ.

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, et
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i

Judge David £.. Young

PJ a i n t: J f f s

89-09L... 18
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enters its order as follows:
1•

D e f e ii d a i 1 t s "" M o il: 1 o i : !::: • :: D i s ::n: i i s s i s d € • i :i i e 11 ri • I i: c 1 1!

causes of action and al 1 tax years claimed in plaintiffs'" Amended
Complaint except Count Five.

)

2.

The denial of defendants' Motion to Dismiss is

based on the following grounds:
A.

The Tax Division of district court has

jurisdiction for the tax years at issue.
B.

This court specifically finds under Utah

Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-14, that plaintiffs need not exhaust
administrative remedies because requiring the plaintiffs to
exhaust administrative remedies would result in irreparable harm
disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring
exhaustion.
C.

In finding the administrative remedies to be

disproportionate, this court has reviewed the pleadings,
memoranda, documents filed by the parties, and arguments of
counsel.
D.

Defendants concede that the Utah State Tax

Commission has no administrative procedures to consider and
process a class action that would preserve and protect the rights
of and grant the relief the representative members of the class
seek.
E.

In finding that the exhaustion of remedies

will result in irreparable harm disproportionate to public
benefit derived from requiring an exhaustion, this court has
specifically considered the size of the proposed class, the older
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/^

age of many of the plaintiffs, and the relatively small amount of
each claim for refund in relation to the cost to each taxpayer in
pursuing a resolution of his or her claim through the State Tax
Commission.

The burden to each of the estimated 35,000 taxpayers

in the described class is not justified by the incidental public
benefit which might be gained by following the administrative
remedies in the Tax Commission.

This is especially true in light

of indications that the Utah State Tax Commission has
preliminarily decided that Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury;
109 S.Ct. 1500 (1989) does not mandate refunds in Utah.
The Court accepts the parties' stipulation that
defendants need not answer Counts Three and Four, which are
misrepresentation for the 1985 tax year and fraud or
misrepresentation pertaining to the 1988 tax year, until
defendants' Motion for More Definite Statement of those claims is
resolvedDATED this

*^Dt^-ffay^of February, 1990,

DAVID S.
District
Tax Division"
APPROVED AS Tp FO!
BRIAN L. TARBET
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendants
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JACK C. HELGESEN, #1451
RICHARD W. JONES, #3938
LYON, HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4768 Harrison Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84403
Telephone: (801) 479-4777

IN THE TAX DIVISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION

WENDELL E. BRUMLEY, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
UTAH TAX COMMISSION, et al.,

Civil No. 89-0903618 CV
Judge David S. Young

Defendants.

On June 4, 1990, before the Honorable David S. Young,
District Court Judge, "Plaintiffs' Motion to Enjoin State Tax
Commission

from

Proceeding

with

Administrative

Involving Members of the Class" was heard.
represented

by

Richard

W.

Jones

and

Hearings

Plaintiffs were

Jack

C.

Helgesen.

Defendants were represented by Brian L. Tarbet and L.A. Dever.
Arguments were heard, the court file was reviewed and the Court
made the following order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Plaintiffs1 motion is granted.

Defendant Utah

State Tax Commission is hereby enjoined from proceeding with
administrative hearings involving members of the plaintiff
class.

Forty-five (45) days following the publication of the

"Notice

of

Class

Action,"

Defendants

may

proceed

with

administrative hearings for all federal retirees who paid taxes
during the years in question and who elected to opt out of the
plaintiff class.
DATED this

day of June, 1990.

T££^

DAVID S. YOUNG
District Court Judg
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

BRIAN L. TARBET

2
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IN THE TAX DIVISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

* * *

WENDELL E. BRUMLEY, ET AL,
PLAINTIFFS,

CIVIL NO. C-89-090-361S

-VS-

JUDGE'S RULING

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
ET AL,
DEFENDANTS.

* * *

BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON MONDAY, THE 4TH DAY
OF MARCH, 1991, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 11:55 O'CLOCK
A.M., THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE
COURTROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HELD BY THE
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH.

* * *

m rv7a

A P P E A R A N C E S

FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:

JACK C. HELGESEN,
RICHARD W. JONES
LYON, HELGESEN, WATERFALL &
JONES
4 768 HARRISON BLVD.
OGDEN, UTAH 84 4 03

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

BRIAN L. TARBET,
L. A. DEVER
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERALS
3 6 SOUTH STATE, 11TH FLOOR
BENEFICIAL LIFE TOWER
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111

INDEX

JUDGE'S RULING

EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R.

PAGE 3

niflfcn

1

EEOCE.EP.INGS

2

JUDGE YOUNG:

3

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED.

4

ALL RIGHT. THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION

MR. HELGESEN, I'LL ASK YOU TO PREPARE SOME FIND-

5

INGS AND JUDGMENT CONSISTENT WITH THE COURT'S RULING AND,

6

ALSO, I SPECIFICALLY APPROVE YOUR FINDINGS OF FACT THAT ARE

7

CONSISTENT WITH THE PLEADINS ON FILE BEFORE THE COURT

8 WHETHER I STATE IT IN RELATION TO THAT RULING OR NOT.
9

THE COURT FINDS THAT THE PETITIONING PLAINTIFFS

10 ARE ENTITLED TO CLAIM A TAX REFUND FOR THE YEARS 1985
11 THROUGH 1988. THE COURT FINDS THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE
12 ENTITLED TO A REFUND UNDER STATE LAW AND, THEREFORE, TKEY
13 ARE ENTITLED TO INTEREST ON THAT REFUND AT THE RATE OF 12
14 PERCENT.
15

THE COURT WILL INVITE COUNSEL TO SUBMIT APPROPRI-

16 ATE MEMORANDA AND AFFIDAVITS IN RELATION TO THE COSTS AND
17 FEES ISSUED TO BE ORDERED.

THE COURT FINDS, HOWEVER, THAT

18 THE CLASS IS ENTITLED TO THE REPRESENTATION OF COUNSEL AND
19 I WOULD SUGGEST TO EVERYONE THAT THERE NEEDS TO BE A MECHA20 NISM ESTABLISHED TO MINIMIZE THE COSTS OF PREPARING RE21

TURNS.

I DON'T KNOW WHAT THAT MIGHT BE BUT I THINK BETWEEN

22 THE STATE'S ATTORNEYS AND MR. HELGESEN AND YOUR ASSOCIATES
23 THAT SOMETHING SHOULD BE SUGGESTED THERE TO MINIMIZE THE
24 IMPACT OF THE COST IN FILING THESE AMENDED RETURNS.
25

THE COURT FURTHER FINDS THAT ALL OF THE 198 8

PARTICIPANTS IN THIS ACTION, WHICH INCLUDES THE ENTIRE
CLASS, SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE PAID "UNDER PROTEST" AND
SHALL BE ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS THAT THAT STATUS WOULD
BRING.
NOW, THE COURT FURTHER FINDS THAT THE DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHALL BE, AND THE SAME IS
HEREBY DENIED.
THERE IS IN THE FILE A MOTION FROM THE PLAINTIFF
AND FROM THE DEFENDANT TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVITS.

I WOULD

BE WILLING TO RULE ON THAT MOTION BUT I WOULD INVITE COUNSEL TO GIVE ME YOUR IMPRESSIONS AS TO WHETHER YOU WOULD
DESIRE THE RULING ON THAT MOTION.

LET ME SUGGEST TO YOU

THAT FROM MY REVIEW OF THE AFFIDAVITS MUCH OF THE MATERIAL
CONTAINED IN THE AFFIDAVITS IS IRRELEVANT TO THE BASIS OF
THIS RULING AND, THEREFORE, A NEED TO STRIKE WOULD BE
BEYOND THE SCOPE OF WHAT MIGHT BE NEEDED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
DO EITHER OF YOU HAVE A VIEW THAT MIGHT BE OTHERWISE ON THE MOTIONS TO STRIKE?
MR. HELGESEN:
WAS IRRELEVANT.

OUR POINT, YOUR HONOR, WAS THAT IT

IF WE CAN SIMPLY HAVE THAT FINDING THERE'S

NO NEED TO DO ANYTHING ELSE.
JUDGE YOUNG:
MR. TARBET:

MR. TARBET?
YOUR HONOR, I'M NOT SURE SPECIFICAL-

LY WHAT AFFIDAVIT THE COURT IS SPEAKING TO.

EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R.

IN TERMS OF

4

1 THE KNOWLTON, CHRISTENSEN, MEMMOTT AFFIDAVIT WE THINK IT'S
2

HIGHLY RELEVANT TO CHEVRON.

3

JUDGE YOUNG:

TO THE THIRD PRONG?

4

MR. TARBET: CORRECT.

5

JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT.

THE COURT GRANTS THE

6

DEFENDANT'S—OR THE PETITIONER'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE

7

AFFIDAVITS OF THE DEFENDANT IN RELATION TO THOSE OF MR.

8

KNOWLTON, MR. CHRISTENSEN AND MR. MEMMOTT.

9

THE SCOPE OF THOSE AFFIDAVITS WAS WELL BEYOND THE FACTUAL

I BELIEVE THAT

10 BASIS UPON WHICH THE COURT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO CONSIDER A
11 BASIS FOR RENDERING THIS DECISION.
12

NOW, AS TO THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE.

13 WHAT IS YOUR PREFERENCE IN RELATION TO THAT?
14 THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE.

THAT GRANTS THE PLAINTI-

15 FF'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT.
16 WRONG PARTY.
17

EXCUSE KE,

I SAID THAT WITH THE

THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE.

MR. HELGESEN:

YOU HAD A MOTION TO STRIKE ONE

18 AFFIDAVIT FROM A GUY WHO CLAIMED TO PROTEST EARLY.
19 SHOULD BE GRANTED.

THAT

WE NEVER ALLEGED WE PROTESTED BEFORE

20 '88.
21

JUDGE YOUNG:

ALL RIGHT.

THAT IS NOT AN ISSUE

22 I THAT GIVES RISE TO A CONCERN THAT WE HAVE AS A FACTUAL
23 (BASIS FOR THIS RULING, IN ANY EVENT.
24

MR. HELGESEN:

25 I

JUDGE YOUNG:

NO, IT IS NOT.
ALL RIGHT.

EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R.

THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION

5

1

TO STRIKE IS LIKEWISE GRANTED.

2

GRANTED.

3

BOTH MOTIONS TO STRIKE ARE

NOW, MR. HELGESEN, DOES THIS PROVIDE YOU WITH

4

ADEQUATE INFORMATION UPON WHICH YOU MAY PREPARE FINDINGS

5

AND A JUDGMENT?

6

MR. HELGESEN:

IT DOES, YOUR HONOR.

I'D ASK FOR

7

THE PREPARATION OF A COPY OF THE RULING, OF THE BENCH

8

RULING.

9

JUDGE YOUNG:

10

MR. DEVER:

ALL RIGHT.

ANYTHING FURTHER?

JUST ONE QUESTION.

YOU TALKED ABOUT

11 J THE PARTIES SHOULD WORK TOGETHER TO FORMULATE A METHOD OF
12 I DOING AMENDED RETURNS.
13

COURT DIDN'T MEAN THAT THE COST IS

TO BE BORNE BY THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS MATTER, DID IT?

14 I

JUDGE YOUNG:

I HAVE A CONCERN ABOUT THAT BECAUSE

15

I DON'T KNOW WHAT THOSE COSTS ARE AND I DO DESIRE TO MINI-

16

MIZE THOSE COSTS.

17

ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION FOR COUNSEL'S EFFORTS HERE BUT I

18

DON'T KNOW SPECIFICALLY WHAT THOSE FEES WILL BE THAT WILL

19

BE REQUESTED.

20

SPECIFICALLY IN RELATION TO THE ISSUES OF FEES AND I OUGHT

21

TO RULE ON THAT AS AN INDEPENDENT MATTER.

22

I DO THINK THAT THE CLASS IS GOING TO BE

PERHAPS THERE OUGHT TO BE MEMORANDA FILED

MR. DEVER:

YOUR HONOR, COULD WE HAVE MR.

23

HELGESEN, SINCE HE IS THE PERSON IN CHARGE OF WHAT THE FEES

24

ARE, SUBMIT HIS MEMORANDA AND WE HAVE THREE DAYS TO RESPOND

25 I FROM THAT?

EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R.

010S4

*

JUDGE YOUNG:

MR. HELGESEN?

2

MR. HELGESEN:

IT SEEMS TO ME, YOUR HONOR,

3 THERE'S NO HURRY, IN THAT, OBVIOUSLY, THEY ARE GOING TO
4

APPEAL.

WE HAVE A LOT MORE WORK TO DO BEFORE WE'RE THROUGH

5 HERE SO WE'D ASK WE BE ABLE TO RESERVE THAT UNTIL SOME
6

FINAL RESOLUTION AND THEN PRESENT THE COURT WITH WHAT WE

1

HAVE DONE.

8
9

THAT SEEMS MORE EFFICIENT.

JUDGE YOUNG:

I DON'T HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO THAT

PROCEDURE.

10

DO YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO THAT?

11

MR. DEVER:

I GUESS THE ONLY QUESTION I HAVE IS

12 IF THE COURT IS, IN ITS ORDER, IS SAYING THE DEFENDANTS ARE
13 RESPONSIBLE, I THINK THAT NEEDS TO BE IN OR OUT.

IF YOU

14 ARE SAYING THAT SHOULD BE A MATTER LATER TO BE CONSIDERED
15 | THEN I THINK THAT WAHT NEEDS TO B E —
16

JUDGE YOUNG:

ALL RIGHT.

I'M WILLING TO PUT IN

17 i THE ORDER THAT THE DEFENDANTS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FEES
18 I AND THE AMOUNTS WILL HAVE TO BE DETERMINED LATER.

THAT WAY

19 WHEN THIS IS REVIEWED BY THE APPELLATE COURT THEY CAN
20 DETERMINE THAT ISSUE AS WELL.

THAT SEEMS TO BE EFFICIENT.

21

ANY DIFFICULTY WITH THAT, MR. HELGESEN?

22

MR. HELGESEN:

23

JUDGE YOUNG:

NO.
ANYTHING FURTHER?

COURT'S IN

24 RECESS.
25

(WHEREUPON, THE JUDGE'S RULING WAS CONCLUDED).

* * *

C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF UTAH
SS.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

I, EILEEN M. AMBROSE, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I AM A
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER OF THE STATE OF UTAH; THAT AS
SUCH CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER, I ATTENDED THE HEARING
OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MATTER AT THAT TIME AND PLACE SET
OUT HEREIN; THAT THEREAT I TOOK DOWN IN SHORTHAND THE
TESTIMONY GIVEN AND THE PROCEEDINGS HAD THEREIN; AND THAT
THEREAFTER I TRANSCRIBED MY SAID SHORTHAND NOTES INTO
TYPEWRITING, AND THAT THE FOREGOING TRANSCRIPTION IS A
FULL, TRUE, AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF THE SAME.

;O^M^ &<$£.

EILEEN/M. AMBROSE, C.S.R.

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:
JANUARY 14TH, 1992

FTT.FFN M. AMBROSE. C.S.R.

<vf n a c
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APR 1 6 1391
JACK C. HELGESEN, #1451
RICHARD W. JONES, #3938
LYON, HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES, P . C .
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4768 Harrison Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84403
Telephone: (801) 479-4777
IN THE TAX DIVISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WENDELL E. BRUMLEY, et al.,

:

Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS
AND PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

:

vs.

:

UTAH TAX COMMISSION, et al., :
Defendants.

:
Civil No. 89-0903618 CV
Judge David S. Young

On March 4, 1991 before the Honorable David S. Young, Tax
Division,

Third

District

Court,

a

hearing

was

held

en

Plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary Judgment and on Defendants'
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment.

Jack C. Helgesen and

Richard W. Jones were present representing Plaintiffs.
L. Tarbet, L.A.

Dever and John C. McCarrey were present

representing Defendants.
were reviewed.
considered

Brian

Arguments were heard and exhibits

Prior to the hearing, the Court reviewed and

the memoranda

and

affidavits submitted

by the

parties supporting and opposing the motions.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court ruled granting
Plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Defendants'
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court has not ruled on

Olltt

a number of issues such as: notice to the class, deadlines for
Plaintiffs to submit amended returns, amount of attorneys1 fees
awarded class counsel, etc.

Consequently, this ruling is a

partial summary judgment which the Court is willing to certify
for appeal purposes.
In support of its ruling, the Court now enters its formal
findings.

Although some facts remain in dispute, the Court

finds the disputed

facts to be immaterial

and

finds the

undisputed material facts to be dispositive of the issues as a
matter of law.

Specifically, the Court bases its decision on

the following undisputed material facts.
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1.

Plaintiffs

and

members

of

the

Plaintiff

class

received pay or compensation as a result of personal services
rendered as officers or employees of the United States.
2.

4 U.S.C. §111 reads in relevant part as follows:

The United States consents to the taxation of pay or
compensation for personal service as an officer or
employee of the United States . . . by a duly
constituted taxing authority having jurisdiction, if
the taxation does not discriminate against the
officer or employee because of the source of the pay
or compensation.
3.

The State of Utah taxed the income of Plaintiffs and

members of the Plaintiff class and did not tax the income of
retired state employees.
- 2 -
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4.

The Plaintiff class consists of all persons and the

estates of deceased persons who received retirement pay, cr
annuities from federal sources and who have paid Utah State
income tax on such retirement income for the 1985, 1986, 1987,
and/or the 1988 tax years,
5.

The Plaifttiff class consists of approximately 34,000

individuals

and/or estates, the majority

of whom

are cf

advanced age.
6.

The size of each class member's claim is small in

amount in relation to the high cost of pursuing a resolution of
the claim.
7.

The Defendants became aware of the decision in Davis

v. Michigan, when it was announced on March 28, 1989, and
understood it to impact the Utah income tax scheme.
8.

1988 Utah income tax returns were due April 17, 1959.

9.

Prior to April 17, 1989 Defendants received hundreds

of phone calls from members of the Plaintiff class protesting
the collection of 1988 Utah state income taxes on Plaintiffs1
federal retirement compensation.
10.

In a press release on April 5, 1989, the Utah Tax

Commission through commissioner Roger Tew instructed members cf
the Plaintiff class who wished to protect "any legal rights for
any year prior to 1989n to file amended returns. The Utah Tax
- 3-
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Commission received hundreds of such amended, returns on or
before April 17, 1989.
11.
members

Representative Plaintiffs and more than 3,000 Utah
of

the

National

Association

of

Retired

Federal

Employees (NARFE), protested for themselves and "all others
similarly situated", the collection of state income tax on
their federal retirement benefits by filing with Defendants on
or before April 17, 1989 a "Notice of Claim", and "Class Claim
for Refund", seeking a refund of all state income taxes paid on
federal retirement benefits for the 1985 through 1988 tax
years, specifically alleging the illegality of the state income
tax under federal and state law.
12.

Many

representative

Plaintiffs

and

hundreds

of

members of the Plaintiff Class also protested payment of their
1988

state

income

taxes

by

calling

the

Utah

State

Tax

Commissioner, by filing written protests and by filing 1988
amended returns prior to the 1988 due date, or by filing claims
for protection of rights in the form and manner prescribed by
the tax commission.
13.

Representative Plaintiffs for themselves and all

others similarly situated, plus over 3,000 Utah members of the
National Association of Retired Federal Employees (NARFE) filed
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timely

class

claims

for

refund

with

the

Utah

State

Tax

Commission for the years 1985 through 1988.
Also, individual Class Members filed claims with the State
Tax Commission for the years indicated below seeking a refund
of state income taxes paid on federal retirement benefits. The
number of such individual claims filed with the tax commission
for each tax year are:

14.

1985:

11,921

1986:

16,892

1987:

15,185

1988:

11,827

On March 30, 1990, Plaintiff class, by and through

legal representatives, filed a "Protective Claim" with the
State Tax Commission on a form prepared by the tax commission.
15.

The State Tax Commission instructed Plaintiffs in

February 1990 to file protective claims by April 16, 1990 to
protect their claims for refund for the 1985 and 1986 tax years
within the three-year statute of limitations.
16.

The

consistent

practice

of

the

Utah

State

Tax

Commission has been to treat all claims for refund of income
taxes as being timely filed under Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-529(7)
if filed within three years of the due date of the return.

In

considering the timeliness of income tax refund claims, it has
- 5 -

01123

not been the practice of the commission to distinguish between
claims for refund by taxpayers who paid their tax before the
due date from those who paid on the due date.
17.

The original deadline for filing claims for refund

for 1985 taxes was April 17, 1989.

The 1990 Utah State

Legislature extended this deadline to April 16, 1990.
18.

Defendant Utah State Tax Commission has consistently

and publicly taken the position since April 5, 1989 that
refunds of state income taxes paid by federal retirees will not
be paid.
19.

In denying Plaintiffs' claims for refund Defendants

have not relied upon prior case law interpretations of 4 U.S.C.
§111.
20.

Plaintiffs will necessarily incur costs to prepare

amended tax returns to be filed with the State Tax Commission
as part of the refund process. The State Tax Commission has no
mechanism to compute refunds for Plaintiffs.
21.

Attorney's

fees

have

been

incurred

herein

by

Plaintiffs and by the Plaintiff class.
22.

The

Court

makes

no

factual

findings

regarding

hardship to the State of Utah in paying refunds.

- 6-

0ii24

I. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs1 claim
for recovery of taxes paid under protest for the 1988 tax year
under Utah Code Ann. §59-1-301.
This Court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of
Utah's tax scheme and to consider the remedy of tax refunds for
all the tax years in question pursuant to the Utah Declaratory
Judgment Act, Utah Code Annotated §78-33-1 et seq.
Plaintiffs claim tax refunds for the tax years 1985, 1986,
1987 and 1988 on the basis of overpayments under Utah Code Ann.
§59-10-529(7). Plaintiffs pray for 1) a declaratory order that
Utah's taxation of federal retirees was unlawful for all tax
years in dispute, and 2) an order compelling Defendants to
recognize Plaintiffs' class claims for refund, and to compute
and pay refunds.

The District Court has jurisdiction to

determine the validity of the tax, the availability of refunds,
the propriety of the class claims for refund and to issue a
declaratory order resolving those issues pursuant to the Utah
Declaratory Judgment Act.
Utah Code Ann. §78-33-1 states:
The district courts within their respective
jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights,
status, and other legal relations, whether or not
further relief is or could be claimed. No action or
proceedings shall be open to objection on the ground
that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for.
- 7 -

The issues raised in Plaintiffs1 claims for a refund of
1988 taxes paid under protest are similar to and in some
instances identical to Plaintiffs' claims for a refund of
overpayment of 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988 taxes. Consequently,
a declaratory order addressing the claims for a refund of taxes
for all the tax years is in the interest of judicial economy.
Jurisdiction in the District Court to compel action by an
administrative agency through writ of mandamus is protected by
Article VIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution which provides
the "district court shall have original jurisdiction in all
matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute,
and

power

to

issue

all

extraordinary

writs.11

This

is

recognized in Utah Code Ann. §78-3-4 which gives district court
judges "power to issue all extraordinary writs necessary to
carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees."
The Court also finds jurisdiction over Plaintiffs1 claims
in its interpretation of the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act, Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-l, et seq.

The clear legislative

intent of this act is to allow taxpayers a full hearing and
review.

Due process requires as much.

If the tax commission

conducts the hearing, review will be in an appellate court,
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16.

Cases which are not heard in the

tax commission receive a full hearing in District Court. Utah
- 8 -
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Code Ann. §63-4 6B-15.

This is such a case.

This Court by

prior order relieved Plaintiffs of the necessity of exhausting
administrative remedies before the tax commission. Plaintiffs
are entitled to a plenary hearing before this Court with appeal
to the Utah Supreme Court.
II. 4 U.S.C. Sill
Title 4, Section 111 of the United States Code reads in
relevant part:
The United States consents to the taxation of pay or
compensation for personal service as an officer cr
employee of the United States . . . by a duly
constituted taxing authority having jurisdiction, if
the taxation does not discriminate against the
officer or employee because of the source of the pay
or compensation.
Plaintiffs allege Utah's taxation of pay or compensation
from federal retirement sources to be in violation of the plain
meaning of 4 U.S.C. §111. The Court agrees and rules in favor
of the Plaintiffs.
The federal statute is directed at state taxation nof pay
or compensation for personal service as an officer or employee
of the United States11. Plaintiffs or their decedents were once
employees

or

officers

of

the

United

States

or

received

retirement pay from the federal government. Plaintiffs1 prior
personal service to the United States is the sole reason they
now receive retirement pay.

Although retired, Plaintiffs

- 9 -
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continue to receive compensation from that personal service,
and

retirement

pay

is

best

characterized

as

deferred

compensation.
This interpretation is consistent with the position taken
by the Utah Tax Commission in Fitzpatrick v. Tax Commission,
386 P.2d 896 (Utah 1963), wherein the Utah Supreme Court agreed
the taxpayer's retirement benefits were deferred compensation
from former employment. Defendants now attempt to distinguish
the

private

sector

employee

in Fitzpatrick

from

federal

retirees with the explanation that private retirement is a
matter of contract but federal retirement
entitlement.
without

a

is a statutory

In the Court's view, this is a distinction

difference.

That

federal

employees'

pay

or

compensation may arise from a statutory enactment does not
destroy the nexus between retirement pay and the employees1
previous service with the federal government.

Most federal

retirees would be justifiably offended at the State's view of
their retirement pay, earned over many years of faithful
service to the United

States government, as an unearned

statutory entitlement.
Under the plain reading of 4 U.S.C. §111, the State of
Utah may tax Plaintiffs' retirement benefits only if the
taxation does not discriminate against Plaintiffs "because of
- 10 -

the source of the pay or compensation".

Until 1989, Utah's

taxation of retirement benefits was based solely on the source
of

compensation;

retirement

pay

from

the

State

and

its

political subdivisions was exempt and retirement pay from the
federal

government

was

taxed.

This

is

an

unmistakable

discrimination against federal retirees in violation of 4 U.S.C
§111.
This Court reads 4 U.S.C §111 to be a limited waiver of
federal immunity:

"The United States consents to the taxation

. . . if the taxation does not discriminate".
State

of

Utah

did

not

meet

the

statutory

Because the
condition

of

nondiscriminatory taxation, the consent of the United States
was not given. Therefore, the State's taxation of federal
retirement pay was not only in violation of 4 U.S.C. §111, but
was also a breach of the constitutional doctrine of federal
sovereign immunity.
III. Refunds of Tax Overpayments
The Utah legislature has made a clear choice to grant
refunds to taxpayers who are improperly taxed.
Section 59-10-529 reads in relevant part as follows:
(1) In cases where there has been an overpayment of any
tax imposed by this chapter, the amount of overpayment is
credited as follows:
(7) (a) If a refund or credit is due because the amount
of tax deducted and withheld from wages exceeds the actual
- 11 -

tax due, no refund or credit may be made or allowed unless
the taxpayer or his legal representative files with the
commission a tax return claiming the refund or credit:
(i) within three years from the due date of the
return, plus the period of any extension of time for
filing the return; or
(ii) within two years from the date the tax was
paid, whichever period is later.
(b) In other instances where a refund or credit of
tax which has* not been deducted and withheld from income
is due, no credit or refund may be allowed or made after
three years from the time the tax was paid, unless, before
the expiration of the period, a claim is filed by the
taxpayer or his legal representative.
This statutory scheme demonstrates legislative intent to
refund

tax

overpayments

to

taxpayers

if

the

following

conditions are met:
1.

An overpayment of income tax occurs;

2.

A claim is filed by the taxpayer or his legal

representative before the expiration of a three year period.
Utah incorporates the federal definition of "overpayment11
by specific reference to federal tax laws. Utah Code Ann. §5910-103(2) reads:
"Any term used in this chapter has the same meaning as
when used in comparable context in the laws of the United
States relating to federal income taxes unless a different
meaning is clearly required."
"Overpayment" in the federal tax laws has been defined to
include the payment of a tax later declared to be unlawful.
Jones v. Liberty Glass Company, 332 U.S. 524 (1948).
- 12 -
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The federal definition of "overpayment11 is consistent with
the meaning used by the Utah State Tax Commission, when, in its
press release of April 5, 1989 the tax commission directed
federal retirees who wished to preserve

f,

any legal rights11 to

file claims in the form of amended tax returns. This direction
was followed by many members of the class.

The commission

later provided to federal retirees a simplified form, called a
"protective claim11, under which the taxpayer circled the tax
year for which he or she claimed a tax refund and which
contained a notice with this instruction to federal retirees in
bold print:
"To protect claims for 1985 or 1986, this form or
amended return (s) must be mailed to the TaxCommission by April 16, 1990. You may file this
form for 1987 and 1988 at a later date, but it must
be done within the three-year deadline."
The "three-year deadline" referred to by the Utah State
Tax Commission refers to the three-year claim period for
refunds of overpayments under Utah Code Ann. §59-10-529(7).
Defendants' contention that a six-month statute of limitations
bars Plaintiffs1 claims is without merit.
Section 59-10-529, Utah Code Ann., provides for the refund
of any overpayment of state income tax, including the refunding
of taxes paid as a result of an error in law.

"If there is no

tax liability for a period in which the amount is paid as
- 13 -

income tax, the amount is an overpayment.11
10-529(12).

Utah Code Ann. §59-

A "liability" is a legal obligation.

Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. Rev., at p. 1059.

See Blacks

Having determined

Utah's tax scheme of Plaintiffs1 retirement pay to have been
unlawful and unconstitutional in the years 1985 through 1988,
this

Court

finds

the

amounts

collected

unlawfully

to

be

"overpayments" entitling Plaintiffs to refunds.
To deny Plaintiffs the opportunity of taking advantage of
the refund process which the Utah legislature has granted to
them would compound one illegal act with another.

The State of

Utah has consented to the refund of illegally collected taxes
by inviting Plaintiffs to file a claim for refund within the
three-year statute of limitations.

This Plaintiffs have done.

It certainly would be a delusion to require a
taxpayer to pay the tax, seek a review, and if he
prevails, not allow him to get it back.
The most
elemental
principles
of
justice
dictate
the
implication that if he pays the tax and follows the
procedure set out in the . . . Tax Act, and is
sustained in this contention that the tax is
unlawful, it must be refunded. (Emphasis added).
Pacific Intermountain Express Co. v. State Tax Comm'n. 316 P. 2 d
549, 552 (Utah 1957).
Plaintiffs are entitled to income tax refunds for years
1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988.
Because Utah provides a clear statutory remedy of refunds,
this Court has not reached the issue of whether refunds should
- 14 -
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be ordered as a breach of implied contract.

If, however, a

clear statutory remedy were not available, an implied contract
as found in El Rancho Enterprises v. Murray City Corp., 565
P.2d 778 (Utah 1977) would also apply here.
IV. Refund of 1988 Taxes Paid Under Protest
Plaintiffs have invoked Utah Code Ann. §59-1-301 as an
alternative remedy for the 1988 tax year.

That provision

allows a party to pay a tax under protest and then sue for a
refund in District Court.

Any action against the officer who

collected the tax paid under protest must be commenced within
six months.

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-31.

No particular form of protest is required to challenge an
unlawful tax, and the protest need not be in writing.
v. Murdock. 113 P. 330, 332 (Utah 1911).

Murdock

The essence of a

protest is notice to the tax collector that the taxpayer deems
the tax unlawful.
Following

announcement

of

the

U.S.

Supreme

Court's

decision in Davis v. Michigan. 489 U.S. 803, 109 S.Ct. 1500
(1989) on March 23, 1989, the Utah Tax Commission received
hundreds of phone calls and letters from retirees concerning
the issue.

The Tax Commission instructed federal retirees

through an April 5, 1989 press release to file amended returns
if they wished to protect

,!

any legal rights for any tax year
- 15 -
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prior to 1989."
others filed

Consequently, hundreds of retirees did so-

individual claims for refund,

filed written

protests or noted their protest on their checks. On April 17,
1989, the last day for filing 1988 returns, the representative
Plaintiffs were among more than 3,000 who filed, through class
counsel, written notices of claim and claims for refund on
behalf of themselves and "all others similarly situated11. This
Court finds these actions to be a sufficient protest for the
1988 tax year.
Plaintiffs filed their complaint herein on June 9, 1989.
This met the six month statute of limitations of Utah Code Ann.
§78-12-31, and the Court rules for Plaintiffs on this issue.
Defendants ask the Court to bar recovery to those members
of the Plaintiff class who did not personally pay their taxes
under protest. Presumably, these are primarily those taxpayers
who paid their taxes prior to the time of the Davis decision.
The Court sees no rational basis for penalizing those taxpayers
who filed early.

To do so would also ignore the law and

consistent practice of the tax commission under which all
returns "filed before the last day prescribed by statute . . .
shall be deemed to be filed on such last day". Utah Code Ann.
§59-10-536(2).

- 16 -
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This ruling will extend to all members of the Plaintiff
class.
V. Retroactivity of Davis v. Michigan
Defendants do not dispute that Utah's taxing

scheme

violated 4 U.S.C. §111 during the years 1985 through 1988.
Defendants1 principal defense is that the U.S. Supreme Court's
ruling in Davis v. Michigan cannot be applied retroactively to
any tax year prior to 1989.
In raising this argument, Defendants mistakenly assume
that prospective-only treatment of the Davis decision will
prohibit this Court from making its own independent analysis of
4 U.S.C. §111, a statute enacted in 1939.

Defendants would

give no meaning or effect to the statute for the first fifty
years of its existence because no court during that time ruled
on its application to federal retirement pay. This approach is
flawed.
the

Even without the Davis opinion, this Court would find

State's

actions

in

taxing

Plaintiffs

unlawful

and

unconstitutional.
The federal doctrine of retroactivity is best understood
as a rule of stare decisis; a rule to determine when law
changing precedent will not be applied to prior acts. American
Trucking

Association

v.

Smith,

110

S.

Ct.

2323

(1990).

Therefore, making Davis prospective-only would strip the case
- 17 -
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of any precedential value in judging earlier tax years, but it
would not end our inquiry. Neither this Court nor the State of
Utah needed Davis to reveal that federal retirement pay is "pay
or compensation for personal service as an officer or employee
of the United States11 under 4 U.S.C. §111.

Neither did Utah

have any just basis for believing in the years 1985 through
1989 that 4 U.S.C. §111 would allow it to discriminate against
federal retirees because of the source of their retirement pay.
Giving prospective-only treatment to Davis would not relieve
Utah of its duty in 1985 through 1989 to conform its taxing
practice to federal law and would not deprive Plaintiffs of
their statutory right to refunds.
But, Davis cannot be applied prospective-only.

When the

rules of federal retroactivity are properly applied, Davis must
be accorded full retroactive effect.
Defendants do not claim to have relied to their detriment
on any prior court interpretation of 4 U.S.C. §111. Neither do
they claim to have relied on their own contrary reading of
§111.

Indeed, the real surprise to the State seems to have

been the existence of §111, not its interpretation.

Reliance

on the practice of twenty-two other states, if indeed Utah did
so rely, is not the type of reliance protected by the federal
retroactivity doctrine.

No person
- 18 -

and

no government can be

excused by ignorance of the law,

even

11

widespread ignorance.

. . . [MJunicipalities, like private

responsible

for

anticipating

individuals,

developments

in

the

[are]
lav;.11

McKesson, 110 S.Ct. at 2334.
The federal doctrine of non-retroactivity is a rarely used
approach

reserved

for

unforeseen

law-changing

American Trucking, 110 S.Ct. at 2341.

decisions.

The first part of the

three-part federal test for retroactivity limits prospective
decision making to those new decisions which
establish a new principle of law, either by
overruling clear past precedent on which litigants
may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first
impression whose resolution was not clearly
foreshadowed.
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-107, (1971).
This first test, commonly called the "first prong1', is a
threshold test which, if not met, will be dispositive of the
issue.

Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Carvl . 110 S.Ct. 3202 (1990),

United States v. Johnson. 457 U.S. 537, 550 n.12 (1981).

To

qualify for prospective-only treatment, a new decision must be
so clearly unforeshadowed, so unforeseeable, that its departure
from existing law can be termed "revolutionary."

Ashland Oil

Co. v. Carvl. 110 S.Ct. 3202, 3205, (1990).
Because the clear reading of 4 U.S.C. §111 foreshadowed
the result in Davis v. Michigan, the Davis decision fails to
• 19 -
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meet the first "prong" of the Chevron test and must be applied
retroactively.
In so ruling, this Court is aware that some state courts
have called Davis a "new principle of law."

Every case in

which the United States Supreme Court accepts certiorari will
have elements of novelty, of "first impression", or newness.
This is not the test.

The issue is whether the Davis opinion

so departs from the plain meaning of 4 U.S.C. §111 that its
result was clearly unforeshadowed.

In resolving this issue,

the best authority is the U.S. Supreme Court itself, which
found its opinion in Davis to be dictated by the "plain
language of the statute", noting that the "overall meaning of
§111 is unmistakable", answering arguments identical to those
raised by Utah in this case by observing that "all precedent is
to the contrary" and refusing to depart "from this settled
rule." Davis v. Michigan, 109 S.Ct. at 1504-1507.

The final

arbiter of the retroactivity of a U.S. Supreme Court decision
is the U.S. Supreme Court.
2330.

American Trucking, 110 S.Ct at

This Court is of the firm opinion that the U.S. Supreme

Court would not view its decision in Davis as "unforeshadowed."
Any doubt on that issue should have been dispelled when the
Supreme Court refused to accept certiorari in the Missouri
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case, upholding refunds.

Hackman v. Director of Revenue, 771

S.W.2d 77 (Mo. banc 1989), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 718 (1990).
This Court has considered Utah's arguments that refunds in
this case will place a great financial burden on the state
treasury. A decision's impact on any litigant who comes before
this Court is always a concern. But, the equities between the
parties in this case, however they may lie, are not proper
considerations
retroactively.

in

deciding

whether

to

apply

Davis

As the U.S. Supreme Court has said:

Where
a State can easily
foresee the
invalidation of its tax statutes, its reliance
interests may merit little concern, see McKesson,
U.S., at
,
, 110 S.Ct. 2238 at 22542255, 2257.
American Trucking Association 110 S.Ct. at 233 3.
. . . the State's interest in financial stabilitydoes not justify a refusal to provide relief.
McKesson, 110 S.Ct. at 2257.
We reject respondent's intimation that the cost of
any refund considered by the State might justify a
decision to withhold it. . . . [A] State .
cannot object to a refund here just because it has
other ideas about how to spend the funds.
Id. at 2257, n.35.
Having

found

that

the

State

acted

unlawfully

and

unconstitutionally in taxing federal retirees, this Court is
bound as a matter of federal due process to compel the State to
issue refunds according to its plain statutory remedy.
- 21 -

In making this ruling, the Court does not find that the
State of Utah acted in bad faith or intentional disregard of
federal law when it exempted its own retirees from income tax.
Indeed, the State seems to have simply overlooked the federal
statute.

But, this Court is of the opinion that the State has

acted ignobly in refusing to pay refunds to retirees once the
As an Arizona court has said, nNo

State's mistake was known.

honorable governmental would keep taxes to which it is not
entitled, and the legislative scheme supports that result."
Pittsburgh & Midway Coal v. Dept. of Rev. . 776 P.2d 1061 (Ariz.
1989).
Partial Summary Judgment
From the foregoing facts and conclusions, the Court:
1.

Declares Utah's taxing scheme contained in §§49-1-28,

49-10-47, 49-1-608 during the years 1985 through 1988 to have
been in violation of 4 U.S.C §111 and unconstitutional in that
it

discriminated

against

Plaintiffs

and

violated

the

constitutional doctrine of the sovereign immunity of the United
States.
2.

Declares

Utah

Code

Ann.

§59-10-529

to

be

an

appropriate remedy mandating refunds to Plaintiffs for the 1985
through 1988 tax years and Utah Code Ann. §59-1-301 to be an
additional remedy for the 1988 tax year.
- 22 -

01141

3.

Orders and compels the Utah State Tax Commission to

issue refunds to all persons and estates of deceased persons
who paid Utah State income tax on retirement income from
federal sources in the years 1985, 1986, 1987 and/or 1988.
4.

Further orders the payment

of interest on all

refunds at 12% per annum in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §5910-538, 1987 as amended, with interest accruing ninety (90)
days after the due date of each return, or the date each return
was filed, whichever date is later, and continuing to a date
not more than thirty (30) days preceding the issuance of refund
checks to each member of the Plaintiff class.
5.

Further orders Defendants to pay Plaintiffs1 court

costs and attorneys' fees in amounts to be determined later.
6.

Further orders the parties to design and implement a

simplified procedure for the filing of individual returns, the
computing of refunds owed and the paying of refunds, with costs
to be paid by Defendants.
7.

Denies Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Court specifically reserves for a final decision these
issues:
1.

The timing and content of notice(s) to the Plaintiff

class concerning class members' rights and the procedure to
obtain refunds, and all matters relevant to this issue.
- 23 -
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2.

The amount of Plaintiffs' court costs and attorneys1

fees to be paid by Defendants to the class and/or to be charged
to

the

class,

and

all

matters

relevant

to

a

proper

determination of these issues.
3.

Approval

of

parties1

the

simplified

plan

and

procedure for filing individual returns, and the computing and
paying of refunds, and all matters relevant to this issue.
Because

the

Court's

reservation

of

certain

issues

necessitates a partial summary judgment at this time, the Court
specifically directs, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, the entry of final judgment on all issues
decided and not specifically reserved, there being no just
reason for delay.

AP£(C

DATED this /£^*day of

, 1991.

BY:

DAVID S .
THIRD DISTRICT} CO&tl

-
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The text of Kule Ike) contains no hint that a governmental
violation of iU preacriutioiiii gives rise to a right not to Ktancl
trial. To be sure, we held laat Term in Hank of Nova Scotia
v. United State*, 487 U. S. 250. 2li3 (1U8H), that a district
court has authority in certain circumstances to dismiss an indictment for violations of Kule 6(e). Hut as just noted, that
has nothing to do with a "right not to be tried" in the aenae
relevant here.
As for the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
that reads in relevant part as follows: "No |>ersoii shall be
held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury." U. S.
Const., Amdt. 5. That does indeed confer a right not to lie
tried (in the pertinent sense) when there is no grand jury indictment. Undoubtedly the common-law protections traditionally associated with the grand jury attach to the grand
jury required by this provision—including the requisite secrecy of grand jury proceedings. Hut that is far from saying
that every violation of those protections, like the lack of a
grand jury indictment itaelf, gives rise to a right not to be
tried. We have held that even the grand jury's violation of
the defendant's right against self incrimination does not trigger the Grand Jury Clause's "right not to be tried." Uiwn v.
United State*, 356 U. S. 339, 349 (1958). Only a defect so
fundamental that it causes the grand jury no longer to be a
grand jury, or the indictment no longer to be an indictment,
gives rise to the constitutional right not to be tried. An isolated breach of the traditional secrecy requirements does not
do so.
•

•

•

For these reasons, the Court of Ap|»eals was correct to
grant the Government's motion to dismiss the appeal, and ita
judgment is
Ajfirmed.

ft*
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DAVIS v. MICHIGAN DKI'AltTMENT OF THE
TREASURY
APPEAL FKOM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MICHIGAN
No 87-100).

Argued January «>, 1989-Decided March 2H. IUH9

In each of the yearti I97U through 1984, appellant, a Michigan resident and
former federal employee, paid slate income tax on his federal retirement
henetUa in accordance with the Michigan Income Tax Act, which exeniplM from ta nation ail retirement benefit* |»aid by the State or Us |*ohtical subdivisions, but taxes retirement benelUa paid by other employer*,
including the Federal Government. After tlie Stale denied appellanl'a
rv«|u*Hl for refund*, he tiled auil in the Michigan Court of Claima, alleging that the Stale's inconaiHleiil treatment of retirement beneftla violated t U S. C 111 I, which authorise a Slalea to tax "pay or conipensalion for personal aervicea aa I a federal | officer or employee . . . . if Hie
taxation doea not diacriminate against the . . . employee becauae of the
aource of the pay or compensation " The Court of Claima denied relief,
and the Michigan Court of Appeala affirmed, ruling that appellant la an
"annuitant" under federal law rather than an "employee" within the
meaning of 4 III, and that that aection therefore haa no application to
him. The Court of Ap|>eala alao held that the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity did not rentier the Slale'a diacrimmatory tax
at heme unconstitutional, since the diacrinuiialion waa justified under a
rational hams teat: The State a intereat in at I railing and retaining qualified employeea waa a legitimate objective which waa rationally achieved
by a retirement plan offering econouuc mducemenla.
Held
I. Section 111 applies to federal retirees auch aa appellant. The
State's contention that the section is limited to current federal employeea la refuted by the plain language of the statute's first clause. Since
the amount of civil service retirement benefits is baaed and computed
upon an individual's salary and years of service, it representa deferred
com|»enaatioii for service to the Government, and therefore conatitutes
"pay or compenaalion . . . as |a federal| employee" within the meaning of
that clause. Hie State's contention that, since this quoted language
doea not occur in the statute's second, nondiscrimination clause, that
clause applies only to current employees, ta hypertechmcal and fails to
read the nondiscrimination clause in ita context within the overall atatulory ache me. The reference to ~tk* pay or compensation" in the latter
clause must, in context, mean the same "pay or compeiuiaUon'' denned in
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the aection'a And clauae ami I HUB includeH retirement benehta. The
State'a reading of the clause ia implauadde becauae it ia unlikely that
Congreaa ronaented tu diacrimtuatory taxation of retired federal civil
aervanta' pensions while refuamg to |*ermil auch taxation of current em
ployeea, and there ia nothing in the atalutory language ur legislative lualory tu auggenl auch a reaull. Pp 808-HIO
2. Section lilt* language, purpoae, and legudative history establish
that the scope of I U nondiHcrinunation clause's grant or retention of limited tax immunity for federal employee** in coextensive with, and must be
determined by reference to, the prohibition against discriminatory taxes
embodied in the modem conatituUonai doctrine of intergovernmental lax
immunity. I V 810-814.
3. Michigan a tax scheme viola tea principles of intergovernmental tax
immunity by favoring retired alate and local government employee** over
retired federal employeea. Pp. 814-817.
(a) The State'a contention that appellant ia not entitled to claim the
protection of the immunity doctrine ia without merit. Although the doctrine ia baaed on the need to protect each aovereign'a government*! operation* from undue interference by another aovereign, thia Court's precedenta establish tlmt private entitiea or indivMluala who are subjected to
diacriminatory taxation on account of their dealing!* with a aovereign can
themaelvea receive the protection of the constitutional doctrine. See,
for example, I'htlltps Clunmcal Co. v. Dumus Independent School Uiaf-,
961 U. S 376, 387. Pp. 814-816.
(b) In determining whether the State's inconaiatent tax treatment
of federal and atale retiree a ia permissible, the relevant inquiry ia
whether the inconsistency ia directly related to and juntitled by "sigmncant differencea between the two classes." PAil/ip*. aupro. at 384-386.
Tlie State'a claimed intereal in hiring qualified civil aervanta through the
inducement of a tax exemption for retirement beneflta ia irrelevant to
thia inquiry, ainee it merely demonalratea thai the State haa a rational
reaaon for diacriimnating between two ainular groupa of retireea without demonstrating any differencea between thoae groups them*elvea.
Moreover, the State'a claim that ita retirement benHilu are significantly
leaa mumflcent than federal beneflta in temia of vesting requirements,
rate of accrual, and benefit computations ia inaufticient to juatify the
type of blanket exemption at itmue here. A tax exemption truly in
tended to account for differencea in beneflta would not diacrunmate on
the baaia of like aource of thoae lieneftta, but would, rather, discriminate
on the baaia of the amount of benellta received by individual retireea.
Pp. 816-817.
4. Hecauae the State concedes that a refund ia appropriate in theae
circunialaiicea, appellant ia enUlled to a refund tu the extent he haa paid
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taxes pursuant to the invalid Michigan acheme. However, hia additional
tiuim for pros|iective relief from diacriminatory taxation ahould be decided by the stale courts, whom- s|iecial expertise in state law pula them
in 4 better |M>HIIIOII than this Court to fashion the remedy moat appropriate to comply with the constitutional mandate of equal treatment.
Pp 817-818.
106 Mich. App. 1*8, 408 N. W. 2d 433, reveraed and remanded.
KCNNCDY. J , delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KEHNQUIST.
C

J , and

HKLNNAN, Wiin t ,

SCAMA, JJ , joined.

MAK.HIIALL, HLACKMUN, O'CONNOM,

and

SrtvtNS, J., tiled a diaaenting opinion, post, p. 818

Paul S. Davis, pro se, argued the cause and filed briefa fur
appellant.
Michael K Kellogg argued the cause for the United Statea
an amicus curiae urging re vernal. With him on the brief
were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General
Hose, Deputy Solicitor General Merrill, Uaind English Carvuick, and Steven W. Parks.
Thonuis L. Casey, Assistant Solicitor General of Michigan,
argued the cause for ap|>ellee. With him on the brief were
Frunk J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, and Richard U Hoesch and Ross H. Bishop, Assistant Attorneys General. *
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The State of Michigan exempts from taxation ail retirement benefits paid by the State or its political subdivisions,
but levies an income tax on retirement benellta paid by all
other employers, including the Federal Government. The
question presented by this case ia whether Michigan's tax
scheme violates federal law.
I
Appellant Paul S. Davis, a Michigan resident, ia a former
employee of the United Statea Government. He receives re•Joteph H Scott and Michael J. KaUtr filed a brief for the National Aaaociation of Hetired Federal Employeea aa amicus curias urging reversal.
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tirement benefits pursuant to the Civil Service Retirement
Art, 5 U. S. C. §8331 rl neq In each of the years 1979
through 1984, ap|»ellant paid Michigan .state income tax on Inn
federal retirement benefits in accordance with Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. §200.3(Kl)(f) (Supp. 1988).1 That statute defines
taxable income in a manner that excludes all retirement
benefits received from the State or its |>olitical subdivisions,
but includes most other forms of retirement benefits* The
effect of this definition is that the retirement benefits of retired state employees are exempt from state taxation while
the benefits received by retired federal employees are not.
In 1984, ap|>cllant |»etitioned for refunds of state taxes paid
on his federal retirement benefits between 1979 and 1983.
After his request was denied, appellant filed suit in the Michigan Court of Claims. Appellant's complaint, which was
amended to include the 1984 tax year, averred that his federal retirement benefits were "not legally taxable under
1
Aa a reault of a aeriea of amendmenta, this auboection haa been van
oualy detiiKnated aa (IMf), (IMg), MM! (1Kb) at tunea relevant to thia htigatton. Tlua opinion will refer only to the current atatulory designation,
|20ti30UXf)
* In pertinent part, the atatute providea:
"(I) 'Taxable income'. . . menu* adjuated groaa income aa denned in the
internal revenue code aubject to the following aujuatmenU:

"(f) Deduct to the eitent included in miiusled KTOHM income:
M
<il lietireinent or pentnon benefUa received from * |»uhlic retirement
ayatem of or created by an act of thia atate or a political imbdiviaton of that
•tale.
"(iv) Ketirement or penaion benefit* from any other retirement or pension ayatem aa folioWB
"(A) For a Hingle return, the aum of not more than I7.&00 00.
"(H) For a joint return, the aum of not more than J 10,000 00." Mich.
Comp. Lawa Ann. t a x i 30(1 Mf) (Supp. PJHM).
Kubaection (f Hiv> of thia provimon enempta a portion of otherwiae taxable
retirement benefit a from taxable income, but appellant'* retirement pay
from all nonatate aourcen exceeded the applicable exemption amount in
each of the tax yearn relevant to thia caae.
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the Michigan Income Tax Law" and that the State's inconsistent treatment of state and federal retirement benefits diner immated against federal retirees in violation of 4 U. S. C.
§111, which preserves federal employees' immunity from discriminatory state taxation. See Public Salary Tax Act of
1939, ch. 59, §4, 53 Stat. 575, codified, as amended, at 4
II. S. C. § 111. The Court of Claims, however, denied relief.
No. 84-9451 (Oct. 30, 11185), App. to Juris. Statement A10.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. 100 Mich. App.
98, 408 N. W. 2d 4:i:i (1987). The court Ikrst rejected appellant's claim that 4 U. S. C. § 111 invalidated the State's tax
on appellant's federal benefits. Noting that 6111 applies
only to federal "employees," the court determined that appellant's status under federal law was that of an "annuitant"
ntther than an employee. As a consequence, the court concluded that §111 "has no application to | Davis |, since |he|
cannot be considered an employee within the meaning of that
act." Id., at 104. 408 N. W. 2d, at 435.
The Michigan Court of Appeals next rejected ap|>ellant'a
contention that the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity rendered the State's tax treatment of federal retirement
benefits unconstitutional. Conceding that "a tax may be
held invalid . . . if it o|*erates to discriminate against the federal government and those with whom it deals," id., at 104,
408 N. W. 2d, at 430, the court examined the State's justifications for the discrimination under a rational-basis test.
Ibid. The court determined that the State's interest in "attracting and retaining . . . qualified employees" was a "legitimate state objective which is rationally achieved by a retirement plan offering economic inducements," and it upheld the
statute. Id , at 105, 408 N. W. 2d, at 430.
The Supreme Court of the State of Michigan denied ap|>ellant's application for leave to appeal. 429 Mich. 854 (1987).
We noted probable jurisdiction. 487 U. S. 1217 (1988).
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II
Appellant placea principal reliance on 4 U. S. C. § 111. In
relevant part, that section provides:
"The United States consent* to the taxation of pay or
com|>ensation for |>ersonal service as an officer or employee of the United States . . . by a duly constituted
taxing authority having jurisdiction, if the taxation does
not discriminate against the officer or employee because
of the source of the pay or compensation."
As a threshold matter, the State argues that § 111 applies
only to current employees of the Federal Government, not to
retirees such as ap|»ellant. In our view, however, the plain
language of the statute dictates the opposite conclusion.
Section HI by its terms applies to "the taxation of pay or
compensation for perianal services on an officer or employee
of the United States." (Emphasis added). While retirement pay is not actually disbursed during the time an individual is working for the Government, the amount of benefits to
be received in retirement is based and computed upon the individual's salary and years of service. 5 U. S. C. §833lKa).
We have no difficulty concluding that civil service retirement
benefits are deferred com|>ensation for past years of service
rendered to the Government. See, e. y., Zucker v. United
State*, 758 F. 2d 637, £i«J (CA Fed), cert, denied, 474 U. S.
842 (1H85); Kuan v. Webtter, 227 U. S. App. D. C. 327, 339,
707 F. 2d 624, Ki4», 0»83), cert, denied, 4<>4 U. S. 1042 (1984);
Clar* v. United States, 6U1 F. 2d 837, 842 (CA7 l'J82). And
because these benefits accrue to employees on account of
their service to the Government, they fall squarely within the
category of com|>enaatioii for services rendered "as an officer
or employee of the United States." Appellant's federal retirement benefits are deferred compensation earned "as" a
federal employee, and so are subject to § 111.1
•The S u t e •uggenU that the legittlative hinlory does not aupport thin
interpretation of I 111, pointing to atntemenU in tine Committee KeporU
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The Stale points out, however, that the reference to "compensation for personal services a* an officer or employee" occurs in the first part of § 111, which defines the extent of Con
gress' consent to state taxation, and not in the latter part of
the section, which provides that the consent does not extend
to taxes that discriminate against federal employees. Instead, the nondiscrimination clause speaks only in terms of
"discrimination| against the officer or employee because of
the source of the pay or compensation." From this the State
concludes that, whatever the scope of Congress' consent to
taxation in the first |>ortion of $111, the nondiscrimination
clau.se applies only to current federal employees.
Although the State's hypertechiiical reading of the nondiscrimination clause is not inconsistent with the language of
that provision examined in isolation, statutory language cannot be construed in a vacuum. It is a fundamental canon of
statutory construction that the words of a statute must be
read in their context and with a view to their place in the
overall statutory scheme. See United States v. Morton, 467
U. S. 822, 828 (HI84). When the first part of § 111 is read
together with the nondiscrimination clause, the operative
words of the statute are as follows: "The United States consents to the taxation of pay or compensation . . . if the taxation (Ities not discriminate . . . because of the source of the
pay or compensation." The reference to "the pay or com|M*nsalion" in the last clause of 8 111 must, iu context, mean
the same "pay or conifieiisation" defined in the first part of
the section. Since that "pay or coni|>ensation" includes retirement benefits, the nondiscrimination clause must include
them as well.
that describe the ncope of 9 111 without uaing the phnute "nervice at* an officer or employee." The UuiguuKe of the Mtatute leaves no room for tfoubt on
Hut* |HMIII, however, no ttie Stale'* Mttenipt to eulabhah a minor ineonaiatemy with the legislative history need not detain UH f^gn»lmive hitttory
iu irrelevant to the interpretation of tut uiutmhiguou* alalule. Untied Air
Lu«: Inc. v. AfcAfunn, 434 U. S. ltt£, MKHIOT).
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Any other interpretation of the nondiscrimination clause
would be implausible at beat. It is difficult to imagine that
Congress consented to discriminatory taxation of the |HII
sions of retired federal civil servant* while refusing to permit
such taxation of current employees, and nothing in the statutory language or even in the legislative history suggests this
result. While Congress could |>erhaps have used more precise language, the overall meaning of § 111 is unmistakable: it
waives whatever immunity past and present federal employees would otherwise enjoy from state taxation of salaries, retirement benefits, and other forma of com|>ensation paid on
account of their employment with the Federal (government,
except to the extent that such taxation discriminates on account of the source of the compensation.
Ill
Section 111 was enacted aa part of the Public Salary Tax
Act of 1939, the primary purpose of which was to im|>ose
federal income tax on the salaries of all state and local
government employees. Prior to adoption of the Act, salaries of most government employees, both state ami federal,
generally were thought to be exempt from taxation by another sovereign under the doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunity. This doctrine had its genesis iu McCullttch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), which held that the State of
Maryland could not impose a discriminatory tax on the Hank
of the United States. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for
the Court reasoned that the Bank was an instrumentality
of the Federal Government used to carry into effect the
Government's delegated powers, and taxation by the State
would unconstitutionally interfere with the exercise of those
powers. Id., at 42b-437.
For a time, McCulloch was read broadly to bar most taxation by one sovereign of the employees of another. See
Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, 124-128 (1871) (invalidating
federal income tax on salary of state judge); Dobbin* v. Com-

mtssioners of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435 (1842) (invalidating
state tax on federul officer). This rule "was based on the rationale that any tax on income a party received under a contract with the government was a tax on the contract and thus
a tax W the government because it burdened the government's power to enter into the contract." South Carolina v.
tiaker, 485 U. S. 605, 618 (1988).
In subsequent cases, however, the Court began to turn
away from its more expansive applications of the immunity
doctrine. Thus, in llelveruuj v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 406
(1938), the Court held that the Federal Government could
levy nondiscriminatory taxes on the incomes of most state
employees. The following year. Graves v. New York ex rel.
O'Keefe, 306 II. S. 466, 486-487 (1939), overruled the DayLMtbbins line of cases that had exempted government employees from nondiscriminatory taxation. After Graven, therefore, intergovernmental tax immunity barred only those
taxes that were iui|»oscd directly on one sovereign by the
other or that discriminated against a sovereign or thoae with
whom it dealt.
It was in the midst of this judicial revision of the immunity
doctrine that Congress decided to extend the federal income
tax to state and local government employees. The Public
Salary Tax Act was enacted after Helveruig v. Gerhardt,
supra, had upheld the imposition of federal income taxes on
state civil servants, and Congress relied on that decision aa
support for its broad assertion of federal taxing authority.
S. Hep. No. 112, 76th Cong., 1st Seas., 6-9 (1939); II. K.
Kep. No. 26, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1939). However,
the Act waa drafted, considered in Committee, and pasaed by
the House of Representatives before the announcement of
the decision in Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, supra,
which for the first time permitted state taxation of federal
employees. As a result, during most of the legislative process leading to adoption of the Act it was unclear whether
state taxation of federal employees was still barred by inter-
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governmental tax immunity despite the abrogation of utate
employees' immunity from federal taxation. See H. It. Hep.
No. 2ti, supra, at 2 ("There are certain indications in the ea.se
of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 31b* (1819), . . . that
. . . Federal officers and employeea may not, without the
consent of the United Statea, be aubjected to income taxation
under the authority of the varioua Statea").
Dissatisfied with thia uncertain atate of affairs, and concerned that conaiderationa of faimeaa demanded equal tax
treatment for atate and federal employeea, Congress decided
to enaure that federal employeea would not remain immune
from atate taxation at the aame time that atate government
employeea were being required to pay federal income taxea.
See S. Hep. No. 112, supra, at 4; H. It. Hep. No. 2fi, supra,
at 2. Accordingly, §4 of the propoaed Act (now §111)
expressly waived whatever immunity would have otherwise shielded federal employeea from nondiscriminatory atate
taxea.
liy the time the statute waa enacted, of course, the decision
in Graven had been announced, ao the constitutional immunity
doctrine no longer proscribed nondiscriminatory atate taxation of federal employeea. In effect, § 111 simply codified
the result in Graven and forecloaed the possibility that subsequent judicial reconsideration of that caae might reestablish
the broader interpretation of the immunity doctrine.
Section 111 did not waive all as|>ects of intergovernmental
tax immunity, however. The Anal clauae of the aection contains an exception for state taxes that discriminate against
federal employees on the baaia of the source of their compensation. Thia nondiscrimination clause closely parallels
the nondiscrimination component of the constitutional immunity doctrine which has, from the time of McCulloch v.
Maryland, barred taxea that "ope rati el HO aa to discriminate
against the (Government or those with whom it deals."
United Statea v. City ojDetroit, 365 U. S. 4M, 473 (I9JV8).
See also McCulloch v. Maryland, supra, at 436-437; Miller
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v. Milwaukee, 272 U. S. 713, 714-716 (1927); Helvering v.
Gerhardt, supra, at 413; Phillips Chemical Co. v. Duma* Indepetulent Schoul Ihst., 3bl U. S. 37<i, 386 (l%0); Memphis
Hank *fc Trust Co. v. Garner, 469 U. S. 392, 397, and n. 7
(1983).
In view of the similarity of language and purpose between
the constitutional principle of nondiacrinuiiation and the statutory nondiscrimination clauae, and given that S i l l was consciously drafted against the background of the Court's tax
immunity cases, it ia reasonable to conclude that Congress
drew upon the constitutional doctrine in defining the scope of
the immunity retained in §111. When Congress codifies a
judicially defined concept, it in presumed, absent an express
statement to the contrary, that Congress intended to adopt
the interpretation placed on that concept by the courts. See
Mat tan tic National Hank v. New Jersey l)ept. of Environmental l*rotectum, 474 U. S. 494, 601 (1986); MorissetU v.
United States, 342 U. S. 24(i, 2G3 (1962). Hence, we conclude that the retention of immunity in §111 is coextensive
with the prohibition against discriminatory taxes embodied in
the modern constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunity. Cf. Memphis Hank & Trust, supra, at 396-397
(construing 31 U. S. C. §742, which permits only **'nondiscriminatory'" atate taxation of interest on federal obligations, as "principally a restatement of the constitutional
rule").
On its face, § 111 purports to be nothing more than a partial
congressional consent to nondiscriminatory atate taxation of
federal employees. It can be argued, however, that by negative implication § 111 also constitutes an affirmative statutory grant of immunity from discriminatory state taxation in
addition to, and coextensive with, the pre-existing protection afforded by the constitutional doctrine. Hegardless of
whether § 111 provides an iiule|»endent basis for finding immunity or merely preserves the traditional constitutional
prohibition against discriminatory taxes, however, the in-

HM

O C T O U E H T K K M . 19BH
Opinion of t h e Court

DAVIS v. MICHIGAN DEIT. OF TKKASUKY
4H9 U. S.

<|iiiry IK the same. In either case, the sco|>e of the immunity granted ()r retained by the nondiscrimination clause is to
lie determined by reference to the constitutional doctrine.
Thus, the disfiosttive question in this case is whether the tax
ini|>osed on appellant is barred by the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity.
IV
It is undisputed that Michigan's tax system discriminates
in favor of retired state employees and against retired federal
employees. The State argues, however, that apfM'llant is
not entitled to claim the protection of the immunity doctrine,
and that in any event the State's inconsistent treatment of
Federal and State Government retirees is justified by meaningful differences between the two classes.
A
In support of its first contention, the State |»oints out that
the purpose of the immunity doctrine is to protect governments and not private entities or individuals. As a result, so
long as the challenged tax does not interfere with the Federal
Government's ability to perform its governmental functions,
the constitutional doctrine has not been violated.
It is true that intergovernmental tax immunity is based on
the need to protect each sovereign's governmental operations
from undue interference by the other. Graves, 3(M* U. S., at
481; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., at 435-4:M>. Hut it
does not follow that private entities or individuals who are
subjected to discriminatory taxation on account of their dealings with a sovereign cannot themselves receive the protection of the constitutional doctrine. Indeed, all precedent is
to the contrary. In Phillips Chemical Co., supra, for example, we considered a private corporation's claim that a state
tax discriminated against private lessees of federal land.
We concluded that the tax "discriminate!d| unconstitutionally
against the United States and its leasee/' and accordingly
held that the tax could not be exacted. 3ul U. S., at 387
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(emphasis added). See also Memphis Bank & Trust, supra;
Muxes iAike Monies, Inc. v. Grant County, 365 U. S. 744
(ItHil); Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (1871); lk»blnns v.
Commissioners of Erie County, Jti IVt. 435 (\H42). The
State offers no reasons for departing from this settled rule,
and we decline to do so.4
B
Under our precedents, M|t|he imposition of a heavier tax
burden on (those who deal with one sovereign] than in un•The dissent argues that this tax in nondiscriminatory, and thus conatilulioiutl. becaune it "(IITIWB no distinction between the federal employera or retirees ami the vast majority of voter* in the State." / W , at H£l.
In PhUltp» Chtmual Co., however, we fared that precise aituation: an
e«juai tax burden was imposed on lessees of private, tax-exempt property
and lessee* of federal property, while lessees of state property paid a
lesser tax, or in some circumstance* none mt all. Although we concluded
that "|u|nder these circumstances, there appeara to he no discrimination
hetweeu the Government's leasees and lessees of private property," 3tll
II. S , at 381, we nonetheless invalidated the States tax. This result ta
consistent with the underlying rationale for the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. The danger that a State ia engaging in impermissible discrimination against the Federal Government i* greatest when the
State acts to benefit itself and those in privily with it. As we observed ia
/'AiMips Clurtmcul Co , "it does not seem loo much to require that the
State treat those who deal with the Government aa well aa it treat* those
with whom it deals itself.** id , at 3Mb.
We also take issue with the dissent's assertion that **it is peculiarly inappropriate to focus solely on the treatment of state governmental employees" because **|t|he State may always compensate in pay or salary for what
it assesses in taxes." Pott, at M24. In order to provide the same aftertax benefits to all retired slate employees by means of increased salaries or
benefit payments instead of a lax exemption, the State would have to increase its outlays by more than the cost of the current tax exemption, since
the increased payments to retirees would result in higher federal income
tax payments in some circumstances This fact serves to illustrate the impact on the Federal Government of the State's discriminatory tax exemption for state retirees. Taxes enacted to reduce the Stale's employment
costs si the expense of the feileral treasury are the type of discriminatory
legi.ilalion that the doctrine of intergovernmental lax immunity is intended
to bar.
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|>osed on | those who deal with the other| must be justified
by significant differences between the two classes." /VulhpH Clutmical Co. v. Dumas Independent Sellout l>ist.t 3t»|
I). S., at 383. In determining whether this standard of justification has been met, it is inappropriate to rely solely on
the mode of analysis developed in our equal protection cases.
We have previously observed that Mour decisions in (the
equal protection) field are not necessarily controlling where
problems of intergovernmental tax immunity are involved,"
because "the Government'!) interests must be weighed in the
balance." Id , at 386. Instead, the relevant inquiry is
whether the inconsistent tax treatment is directly related to,
and justified by, "significant differences between the two
classes." Id., at 383-385.
The State points to two allegedly significant differences
between federal and state retirees. First, the State suggests that its interest in hiring and retaining qualified civil
servants through the inducement of a tax exemption for retirement benefits is sufttcient to justify the preferential treatment of its retired employees. This argument is wholly beside the point, however, for it does nothing to demonstrate
that there are "significant differences between the two
classes" themselves; rather, it merely demonstrates that the
State has a rational reason for discriminating between two
similar groups of retirees. The State's interest in adopting
the discriminatory tax, no matter how substantial, is simply
irrelevant to an inquiry into the nature of the two classes receiving inconsistent treatment. See id.\ at 384.
Second, the State argues that its retirement benefits are
significantly less munificent than those offered by the Federal Government, in terms of vesting requirements, rate of
accrual, and computation of benefit amounts. The substantial differences in the value of the retirement benefits paid
the two classes should, in the State's view, justify the inconsistent tax treatment.
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Fven assuming the State's estimate of the relative value of
slate and federal retirement benefits is generally correct, we
do not believe this difference suffices to justify the type of
blanket exemption at issue in this case. While the average
retired federal civil servant receives a larger pension than his
state counterpart, there are undoubtedly many individual instances in which the opposite holds true. A tax exemption
truly intended to account for differences in retirement benefits would not discriminate on the basis of the source of those
benefits, as Michigan's statute does; rather, it would discriminate on the basis of the amount of benefits received by
individual retirees. Cf. I'hilhps Chemical Co., suyra, at
384-385 (rejecting proffered rationale for State's unfavorable
tax treatment of lessees of federal pro|ierty, because an
evenhanded application of the rationale would have resulted
in inclusion of some lessees of State property in the disfavored class as well).
V
For these reasons, we conclude that the Michigan Income
Tax Act violates principles of intergovernmental tax immunity by favoring retired state and local government employees over retired federal employees. The State having conceded that a refund is appropriate in these circumstances, see
Brief for Appellee (J3, to the extent appellant has paid taxes
pursuant to this invalid tax scheme, he is entitled to a refund.
See Iowa De* Moines bank v. Bennett, 284 U. S. 239, 247
(1931).
Ap|>ellant also seeks prospective relief from discriminatory
taxation. With respect to this claim, however, we are not
in the best position to ascertain the appropriate remedy.
While invalidation of Michigan's income tax law in its entirety
obviously would eliminate the constitutional violation, the
Constitution does not require such a drastic solution. We
have recognized, in cases involving invalid classifications in
the distribution of government benefits, that the appropriate
remedy "is a mandate of equal treatment, a result that can be
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accomplished by withdrawal of benefits from the favored
class as well aa by extension of benefits to the excluded
class." Heckler v. Mathews, 406 U. S. 728, 740 (1984). See
lowa-Des Moines Hank, supra, at 247; nee also Welsh v.
United Stale*, 398 U. S. 333, 361 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).
In this caae, appellant's claim could be resolved either by
extending the tax exemption to retired federal employees (or
to all retired employees), or by eliminating the exemption for
retired state and local government employees. The latter
approach, of course, could be construed as the direct imposition of a state tax, a remedy beyond the power of a federal
court. See Moses Lake Home*, Inc. v. Grant County, 3<i6
U. S., at 762 ("Federal courta may not assess or levy taxes").
The permissibility of either approach, moreover, depends in
part on the aeverability of a portion of § 206.30(1 Kf) from the
remainder of the Michigan Income Tax Act, a question of
state law within the special expertise of the Michigan courta.
See lAmi* K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 2SS U. S. 617, 640-641
(19:13). It follows that the Michigan courts are in the best
position to determine how to comply with the mandate of
equal treatment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and the case ia remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with thia opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE STEVENS,

dissenting.

The States can tax federal employees or private parties
who do business with the United States so long as the tax
does not discriminate against the United States. South Carolina v. Haker, 486 U. S. 606, 523 (1988); United Stales v.
County of Fresno, 429 U. S. 462, 462 (1977). The Court
today strikes down a state tax that applies equally to the
vast majority of Michigan residents, including federal employees, because it treats retired state employees differently
from retired federal employees. The Court'a holding is not
supported by the rationale for the intergovernmental iinmu-
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nity doctrine and is not compiled by our previoua decisions.
1 cannot join the unjustified, court-imposed restriction on a
State's power to administer its own affairs.
The constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental immunity, Justice Frankfurter explained, 'Minds its explanation
and justification . . . in avoiding the potentialities of friction
and furthering the smooth operation of complicated governmental machinery." City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 366
U. S. 489, 604 (1968). To protect the smooth operation of
dual governments in a federal system, it was at one time
thought necessary to prohibit state taxation of the salaries
of officers and employees of the United States, Dobbins v.
Commissioners of tine County, 16 Pet. 436 (1842), aa well aa
federal taxation of the salaries of state officials. Collector
v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (1871). The Court has since forsworn
audi "wooden formalism." Washington v. United States,
400 U. S. 630, 644 (1983).
The nondiscrimination rule recognizes the fact that the Federal Government had no voice in the policy decisions made
by the several States. The Federal Government's protection
against state taxation that singles out federal agencies for
s|»ccia! burdens is therefore provided by the Supremacy
Clause of the Federal Constitution, the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity, and statutes auch aa 4 U. S. C.
§111/ When the tax burden is shared equally by federal
agenta and the vast majority of a State's citizens, however,
the nondiscrimination principle ia not applicable and constitutional protection is not necessary. Aa the Court explained in
United States v. County of Fresno:
'The legislative hiatory of 4 U. S. C. f i l l correctly describe* the purpooe of tl»e nondiscrimination principle aa "|t|o protect the Federal Government againat the unlikely pot*t*ibilily of Stale MM! local taxation of coinpenaalion of Federal oftlcent and employe** which ia Aimed ml, or threaten*
the efficient operation of, the Federal tiovenifnefit." II. It. Hep No. 2t»,
7<ith Cong., lat Seaa., 6 (1SU9); 3. Hep No. 112, 7oth Cong., lal Seaa., 12
(1U39).
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"The rule to be derived from the Court's more recent
decisions, then, it* that the economic burden on a federal function of a state tax imposed on those who (leal
with the Federal Government does not rentier the tax
unconstitutional so long as the tax is im|»osed equally on
the other similarly situated constituents of the State.
This rule returns to the original intent of M'Cullock
V. Maryland, The political check against abuse of the
taxing power found lacking in MVulloch, where the tax
was imposed solely on the liank of the United States,
is present where the State imposes a nondiscriminatory
tax only on its constituent* or their artificially owned
entities; and M'Cullock foresaw the unfairness in forcing a State to exempt private individuals with beneficial interests in federal pro|>erty from taxes im|msed
on similar interests held by others in private property.
Accordingly, M'Culloch expressly excluded from its rule
a tax on 'the interest which the citizens of Maryland may
hold | in a federal instrumentality | in common with other
property of the same description throughout the State.'
4 Wheat., at 436." 429 U. S., at 462-464.«
'The quotation in the teat omiu one footnote, but thin footnote m
relevant:
- M A Uu on the income of federal employee*, or a tax on the poaaeaaory
interest of federal employee* in lioventmeiil houaea, if imoobeti only on
them, could be eacalated by a State ao aa to destroy the federal function
performed by them either by making the Federal Government unable to
hire anyone or by caumng the Federal Government to pay prohibitively
high aalariea. Thia danger would never ariae, however, if the tax ia alao
ini|»oaed on the income and property intereata of all other reauleiila and
voter* of the State." 4&t U.S., at 463.
The ()ourt ha* repeatedly emphaaized tliat the rationale of the nondiacrimination rule ia met when there ia a political check against exceanive taxation.
See South ( aruhno v. Hukert 4Ho II. S 606, 62ti, n 16 <I!*8M) t'1T|he bent
aafeguard agauiat exceaaive taxation (ami the moat judicially iitaiiagealtle)
ia the requirement that the government tax in a nondiscriminatory fashion.
For where a government impoaea a nondiacriminatory tax, judge* can term
the tax exceaaive' only by aecond-gueaaing the extent to which the taxing
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If Michigan were to tax the income of federal employees
without mi|Mising a like tax on others, the tax would lie plainly
unconstitutional. Cf. McCuUoch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,
425-4.17 (1819). On the other hand, if the State taxes the income of all its residents equally, federal employees must pay
the tax. Graves v. New York ex ret. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466
( l & m See United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U. S., at
468 (STEVKNS, J., dissenting). The Michigan tax here applies to approximately 4'A million individual taxpayers in the
State, including the 24,000 retired federal employees. It exempts only the 130,000 reitred state employees. IV. of Oral
Arg. 35-36. Once one understands the underlying reason for
the McCuUoch holding, it is plain that this tax does not unconstitutionally discriminate against federal employees.
The Court reaches the opjiosite result only by examining
whether the tax treatment of federal employees is equal to
that of one discrete group of Michigan residents—retired
state employees. It states: "It is undisputed that Michigan's
tax system discriminates in favor of retired state employees
and against retired federal employees." Ante, at 814. But
it does not necessarily follow that such a tax "discrinunatejs)
against the (federal) officer or employee because of the
source of the pay or condensation." 4 U. S. C ft HI. The
fact that a State may elect to grant a preference, or an exemption, to a small |>ercentage of its residents does not make
the tax discriminatory in any sense that is relevant to the
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. The obligation
of a federal judge to pay the same tax that ia imfx>sed on the
government and ita people have taxed theinaelvea, and the threat of deatroyiug another government can lie realized only if the taxing government
ia willing to iin|xmc laxen that will alao denlroy itaelf or ita conaliluenla");
Washington v Untied Stale*. 4«» U. S 63<i, MM 11*83) ("A 'political check'
ia provided when a Htate tax fallu on a ttiginflcaiit group of male citizena
who can be counted upon to uae their votea to keep the Stale front nuaiiig
the tax exce.wively, and thuti placing an unfair burden ou the Federal Government- It haa been thought neceaaary becauae the United Slates duet
not have a direct voice in the alale legialature*").
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income of similarly situated citizens in the State should not be
affected by the fact that the State might choose to grant an
exemption to a few of its taxpayers —whether they be state
judges, other state employees, or perhaps a select group of
private citizens. Such an exemption might be granted "in
spite of" and not necessarily "because of" its adverse effect on
federal employees. Cf. Personnel Administrator of MastachusetU v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 2bu\ 279 (1979). Indeed, at
least 14 other States grant special tax exemptions for retirement income to state and local government employees that
they do not grant to federal employees.* As long as a state
•See A m . Rev. SUt. Ann. ||43-1022(3) and (4) (Supp. 19H8) (benefit*,
annuities, and peneiona received from the ataie retirement aystem, the
atate retirement plan, the judges' retirement fund, the puhlic safely per
annuel retirement ayatem, or a county or city retirement plan exempt in
their entirety; income received from the United Stales civil service retirement ayatem exempt only up to $2600); Colo. Rev. Stat. I I 3 9 22 104(4 Kf)
and (g) (Supp. ttMJH) (amount* received aa penaiona or aiuiuitiea from any
aource exempt up to $20,000, but amounta received from Federal Government aa retirement pay by retired member of Armed Force* less than 66
year* of age exempt only up to $2000); Ga. Code Ann 148-7 27UM4XA)
(Supp. 19HH) (income from employee*' retirement ayatem exempt); La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. 1142 646, 47:44.1 (Weat Supp. IttHD) (annuitiea. retirement allowances and benefit* paid under the atate employee retirement
ayatem exempt from atate or municipal taxation in their entirety, but oilier
annuities exempt only up to $61)00); Md. Tax-Gen. Code Ann. I l0-2O7(o)
(19HH) (ftre, rescue, or ambulance personnel length of service award funded
by any county or municipal corporation of State exempt); Mo. Rev. Slat.
1169 687 (Supp. 1UHV) (retirement allowance, benehi, funds, property, or
rights under public school retirement ayatem exempt); Mont Code Ann.
II lD-30-lll(2McHf) (1987) (benefit* under teachers retirement law, pubbe employees retirement ayatem, and highway patrol law exempt in thruentirety, beneftta under Federal Employees Retirement Act exempt only
up to $3600), N Y Tax Law |6l24oMJ) (McKinney 1987) (pensions to oftteera and employees of State, its subdivisions and agencies exempt), N. C.
Gen. Stat | | 106-14KbK 13) and (14) (Supp. 1988) (amount* received from
retirement and penaton funds established for Itremen and law enforcement
officer* exempt in their entirety, but amounta received from federal
employee-retirement program exempt only up to 14000), Ore. Rev. Stat.
||3U».obOUXc) and (d) (1987) (payment* from Public rJmployea Retire-
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income tax draws no distinction between the federal employees or retirees and the vast majority of voters in the State,
1 uee no reason for concern about the kind of "discrimination" that these provisions make. The intergovernmental
immunity doctrine simply does not constitute a moat favored
nation provision requiring the Statea to accord federal employees and federal contractors the greatest tax benefit* that
they give any other group subject to their jurisdiction.
To be sure, there is discrimination against federal employees—and all other Michigan taxpayers —if a small group of
residents is granted an exemption. If the size of the exempt
group remains the same—say, no more than 10% of the populace—the burden on federal interests also remains the same,
regardless of how the exempt class is defined. Whether it
includes schoolteachers, church employees, state judges, or
perhaps handicap|ied persons, is a matter of indifference to
the Federal Government as long as it can fairly be said that
ment Fund exempt in their entirety, but paymenta under public retirement
aystem established by United States exempt only up to $6000); S. C. ('ode
II 12-7~40bta). (d), (e) (Supp. IU68) (amounta received from state retirement systems and retirement pay received by police officers and firemen
from municipal or county retirement plana exempt in their entirety; federal
civil service retirement annuity exempt only up to $3000); Va. Code
168.1-322(C)(3) (Supp. 1!W8) (pensions or retirement income to officer* or
employees of Commonwealth, ita subdivisions and agenciea, or aurviving
e|»ouaetf of such officers or employees paid by the Commonwealth or an
agency or subdivision thereof exempt); W. Va. Code II II-2l-l2(cKb) and
(t>) (Supp. 1D88) (annuities, retirement allowances, returaa of contributiona
or any other benefit received under the public employeea retirement ayatem, the department of public safety death, disability, and retirement
fund, the atate teachers' retirement aystem, pensions and annuitiea under
any police or firemen's retirement system exempt); Wia. Stat. 171.06(1 Ma)
(Supp. IttHH-lUtft) (payments received from the employees' retirement ayatem of city of Milwaukee, Milwaukee city employees' retirement ayatem,
altertIT a retirement and benefit fund of Milwaukee, firefighters' annuity
and benefit fund of Milwaukee, the public employee trust fund, and the
atate teachers' retirement ayatem exempt).
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federal employees are treated like other ordinary resident** of
the State.
Even if it were appropriate to determine the discriminatory nature of a tax system by comparing the treatment of
federal employees with the treatment of another discrete
group of persona, it ia peculiarly inappropriate to focua aolely
on the treatment of atate governmental employees. The
State may always compensate in pay or aalary for what it
aaaesses in taxes. Thus a apecial tax imposed only on federal and state employees nonetheless may reflect the type of
disparate treatment that the intergovernmental tax immunity forbids because of the ability of the State to adjust the
compensation of its employees to avoid any special tax burden on them. United State* v. County of Fresno, 429 U . S . ,
at 4G8-4GD (STEVENS, J , dissenting). It trivializes the Supremacy Clause to interpret it as prohibiting the States from
providing through this limited tax exemption what the State
has an unquestionable right to provide through increased retirement benefits.4
Arguably, the Court's holding today is merely a logical extension of our decisions in Phillips Chemical Co, v. l>uma*
Independent School Out., 301 U. S. 376 (ItXiO), and Memphis
Bank <fc Trust Co. v. Garner, 469 U. S. 392 (1983). Even if
it were, 1 would disagree with it. Those caaea are, however,
significantly different.
•The Court aleo euggeeta that compensating state emidoyeea through
tax exemption* rather than through increaaed peuaion benefit* dtacriminatea againat federal taxpayere by reducing the penaion income uubject to
federal taxation. See anUt at 816, n 4. But retired atate employee** are
not alone in receiving a aubauly through a tax exemption. Michigan, like
moat States, provide* tax exemption* to aelect indu*triett and group**.
See, «. y , Mich. Comp Law* Ann. I&J6 64a(g) (We*t IUH6 and Supp.
ItaJH) (industrial pruceaaing). and 1206 Maip) (l!*Hb) (|N>llutton control).
Ttiet the State- chooaea to proceed by indirect aubaidy rather than direct
aubatdy, however, ahould not render the tax invalid under the Supremacy
Clauae.
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Phillips involved a tax that applied only to lessees of federal property. Article 6248 of the Texas Code imposed a tax
on lesaees of federal lands measured by the value of the fee
held by the United States. Article 7173 of the Code, the
only other provision that authorized a tax on lessees, either
granted an exemption to lessees of other public lands or
taxed them at a lower rate. Lessees of privately owned
proiierty paid no tax at all/ The company argued that "because Article 6248 applies only to private users of federal
property, it is invalid for that reason, without more." 361
U. S., at 382. The Court rejected that argument, reasoning
that it was "necessary to determine how other taxpayers similarly situated are treated." Id., at 383. it then defined the
relevant classes of "similarly situated" taxpayers as the federal lessees who were taxed under Article 6248 and the lessees of other public property taxed under Article 7173.
Within that narrow focus, the Court rejected the school district's argument that the discrimination between the two
classes could be justified. Because the Court confined its
analysis to the two state taxes that applied to lesaees of public property, its reasoning would be controlling in the case before us today if Michigan's income tax applied only to public
employees; on that hypothesis, if state employees were exempted, the tax would obviously discriminate against federal
employees.
The troublesome aspect of the Court's opimon in Phillips is
its failure to attach any significance to the fact that the tax on
private landlords presumably imposed an indirect burden on
• "Although Article 7173 ia, in term*, applicable to all leaaeea who hold
tai-exempt property under a leaae for a term of three yearn or more, it
appear* that only leasee* of public property fall within tin* claaa in Texaa.
Tax exemption* for real property owned by private organization* — charitiett, churrhea, and auiular entitle*—do not aurvive a leaae to a buetnee*
leaaee. Hie full value of the leaned property become* taxable to the
owner, and the leaaee* indirect burden coneequeiitly u» aa heavy aa the
burden impueed directly on federal leaaeea by Article itZib." 361 U. S , at
asO-381 (empheaut in original, footnote omitted).
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their leasees that was aa heavy aa the direct burden on federal leaaeea imposed by Article 5248. The Court did note
that M|u)nder theae circumatances, there appears to be no discrimination between the Government's lessees and lessees of
private property/' Id., at 381. But—possibly because of
the School District's rather unwise reliance on an eo,ual protection analysis of the case*—the Court never even considered the question whether the political check provided by
private property owners was suflicient to save that tax from
the claim that it singled out federal leasees for an unconstitutional tax burden.'
In Memphis Bank <& Trust Co., the question presented
was the lawfulness of a Tennessee tax on the net earnings of
• T h e School Diatrict addreaaea thin problem, eaeentially, aa one of
equal protection, and argue* that we moat uohold the claaaiflcation, though
apparently diacriminatory, 'if any atate of facta reaaonabiy can be conceived that would auaUun it.' Allied Stores v. Bower; 368 U. S. 622,
628." /«*., at 383.
1
An interesting feature of the Pkillipe opinion ia ita reference to the
fact thai the tax upheld in United State* v. City of Iklnnt, 366 U. S. 4u6
(ItiuM), had actually included an exemption for achool-owned property —and
therefore diacriminated "againat** federal property in the Maine way the tax
involved in thia caae diacriminatee "againat" federal employeea.
"This argument miaconceivea the acope of the Michigan deciaiona. In
thoae caaea we did not decide —in fact, we were not aaked to decide —
whether the exemption of achool-owned property rendered the atatute diacriminatory. Neither the Government nor ita leaaeea, to whom the atatule waa applicable, claimed diacrimination of thia character."
Phillips
Chemical Co. v. Uumae Independent School Utst, 361 U. S , at 386.
The Court'a deacription of the relevant claaa of property aubject to tax in
the Detroit caae obvioualy would have provided the aame political check
againat diacrimination regardleaa of how the achool property might have
been claaained. In iMtnnt, Juatice Black deacribed that claaa aa followa:
"But here the tax apphee to every private party who uaea exempt property
in Michigan in connection with a bueineae conducted for private gain.
Under Michigan law thia meane pereona who uae property owned by the
Federal Government, the State, ita political aubdiviaiona, churchea, charitable orgamxationa and a great hoat of other entitle* The claaa denned ia
not an arbitrary or invidioualy diacriminatory one." 366 U. S., at 473.
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banks doing business in the State that defined net earnings to
"include interest received by the bank on the obligations of
the United States and its instrumentalities, as well as interest on bonds and other obligations of States other than Tennessee, but | to| exclude interest on obligations of Tennessee
and its political subdivisions." 459 If. S , at 394. Although
the federal obligations were part of a large class and the tax
therefore did not discriminate only against the income derived from a federal source, all other members of the disfavored class were also unrepresented in the Tennessee Legislature. There wan, therefore, no political check to protect
the out-of-state issuers, including the federal instrumentalities, from precisely the same kind of discrimination involved
in McCulloch v. Maryland. Indeed, in the McCalloch case
itself, the taxing statute did not, in terms, single out the
National Bank for disfavored treatment; the tax was im|>osed
on "all Hanks, or branches thereof, in the State of Maryland,
not clmrtered by Uie legislature" 4 Wheat., at 317-318. A
tax that discriminates against a class of nonresidents, including federal instrumentalities, clearly is not protected by the
political check that saved the state taxes in cases like United
States v. County of Fresno, 429 U. S. 462 (1977), and City of
Uetnnt v. Murray Corp., 355 U. S. 489 (1968).
When the Court rejected the claim that a federal employee's income is immune from state taxation in Graves v. New
York ex ret. OKeefe, 306 U. S. 466 (1939), Justice Frankfurter wrote separately to explain how a "seductive cliche"
had infected the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity,
which had been "moving in the realm of what Lincoln called
'pernicious abstractions."' He correctly noted that only a
M
web of unreality" could explain how the M|f lailure to exempt public functionaries from the universal duties of citizenship to pay for the costs of government was hypothetically
transmuted into hostile action of one government against the
other." Id., at 489-490.
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Today, it ia not the jjreat Chief Juatice'a dictum about how
the power to tax include** the power to deatroy that obacurea
the iaaue in a web of unreality; it ia the virtually automatic
rejection of anything that can be labeled "discriminatory."
The question in thia case deaervea more careful consideration
than ia provided by the mere use of that label. It should be
anawered by considering whether the ratio decidendi of our
holding in McCutloch v. Maryland is applicable to this quite
different caae. It ia not. I, therefore, respectfully diaaent.
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Appellant, who refused a temporary retail position because the job would
have required him to work on Sunday in violation of hia peraoiial religious beliefs, applied for, and wan demed, unemployment compenaation
benefits. The denial wan aflirined by an administrative review board,
an lllinoia Circuit Court, and the State Appellate Court, which found
that since ap|>ellant waa not a member of an established religious aect or
church and did not claim that his refusal to work resulted from a tenet,
belief, or teaching of an established religious body, hia peraonal professed religious belief, although unquestionably sincere, waa not good
cause for hia refusal to work on Sun*lay.
Held The denial of unemployment compenaation benefits to appellant
on the ground that his refusal to work waa not baaed on teneta or dogma
of an established religious sect violated the Free E&erciae Clause of
the First Amendment as applied to the Slates through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Sherbrrt v Writer, 374 U. S. 398. TAomoa v. Hevtew lid.
oj I minimi Employment Security iMv , 460 U. S. 707, and HoMne v. Unemployment Appeal* Comm'n of Florida, 480 U. S. 136, rested on the
fact that each of the claimants had a sincere belief that religion required
him or her to refrain from the work in question, not on the consideration
that each of them was a member of a |»articular religious aect or on any
tenet of the sect forbidding such work. While membership in a aect
would simplify the problem ol identifying sincerely held beliefs, the notion that one must be responding to the commands of a particular religious organization to claim the protection of the Free Eiercise Clause ia
rejected. Tlie sincerity or religious nature of appellant's belief waa not
questioned by the courts below and was conceded by the State, which
offered no justification for the burden that the denial of benefit* placed
ou ap|»ellaiit a right to e&erciae his religion. The fact that Sunday work
has Income a way of life does not constitute a slate interest sufficiently
compiling to override a legitimate free-eterciae claim, aince there ia no
evidence that there will be a mass movement away from Sunday employment if appellant succeeda on his claim. Pp. 832-836.
169 111 App. 3d 474, 612 N. E. 2d 789, reversed and remanded.

APPENDIX 7

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Code Ann. S 59-1-301 (Supp. 1989):
In all cases of levy of taxes, licenses, or
other demands for public revenue which is
deemed unlawful by the party whose property is
taxed, or from whom the tax or license is
demanded or enforced, that party may pay under
protest the tax or license, or any part deemed
unlawful, to the officers designated and
authorized by law to collect the tax or
license; and then the party so paying or a
legal representative may bring an action in
the tax division of the appropriate district
court against the officer to whom the tax or
license was paid, or against the state,
county, municipality, or other taxing entity
on whose behalf it was collected, to recover
the tax or license or any portion of the tax
or license paid under protest.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31 (1987):
Within six months:
an action against an officer, or an officer de facto:
(1) to recover any goods, wares, merchandise or other
property seized by any such officer in his official
capacity as tax collector, or to recover the price
or value of any goods, wares, merchandise or other
personal property so seized, or for damages for the
seizure, detention, sale of, or injury to, any
goods, wares, merchandise or any other personal
property seized, or for damages done to any person
or property in making any such seizure.
(2) for money paid to any such officer under
protest, or seized by such officer in his
official capacity, as a collector of
taxes, and which, it is claimed, ought to
be refunded.
Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-504(2):
Copies of the proposed findings, judgments,
and orders shall be served upon opposing
counsel before being presented to the court
for signature unless the court otherwise
orders.
Notice of objections shall be
submitted to the court and counsel within five
days after service.

Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1):
To whom awarded.
Except when expressed provision
therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in
these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs;
provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding is
taken, costs of the action, other than costs in
connection with such appeal or other proceeding for
review, shall abide the final determination of the cause.
Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and
agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by
law.
Utah R. Civ. P. 52:
(a) Effect.
In all actions tried upon the
facts without a jury or with an advisory jury,
the court shall find the facts specially and
state separately its conclusions of law
thereon, and judgment shall be entered
pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing
interlocutory injunctions the court shall
similarly set forth the findings of fact and
conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. . . .
Utah Code Ann. S 59-1-704 (1987):
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Parts 5,
6, and 7 of Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, 6, 7, 10,
and 12 and the rules promulgated thereunder,
no suit for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax, penalty,
or interest imposed under Chapter 1, 2, 6, 7,
10, or 12 may be maintained in any court by
any person, whether or not such person is the
person against whom such tax was assessed.
(2) No suit may be maintained in any court for
the purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of the amount of the state tax
liability, of a transferee or of a fiduciary
of property of a taxpayer.

Utah Code Ann. S 78-27-56(1) (Supp. 1991 and 1987):
In civil actions, the court shall award
reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing
party if the court determines that the action
or defense to the action was without merit and
not brought or asserted in good faith.
4 U.S.C. § 111:
The United States consents to the taxation of pay or
compensation for personal service as an officer or
employee of the United States . . . by a duly constituted
taxing authority having jurisdiction, if the taxation
does not discriminate against the officer or employee
because of the source of the pay or compensation.

